U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan and Pakistan - Apr 1, 2009

Transcript Text

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 00:00:16
    12 minutes

    Good morning, everybody. The committee receives
    testimony this morning on the new strategy for Afghanistan and
    Pakistan announced by President Obama last Friday.
    Our witnesses this morning each have contributed to developing
    that strategy. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy,
    who will be with us in a few minutes, was one of three administration
    officials who led the interagency panel that examined U.S. policy
    towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their review drew on and benefited
    from a number of earlier policy reviews, including one by U.S. Central
    Command led by CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus, who also
    joins us this morning. And we have with us Admiral Eric Olson,
    commander, Special Operations Command.
    Ms. Flournoy, General Petraeus and Admiral Olson will play a
    central role in implementing the president's new strategy for
    Afghanistan and Pakistan, and our thanks go to each of them for their
    service and for their being with us this morning.
    In behalf of the committee, please thank the soldiers, sailors,
    airmen and Marines serving in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
    America owes them a debt of gratitude for their willingness to serve
    in harm's way and for the sacrifices which they and their families
    make on a daily basis. General and Admiral, I hope that you will pass
    along that appreciation to the troops.
    The president's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the
    right track. The American people recognize that Afghanistan is the
    place where al Qaeda laid the plans for the attacks of September 11th
    on our homeland and where the training took place for those attacks.
    We must do all we can to make sure that this region never again
    provides a safe haven or a training ground for extremists plotting the
    next attack.
    In formulating this new strategy, the administration has
    consulted closely with our Afghanistan and Pakistan partners.
    Pakistan President Zardari has called the administration's new
    approach a positive change. Afghan President Karzai has welcomed the
    administration's plan, saying it is, quote, "what the Afghan people
    were hoping for."
    This support and buy-in is important, because ultimately it will
    be the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan who will be the ones who
    decide to reject and defeat the hopeless future that al Qaeda and the
    Taliban offer them and the world. I very much support the president's
    commitment to greatly accelerate the expansion of the Afghan National
    Army and the Afghan National Police. It is important to build up the
    Afghan security forces far more quickly than has been the case up till
    now so Afghanistan can provide for its own security.
    As Afghan Defense Minister Wardak told me, Afghan soldiers want
    to provide for their country's security, and our commanders say that
    Afghan soldiers have the will to fight and are respected throughout
    Afghanistan, and the Afghan army has the recruits to build their
    forces.
    For too long, as Admiral Mullen said some months ago, in Iraq we
    do what we must, while in Afghanistan we only do what we can. With
    the new strategy, this will no longer be the case.
    This committee has heard from witnesses over the last few weeks
    that the expansion of the Afghan army has been slowed by a lack of
    training teams to work with Afghan units and delays in getting the
    basic equipment that Afghan units need to train and to fight.
    The president's decision to deploy an additional brigade of 4,000
    soldiers with the almost exclusive mission of training the Afghan
    security forces is a major step in the right direction to moving more
    quickly to building up the Afghan army. By helping the Afghan forces
    as they take the lead in the fight, we avoid the perception that we
    are occupiers. Instead we'll be supporting them in their struggle for
    a better future for their country.
    I also welcome President Obama's decision to match this increase
    in military forces with an increase in our civilian resources in
    Afghanistan. The fielding of up to 500 additional civilian experts
    from the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development,
    Agriculture, Justice and other civilian government agencies will bring
    all instruments of U.S. power to the task of ensuring that Afghanistan
    doesn't serve again as a safe haven for terrorists.
    A large majority of these civilians will be posted at provincial
    reconstruction teams and elsewhere in the countryside to promote
    economic development and good governance at the provincial and
    district levels. We need to support programs that empower Afghan
    communities to set their own priorities and to take ownership of local
    development projects.
    I hope our witnesses will comment on the Afghan National
    Solidarity Program. The National Solidarity Program has funded
    thousands of small development projects in nearly every corner of
    Afghanistan by providing modest grants of money directly to locally
    elected community development councils which plan, implement and
    oversee development projects that they decide are the most beneficial
    for their local communities.
    The decision to establish benchmarks and metrics to assess
    progress towards meeting our objectives is a wise one. Some
    indicators of security, such as the number of violent incidents,
    roadside bombs and suicide attacks, have gotten worse in 2008. At the
    same time, the special representative of the U.N. secretary general
    recently told the Security Council that he is beginning to see
    positive trends emerging in Afghanistan, in government competence, in
    police reform, private-sector development and counternarcotics.
    CENTCOM data on Defense Department-funded reconstruction efforts
    indicate that since October of 2005, the Defense Department has
    constructed 96 schools and other education centers throughout
    Afghanistan. And roughly 6.2 million students were enrolled last
    year, up from 800,000 students in 2001.
    Since January of 2007, the Defense Department has completed
    almost 200 health care construction projects, funded almost 300 water
    and sanitation projects, and funded 115 electricity-related projects,
    including micro-hydro and other generators and solar lighting systems.
    We need metrics and we need benchmarks to measure progress to
    report to the American people and, importantly, to hold people
    accountable. And it's about time NATO establishes some benchmarks for
    itself. Thus far NATO's performance has been woefully inadequate
    except for some very notable exceptions of some countries.
    It is long past time for our NATO allies, friends and other
    stakeholders in the region to step up and do their part. Our NATO
    allies need to provide the troops, equipment and trainers that they
    agreed to provide for the NATO mission in Afghanistan and eliminate
    national caveats on the use of these forces.
    Those who can't provide military resources should contribute
    financially to Afghanistan's economic development or to help build the
    Afghan security forces, for example, through fully funding the NATO-
    Afghan Army Trust Fund. So far, the commitment to provide a billion
    Euros to that fund has fallen short by 90 percent. In addition,
    countries can share their civilian expertise to promote good
    governance and the rule of law.
    I welcome President Obama's commitment to robustly fund the
    special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction to prevent
    waste and fraud in reconstruction programs.
    Relative to Pakistan, the United States should assist Pakistan in
    confronting terrorists within its borders and in building its
    democratic and economic institutions. Over the weekend, President
    Zardari stated that the conflict in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border
    region was Pakistan's fight, not America's. He said Pakistanis,
    quote, "are fighting militancy and extremism for our own sake." I
    sincerely hope that that is the case.
    Pakistani leaders at all levels should need no convincing from us
    that extremist groups pose the greatest threat to Pakistan's survival.
    If Pakistan's goals are attacking militants and extremists for the
    sake of their own stability and the benefit of the Pakistani people,
    then we can and should support their goals. But we can't buy
    Pakistan's support for our goals rather than supporting their goals.
    And if we are perceived as trying to do that, it'll send the wrong
    message to the Pakistani people and to the extremists, who will use it
    against the Pakistan leadership and against our interests.
    Finally, I do not agree with statements by some in the
    administration that we cannot make progress in Pakistan without
    success -- excuse me -- I do not agree with statements by some in the
    administration that we cannot make progress in Afghanistan without
    success on the Pakistan side of the border. We should not tie
    Afghanistan's future totally to the success of efforts in Pakistan or
    to Pakistan's governmental decisions.
    Obviously progress in Afghanistan is impeded by the failure of
    Pakistan to stop the flow of violent extremists into Afghanistan. But
    I remain skeptical that Pakistan has either the will or the capability
    to secure their border, particularly between Baluchistan and southern
    Afghanistan. U.S. Brigadier General John Nicholson in Regional
    Command South said that that stretch of border is, quote, "wide open"
    for Afghan Taliban fighters streaming across to attack U.S. and NATO
    forces.
    Pakistan leaders have failed to date to take on the Afghan
    Taliban in Baluchistan, whose leadership, or shura, meets openly in
    the city of Quetta, and from there commands attacks into Afghanistan.
    And news articles reported last week that operatives in one wing of
    Pakistan's Intelligence Service have been providing direct support in
    terms of money, military supplies and strategic planning guidance to
    the Taliban's campaign in southern Afghanistan. I hope our witnesses
    will address those news reports.
    But even though obviously far more difficult unless Pakistan
    stops the flow of violent extremists coming across the border, an
    expanding Afghan army, with our help, can make progress in providing
    for Afghan security, including at the border.
    The road ahead is going to be long and costly. I believe we now
    have the right strategy. We all look forward to hearing from our
    witnesses about the challenges that lie ahead in implementing the
    administration's new approach.
    Senator McCain is going to join us a little bit later and will
    have an opening statement at that time.
    So let me start with our witnesses. We welcome you, Secretary
    Flournoy. We know that you were very necessarily detained, as a
    matter of fact, at another very important function, and you have your
    priorities exactly right. And you might just spend a few moments, if
    you would, telling us why you're late, because I know you're very
    proud of the fact.

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 00:12:22
    26 seconds

    Sir, thank you very much for allowing me to do
    this. My husband is next-door as the administration's nominee to be
    deputy secretary of the Veterans Administration, and I wanted to be
    there at least for his introduction to that committee and to show my
    support for him.
    But, I also didn't want to let you all down and fail to appear,
    so I appreciate you being -- letting me be 15 minutes late so I could
    join you as well.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 00:12:48
    1 minute

    Well, we thank you for getting here. We know how
    proud you are of your husband.
    Let me now, since a quorum is present, interrupt the flow of the
    hearing to ask the committee to consider three civilian nominations,
    and a list of 3,952 pending military nominations.
    First, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of Ashton
    Carter to be under secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
    and Logistics. Is there a motion to favorably report Dr. Carter's
    nomination to the Senate?
    RESPONSE: So moved.
    Is there a second?
    RESPONSE: Second.
    All in favor, say aye.
    RESPONSE: Aye.
    Opposed, nay?
    (No nays are heard.)
    The motion carries.
    Second, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of Dr.
    James Miller, Jr. to be deputy under secretary of Defense for Policy.
    Is there a motion to favorably report Dr. Miller's nomination?
    RESPONSE: So moved.
    Is there a second?
    RESPONSE: Second.
    All in favor, say aye.
    RESPONSE: Aye.
    Opposed, nay?
    (No nays are heard.)
    The motion carries.
    Next, I ask the committee to consider the nomination
    of Ambassador Alexander Verhsbow be assistant secretary of Defense for
    International Security Affairs. Is there a motion to report?
    RESPONSE: So moved.
    Is there a second?
    RESPONSE: Second.
    All in favor, say aye.
    RESPONSE: Aye.
    Any nays?
    (No nays are heard.)
    The motion carries.
    Finally, I ask the committee to consider a list of
    3,952 pending military nominations. Of these nominations, 289 are one
    day short of our seven-day requirement.
    However, we've checked and there's no objection that has been
    raised to these nominations because of that technical shortfall, and I
    recommend to the committee that we waive the seven-day rule in order
    to permit the confirmation of the nominations of these 289 officers
    prior to the coming recess.
    Is there a motion to favorably report the 3,952 nominations?
    RESPONSE: So moved.
    Is there a second?
    RESPONSE: (inaudible).
    All in favor, say aye.
    RESPONSE: Aye.
    Any nays?
    (No nays are heard.)
    The motion carries.
    And now we will, I think, start with you, Madame Secretary.

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 00:14:42
    4 seconds

    Thank you very much, sir, and thank you to the
    committee for taking the --

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 00:14:46
    20 seconds

    Let me interrupt you one more time.
    Let me remind everybody, since we do have a good attendance here,
    that we will mark up a bill tomorrow, which is a very significant
    bill, Senate Bill 454, which is the Acquisition Reform Act. We're
    going to be marking this bill up and we need good attendance for that.
    It'll be at 9:00 in this room.
    Madame Secretary.

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 00:15:06
    9 minutes

    Well, let me add my word of thanks to you for
    taking the time to have those committee votes. I know that Secretary
    Gates is very much looking forward to having some of his team arrive
    to help him.
    Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, members of the committee, thank you
    very much for asking me and giving me the opportunity to testify
    before you today on the Obama administration's new strategy for
    Afghanistan and Pakistan. As the president stated last Friday, I
    think, very eloquently, we have a very clear goal.
    This strategy went -- really went back to first principles about
    our interests and our objectives. And we clarified our goal in this
    region as disrupting, dismantling and defeating al-Qaeda and its
    extremist allies. And to do so, we must eliminate their safe haven in
    Pakistan and ensure that such a safe haven does not return to
    Afghanistan.
    Preventing future terrorist threats on the American people and on
    our allies is absolutely vital to our national interests. We have
    learned in the past, at too high a price, the danger of allowing al-
    Qaeda and its extremist supporters to have safe havens and access to
    resources to plan their attacks. This is why we have troops in
    Afghanistan and why we are going to heavily engage and intensify our
    efforts in Pakistan.
    To achieve our goals, we need a smarter and more comprehensive
    strategy, one that uses all the instruments of our national power and
    those of our allies. We need to devote the necessary resources to
    implement it. A critical aspect of this new strategy is the
    recognition that Afghanistan and Pakistan, while two countries, are a
    single theater for our diplomacy. Al-Qaeda and its extremist allies
    have moved across the border into Pakistan where they are planning
    attacks and supporting operations that undermine the stability of both
    countries.
    Special Representative Holbrooke will lead a number of bilateral
    and trilateral and region diplomatic efforts. And from the Defense
    side, we will be working to build the counterterrorism and
    counterinsurgent capabilities of both -- counterinsurgency
    capabilities of both countries so that they can more effectively
    combat terrorists and insurgents.
    Pakistan's ability to dismantle the safe havens on its territory
    and defeat the terror and insurgent networks within its borders are
    absolutely critical to the security and stability of that nuclear
    armed state. It is in America's long-term interests to support
    Pakistan's restored democracy by investing in its people and in their
    economic wellbeing. We seek a strategic partnership with Pakistan
    that will encourage and enable it to shift its focus from conventional
    war preparations to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
    preparations.
    And so we will be urging the Congress to support a forthcoming
    proposal, such as the Kerry-Lugar legislation that will authorize
    civilian and economic assistance, and the Pakistani -- as well as the
    Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, to develop a more
    effective military that can defeat insurgent networks. This support,
    both military and economic, will be limited if we do not see
    improvements in Pakistani performance.
    We must also develop a lasting partnership with Afghanistan.
    Like Pakistan, Afghanistan suffers from severe socio-economic crises
    that exacerbates its own political situation. These are the root
    causes of the insurgency that al-Qaeda and the Taliban are seeking to
    exploit. Building Afghan capacity to address these causes, while
    simultaneously taking the fight to the enemy, are important components
    of our efforts, going forward.
    So, the U.S., along with our Afghan partners, our international
    allies, is fully committed to resourcing an integrated
    counterinsurgency strategy. This strategy aims to do several things:
    First, to reverse Taliban gains and secure the population, the
    heart of counterinsurgency in the troubled south and east of the
    country.
    Second, to build to capacity of the Afghan national security
    forces, both the army and the police, to be able to take -- eventually
    to take the lead in providing the security for the population and the
    country. Building the ANSF should enable us, over time, to transition
    from an ISAF-led effort to an Afghan-led counterinsurgency effort. To
    do so, we have to meet the requirements of our commanders on the
    ground, particularly for trainers, and the deployment that the
    president announced, of an additional 4,000 troops focused as
    trainers, will be the first time that this critical need has been
    addressed or fully met in several years.
    But, beyond the strength in military mission, we will intensify
    our civilian assistance and our efforts to better integrate that
    assistance to promote more effective governance and development.
    Working with the U.N. and our allies, we will seek to improve
    coordination and coherence in these efforts in support of Afghan
    development priorities.
    Ensuring a free, and fair and secure election will also be an
    immediate and consequential task. We will also complement efforts at
    -- assistance at the national level focused on building capacities in
    the ministries with a much more bottom-up set of initiatives designed
    to build capacity at the district and provincial levels where most
    Afghans have their direct experience with Afghan institutions and
    government.
    Combating corruption will reinforce efforts to strengthen these
    institutions and these methods will address the root -- we hope, the
    root causes of the insurgency, build accountability, and ultimately
    give the Afghan people more reason to support their government.
    Defeating the insurgency will also require breaking links with the
    narcotics industry. We will work very hard to build more effective
    Afghan law enforcement, develop alternative livelihoods to deny the
    insurgency lucrative sources of funding, and reform the agricultural
    sector on which so much of the Afghan population depends.
    As we regain the initiative in Afghanistan, we will support an
    Afghan-led reconciliation process that's designed to bring -- to
    essentially flip the foot soldiers, to bring low and mid-level leaders
    to the side of the government. If this process is successful, the
    senior leaders, the irreconcilables, should be more easily isolated
    and we should be better able to target them.
    Our men and women in uniform and our allies have fought for --
    fought bravely for several years now in Afghanistan. Nearly 700 of or
    soldiers and Marines have made the ultimate sacrifice and now over
    2,500 have been wounded. We believe that the best way to honor them
    is to improve our strategy and to commit the necessary resources to
    bring this war to a successful conclusion. And I would urge all of
    you on this key committee to provide your full support.
    The strategy aims not to solve the problem with the U.S. and the
    international community alone, but more importantly to build a bridge
    to Afghan self reliance even as our forces transition out of
    responsibility -- transition their responsibility to our Afghan
    partners. We will want to be continuing to help Afghanistan with
    security and economic assistance to build their nation over time, and
    I would argue that our vital interests demand no less.
    Although we do not -- have not finalized or budget request for
    the '09 supplemental or for the '10 base budget, I can just tell you
    that we will be coming back to you to ask for your assistance in
    several areas: certainly, funding our additional troop deployments,
    accelerating the growth of the ANSF, continuing to support
    counternarcotics funding, increasing the CERP funding available to our
    commanders, and continuing humanitarian assistance support in
    Afghanistan.
    In Pakistan, we will be coming to discuss with you in more detail
    the Security Development Plan, which will include funding for Pakistan
    Counterinsurgency Capability's funds, counternarcotics funding,
    continued Coalition support funds, 1206, et cetera.
    So this is the beginning of our work together, and while I don't
    have budgetary details today, we will definitely be coming back to you
    to work with you to provide the necessary resources for this strategy.
    I would also encourage you to urge your counterparts on other
    committees to support the civilian aspects of this strategy which will
    be critical to its success.
    Let me just conclude by saying we understand that this cannot be
    an American only effort. Defeating al Qaeda and its extremists allies
    is a goal and a responsibility for the international community. You
    will be seeing not only the president but others in the administration
    engaging our allies as we already have been doing in the Hague now and
    in the coming days at the NATO summit, at future donor's conferences
    to make sure that our allies are alongside with us, putting on the
    table what they can provide to make this effort successful. We
    believe that keeping the American homeland and the American people
    safe is the bottom line goal of this effort and this is a challenge
    that we all must meet together.
    Thank you very much for letting me have the opportunity to
    testify this morning.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 00:24:49
    2 seconds

    Thank you, Madame Secretary. General Petraeus.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 00:24:51

    Mr. Chairman --

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 00:24:51
    3 seconds

    You need your mic -- yeah.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 00:24:54
    13 minutes

    Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the
    committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide an update on the
    situation in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility and to
    discuss the way ahead in Afghanistan and Pakistan together with
    Undersecretary Flournoy and the commander of the Special Operations
    Forces that are so critical to all that we do in our area of
    responsibility, Admiral Eric Olson.
    As Undersecretary Flournoy noted in her statement and as
    President Obama explained this past Friday, the United States has
    vital national interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These countries
    contain the most pressing transnational extremists threats in the
    world, and in view of that, they pose the most urgent problem set in
    the Central Command area of responsibility. Disrupting and ultimately
    defeating al Qaeda and the other extremist elements in Pakistan and
    Afghanistan and reversing the downward security spiral seen in key
    parts of these countries will require sustained substantial
    commitment. The strategy described last Friday constitutes such
    commitment.
    Although the additional resources will be applied in different
    ways on either side of the Durand Line, Afghanistan and Pakistan
    comprise a single theater that requires comprehensive whole of
    governments' approaches that are closely coordinated. To achieve that
    level of coordination, Ambassador Holbrook and I will work closely
    with our ambassadors and our counterparts from other countries and the
    host nations.
    This morning I'll briefly discuss the military aspects of the new
    strategy, noting however, that while additional military forces
    clearly are necessary in Afghanistan, they will not by themselves be
    sufficient to achieve our objectives. It is important that the
    civilian requirements for Afghanistan and Pakistan be fully met as
    well. To that end, it is essential that the respective departments,
    State and USAID foremost among them, be provided the resources
    necessary to implement the strategy. And I agree with you, Mr.
    Chairman, on the value of the Afghan National Security Program as
    well.
    Achieving our objectives in Afghanistan requires a comprehensive
    counterinsurgency approach, and that is what General David McKiernan
    and ISAF are endeavoring to execute with the additional resources
    being committed. The additional forces will provided an increase
    capability to secure and serve the people, to pursue the extremists,
    to support the development of host nation security forces, to reduce
    the illegal narcotics industry, and to help develop the Afghan
    capabilities needed to increase the legitimacy of national and local
    Afghan governance.
    These forces will also, together with the additional NATO
    elements committed to the election security force, work with Afghan
    elements to help secure the national elections in late August and to
    help ensure that those elections are seen as free, fair and legitimate
    in the eyes of the Afghan people.
    As was the case in Iraq, the additional forces will only be of
    value if they are employed properly. It is vital that they be seen as
    good guests and partners, not as would-be conquerors or superiors, as
    formidable warriors who also do all possible to avoid civilian
    casualties in the course of combat operations. As additional elements
    deploy, we'll also be essential that our commanders and elements
    strive for unity of effort at all levels and integrate our security
    efforts into the broader plans to promote Afghan political and
    economic development.
    We recognize the sacrifices of the Afghan people over the past
    decades, and we will continue working with our Afghan partners to help
    them earn the trust of the people and with security to provide them
    with new opportunities.
    These concepts and others are captured in the counterinsurgency
    guidance recently issued by General McKiernan. I commend his guidance
    to the committee and have provided a copy for you with my opening
    statement.
    The situation in Pakistan is of course closely linked to that in
    Afghanistan. Although there has been progress in some areas as
    Pakistan's newly established democracy has evolved, significant
    security challenges have also emerged. The extremists that have
    established sanctuaries in the rugged border areas not only contribute
    to the deterioration of security in eastern southern Afghanistan, they
    also pose an evermore serious threat to Pakistan's very existence. In
    addition, they have carried out terrorists attacks in India and
    Afghanistan and in various other countries around the region as well
    as in the United Kingdom and they have continued efforts to carry out
    attacks in our homeland. Suicide bombings and other attacks have as
    you know increased in Pakistan over the past three years, killing
    thousands of innocent Pakistani civilians, security personnel, and
    government officials including, of course, former Prime Minister
    Benazir Bhutto, and damaging Pakistan's infrastructure and economy as
    well.
    To be sure, the extremists have sustained losses, and in response
    to the increased concern over extremist activity, the Pakistan
    military has stepped up operations against militants in parts of the
    tribal areas. However considerable further work is required. It is
    in Pakistan that al Qaeda senior leadership and other transnational
    extremists elements are located. Thus operations there are imperative
    and we need to provide the support and assistance to the Pakistani
    military that can enable them to confront the extremists who pose a
    truly existential threat to their country.
    Given our relationship with Pakistan and its military over the
    years, it is important that the United States be seen as a reliable
    ally. The Pakistani military has been fighting a tough battle against
    extremists for more than seven years. They have sacrificed much in
    this campaign and they need our continued support.
    The U.S. military thus will focus on two main areas. First we
    will expand our partnership with the Pakistani military and help it
    build its counterinsurgency capabilities by providing training,
    equipment and assistance. We will also expand our exchange programs
    to build stronger relationships with Pakistani leaders at all levels.
    Second, we will help promote closer cooperation across the Afghan
    Pakistan border by providing training equipment facilities and
    intelligence capabilities and by bringing together Afghan and
    Pakistani military officers to enable coordination between the forces
    on either side of the border.
    These efforts will support timely sharing of intelligence
    information and help to coordinate the operations of the two forces.
    Within the counter insurgency construct, we have laid out for
    Afghanistan and Pakistan, we will of course continue to support the
    targeting, disruption and pursuit of the leadership bases and support
    networks of al Qaeda and other transnational extremists groups
    operating in the region. We will also work with our partners to
    challenge the legitimacy of the terrorist methods, practices and
    ideologies, helping our partners address legitimate grievances to win
    over reconcilable elements of the population and supporting promotion
    of the broad based economic and governmental development that is a
    necessary part of such an effort.
    As we increase our focus on and efforts in Afghanistan and
    Pakistan, we must not lose sight of other important missions in the
    CENTCOM AOR. There has for example been substantial progress in Iraq
    but numerous challenges still confront its leaders and its people.
    Although al Qaeda and other extremists elements in Iraq have been
    reduced significantly, they pose a continued threat to security and
    stability. Beyond that lingering ethnic and sectarian mistrust,
    tension between political parties, the return of displaced persons,
    large detainee releases, new budget challenges, the integration of the
    sons of Iraq and other issues indicate that the progress there is
    still fragile and reversible, though less so than when I left Iraq
    last fall, especially given the successful conduct of provincial
    elections earlier this year.
    Despite the many challenges, the progress in Iraq, especially the
    steady development of the Iraqi security forces, has enabled the
    continued transition of security responsibilities to Iraqi elements,
    further reductions of coalition forces, and steady withdraw of our
    units from urban areas. We're thus on track in implementing the
    security agreement with the government of Iraq and in executing the
    strategy laid out by the president at Camp LeJeune.
    A vital element in our effort in Iraq has been Congressional
    support for a variety of equipment and resource needs. And I want to
    take this opportunity to thank you for that. In particular, your
    support for the rapid fielding of Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected
    vehicles, the MRAPs, and various types of unmanned aerial vehicles as
    well as important individual equipment and the Commanders Emergency
    Response Program has been of enormous importance to our troopers.
    With respect to CERP, we have taken a number of steps to ensure proper
    expenditure and oversight of the funds allocated through this
    important program, including procedural guides, instruction of
    leaders, and an audit by the Army Audit Agency at my request when I
    was the multinational force Iraq commander in 2008.
    Iran remains a major concern in the CENTCOM AOR. It continues to
    carry out destabilizing activities in the region, including the
    training, funding and arming of militant proxies active in Lebanon,
    Gaza and Iraq. It also continues its development of nuclear
    capabilities and missile systems that many assess are connected to the
    pursuit of nuclear weapons and delivery means.
    In response, we are working with partner states in the region to
    build their capabilities and to strengthen cooperative security
    arrangements, especially in the areas of shared early warning, air and
    missile defense and establishment of a common operational picture.
    Iran's actions and rhetoric have in fact prompted our partners in the
    Gulf to seek closer relationships with us than we have had with them
    in some decades.
    We are also helping to bolster the capabilities of the security
    forces in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, the Gulf states and the
    Central Asian states to help them deal with threats to their security,
    which range from al Qaeda to robust militia and organized criminal
    elements. In addition, we are working with partner nations to counter
    piracy, combat illegal narcotics production and trafficking and
    interdict arms smuggling, activities that threaten stability and the
    rule of law and often provide funding for extremists.
    Much of this work is performed through an expanding network of
    bilateral and multilateral cooperative arrangements established to
    address common challenges and pursue shared objectives. As we
    strengthen this network, we strive to provide our partners responsive
    security assistance, technical expertise and resources for training,
    educating and equipping their forces and improving security facilities
    and infrastructure. We believe significant gains result from these
    activities, and we appreciate your support for them as well.
    Finally, in all of these endeavors, we seek to foster
    comprehensive approaches by ensuring that military efforts are fully
    integrated with broader diplomatic, economic and developmental
    efforts. We are working closely with former Senator Mitchell and
    Ambassador Ross as they undertake important responsibilities as
    special envoys, in the same way that we are working with Ambassador
    Holbrook and the U.S. ambassadors in the region.
    In conclusion, there will be nothing easy about the way ahead in
    Afghanistan or Pakistan or in many of the other tasks in the Central
    Command area. Much hard work lies before us, but it is clear that
    achieving the objectives of these missions is vital, and it is equally
    clear that these endeavors will require a sustained, substantial
    commitment and unity of effort among all involved.
    There are currently over 215,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    Marines and Coast Guardsmen serving in the CENTCOM area of
    responsibility. Together with our many civilian partners, they have
    been the central element in the progress we have made in Iraq and in
    several other areas, and they will be the key to achieving progress in
    Afghanistan, in Pakistan and in the other locations where serious work
    is being done. These wonderful Americans and their fellow troopers
    around the world constitute the most capable military in the history
    of our nation. They have soldiered magnificently against tough
    enemies during challenging operations, in punishing terrain and
    extreme weather. And they and their families have made great
    sacrifices since 9/11. Nothing means more to these great Americans
    than the sense that those back home appreciate their service and
    sacrifice.
    In view of that, I want to conclude this morning by thanking the
    American people for their extraordinary support of our military men
    and women and their families and by thanking the members of this
    committee for your unflagging support and abiding concern for our
    troopers and their families as well. Thank you very much.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 00:38:27
    8 seconds

    Thank you so much, General. Thank you, again, for
    your tremendous leadership.
    Admiral Olson.

  • ADM. OLSON

    At 00:38:35
    10 minutes

    Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain,
    distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the invitation
    to appear before this committee and to represent the United States
    Special Operations Command. I'll focus on the roles of our
    headquarters and joint Special Operations forces in addressing the
    current and potential threats posed by extremists and their allies and
    networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
    I'm pleased to join Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus here
    this morning.
    The situation in this region is increasingly dire. Al Qaeda's
    surviving leaders have proven adept at hiding, communicating and
    inspiring, operating in and from remote sites in both Afghanistan and
    Pakistan. Al Qaeda remains a draw for local and foreign fighters who
    subscribe to its extremist ideology and criminality.
    The Taliban, although not militarily strong, is pervasive and
    brutal, operating in the guise of both nationalists and keepers of the
    faith but behaving in a manner of street gangs and mafias. They have
    forced and intimidated a mostly benign populist to bend to their will.
    Their methods run the relatively narrow range, from militias to evil.
    The president's strategy, announced last week, is one we fully
    support. We have contributed to the review of the past several
    months, and are pleased to see that the strategy includes a clear
    focus on al Qaeda as the enemy and that a whole-of-government approach
    is directed. We know well that progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan
    will be neither quick nor easy.
    We, as a nation and international community, must be prepared for
    an extended campaign, a campaign that must go well-beyond traditional
    military activity. Increasing the presence and capacity of civilian
    agencies and international organizations to include sufficient funding
    and training is essential to help develop and implement the basic
    functions of credible government in Afghanistan and to assist
    Pakistan's efforts to dismantle safe havens and displace extremists in
    (supportive ?) provinces. Also essential is robust support for the
    military, law enforcement and border security and intelligence
    organizations of Afghanistan and Pakistan themselves, as it is
    ultimately they who must succeed in their lands.
    The United States Special Operations Command has a major role as
    a force provider. And the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps
    forces it trains equips, deploys and supports, have key roles in
    missions in this campaign. With the long history of counterterror,
    counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare operations in many of the
    earth's crisis and tension spots, the capabilities, culture and ethos
    of Special Operations Forces are well-suited to many of the more
    demanding aspects of our mission in Afghanistan and to our increasing
    interaction with Pakistan's military and Frontier Corps forces.
    Right now in Afghanistan, and for the last seven years, Special
    Operations activities range from high-tech manhunting to providing
    veterinary services for tribal livestock. The direct action missions
    are urgent and necessary as they provide the time and space needed for
    the more indirect counterinsurgency operations to have their decisive
    effects. Undertaken in proper balance, these actions address
    immediate security threats while also engaging the underlying
    instability in the region.
    In Pakistan, we continue to work with security forces at the
    scale and pace set by them. And we are prepared to do more. With our
    Pakistani partners, Special Operations forces are currently helping to
    train Pakistani trainers in order to enhance their counterinsurgency
    operations. And while we share much with them, our forces are, in
    turn, learning much about our common adversaries and the social
    complexities of the region. We stand ready to continue to work with
    Pakistani forces and to stand by Pakistani forces for the long term.
    While certain units of the Special Operations force are leading
    high-tech, high-end efforts to find and capture or kill the top
    terrorist and extremist targets in Afghanistan, fundamental to most of
    the deployed Special Operations force is our enduring partnership with
    our Afghan counterparts. Under a program that began over three years
    ago, United States Special forces at the 12-man-team level have
    trained Afghan commandos in the classrooms and on the firing ranges
    and then moved with them to their assigned regions across the country,
    living remotely with them on small camps. Continuing the training and
    mentoring and integrating with them on day and night combat operations
    has had great effect. Supporting their local development and
    assistance efforts has had perhaps even a more powerful impact.
    This program was recently expanded to formally partner the United
    States Special Operations forces with non-commando Afghan battalions,
    a program that will consume most of the additional Special Operations
    force that will be deployed as part of the 21,000-troop increase.
    The Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps component commands of
    the United States Special Operations Command use authorities and a
    budget granted by legislation to the United States Special Operations
    Command commander to organize, equip, train and provide their forces
    to support operational commanders globally. When outside the United
    States, all Special Operations forces are under the operational
    control of the appropriate geographic combatant commander.
    The United States Special Operations Command's budget which is
    historically slightly under 2 percent of the total Defense budget is
    intended to fund the materials, services, equipment, research,
    training and operations that are peculiar to the Special Operations
    force. It primarily enables modification of service-common equipment
    and procurement of specialized items for the conduct of missions that
    are specifically and appropriately Special Operations force's missions
    to perform. In general, this has been robust enough to provide for
    rapid response to a broad set of crises, but we rely on each of the
    services to provide for our long-term sustainment and wartime
    environment and to develop and sustain the enabling capabilities. And
    we rely on operational commanders to assign these capabilities to
    their Special Operations task forces.
    We can serve in both supported and supporting roles at the
    operational level. Special Operations effects are actually core
    elements around which key parts of a strategy can be based.
    And while more than 10,000 members of our Special Operations
    Forces are now under the command of General Petraeus in the Central
    Command Area of Responsibility -- and around 100 more are working in
    Afghanistan under NATO's ISAF command structure -- about 2,000 others
    are in 65 countries on an average day. Their activities, fully
    approved and coordinated, cover the broad spectrum of traditional
    military activities -- well beyond the stereotypical one-dimensional
    gunslinger to encompass the three-dimensional warrior adept at
    defense, development and diplomacy. Special Operations Forces
    bring soft power with a hard edge.
    The employment of Special Operation Forces will actually not
    change much as a result of a revised overall strategy. Our units have
    been conducting both counterterrorism and counterinsurgency for
    several years. We will continue to provide our broad capabilities to
    our fullest capacity in order to meet the needs of our elected and
    appointed civilian leaders and our military operational commanders.
    Our strategy in Afghanistan must secure the primary urban areas
    and main routes so that life and legitimate business can begin a
    return to normalcy. But Afghanistan is not Iraq; most of the
    population is not urban. Security must be felt in the hinterland,
    provided by Afghan forces supported by small teams of U.S. and NATO
    troops -- and enhanced by civilian agencies -- in a manner that
    improves local life by local standards. I'm encouraged by the
    prioritization of this approach in the new strategy.
    And inherent to our success and to the defeat of our enemies is
    the realization that this is a real fight as long as al Qaeda, the
    Taliban and associated extremists want it to be. Civilian causalities
    are mostly the result of their tactics, not ours. The operational
    commanders I hear from are doing all they can to minimize the number
    of noncombatant deaths, because they both abhor the reality of
    civilian causalities and they understand the negative strategic impact
    of such deaths.
    They know that as long as our enemies force noncombatant women,
    children and others to support their operations or remain on targeted
    facilities after warnings have been issued, some will die. They also
    know that the conditions, numbers and severity of the casualties will
    be highly exaggerated and quickly communicated. We must acknowledge
    the seriousness of this challenge and find ways to mitigate its
    effects -- especially as we increase our troop presence in the coming
    months.
    I'll conclude with a simple statement of pride in the Special
    Operations Force that I'm honored to command. Created by a proactive
    Congress and nurtured by your strong support over the last 22 years,
    the United States Special Operations Command Headquarters has brought
    together units from all four services to develop and sustain a truly
    magnificent joint capability. Special Operations Forces are
    contributing globally, well beyond what the percentage of the total
    force would indicate. And in Afghanistan and Pakistan -- under
    General Petraeus's operation command -- they are well known for their
    effectiveness.
    I stand ready for your questions.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 00:48:52
    1 minute

    Thank you, Admiral.
    We'll try a six-minute round for our first round.
    First, as I indicated in my opening statement, I'm concerned
    about statements by the -- some administration officials that success
    in Afghanistan is not possible -- to use the word of Admiral Blair --
    unless we solve the challenges in western Pakistan.
    Now, there's obviously a link between the failure of the Pakistan
    government to take on religious extremists -- particularly those that
    are crossing the border into Afghanistan -- and the situation in
    Afghanistan. No one denies that link.
    The problem that I have is that to make the kind of statement
    that Ambassador Holbrooke made over the weekend that, quote, "You
    can't succeed in Afghanistan if you don't solve the problem of western
    Pakistan" puts the future of Afghanistan too much in the hands of
    events in Pakistan and decisions in Pakistan.
    And I'm wondering whether or not you agree. Let me start with
    you: Perhaps, General, you can make some progress in Afghanistan,
    even though Pakistan does not succeed in addressing their religious
    extremist problem. It's much more difficult, but you can make
    progress and the Afghans can make progress.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 00:50:21
    8 seconds

    I do agree with that, Senator.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 00:50:29
    37 seconds

    The Afghan-Pakistan strategy did not include a new
    target end-strength for the Afghan national army. It remained at
    134,000. And that's even though Defense Minister Wardak of
    Afghanistan has recommended that the Afghan army go to somewhere
    between 200,000 and 250,000.
    And I'm just wondering why we did not change that end-strength
    goal for the Afghan army, Secretary.

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 00:51:06
    42 seconds

    Senator, we certainly wanted to start by going
    after the near-term goal of accelerating the growth of the ANSF by the
    target date forward to 2011.
    We also left open the notion of assessing whether we need a
    larger ANSF. We did not feel that the analysis had been done to
    really arrive at a number of what that larger force should look like.
    So we wanted to take some time to look at this with commanders on the
    ground with the Afghans in greater detail, but the door is definitely
    open to the idea of a larger force over time.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 00:51:48
    50 seconds

    The long poles in the tent to get a larger Afghan
    army faster have been identified as the following: One is lack of
    trainers. We're sending maybe 4,000 additional trainers. That should
    address that problem or that challenge.
    Secondly is the lack of equipment. And I would think we ought to
    make a crash effort to get some additional equipment to Afghanistan.
    And perhaps for the record, because of the time shortage here, you
    could identify -- either one of you -- what we're doing in that
    regard.
    And I believe, General, that you have indicated to me personally
    that developing the Afghan leadership among officers and
    noncommissioned officers is also a major challenge in accelerating the
    expansion of the Afghan army. Could you just briefly comment on that?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 00:52:38
    1 minute

    In fact, we had a session here this past
    Saturday, Mr. Chairman -- the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral
    Mullen, General McKiernan, the Supreme Allied Commander-NATO Commander
    General Craddock and myself with some staff officers -- and walked
    through, again, what are the critical paths, if you will, to
    accelerate in the growth of the Afghan national army in particular.
    And in fact, the critical factor in General McKiernan's mind is
    the development of those leaders. So we can train recruits. We can
    even produce -- now they have even a -- not just the Afghan version of
    West Point, but the Afghan version of Sandhurst or Officer Candidate
    School. Even young leaders they can produce.
    The challenge is finding and developing those company commanders,
    battalion commanders and brigade commanders and their staffs to
    support them. And those are very challenging to find. Frankly, this
    is the same experience that we had in Iraq, as you'll recall, and some
    of this just takes time. And that is, we think -- I agree with
    General McKiernan very much on that; that that is the big limiting
    factor.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 00:53:50
    49 seconds

    Now, General Petraeus's prepared statement and his
    oral testimony here said, quote, "Iranian activities and policies
    constitute the major state-based threat to regional security" and I
    don't know if too many people would disagree with that. I surely
    fully agree with that.
    You indicated also that pursuing our longstanding regional goals
    in improving key relationships within and outside the AOR help to
    limit the impact of Iran's policies.
    Let me ask both of you whether or not, if we could work with
    Russia on missile defense against an Iranian missile threat, whether
    or not that cooperation between the United States and Russia could
    contribute to our security?
    Secretary, let me start with you.

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 00:54:39
    10 seconds

    Absolutely, Senator. I think this is one of the
    topics that President Obama will be engaging with his Russian
    counterpart on -- actually, today.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 00:54:49
    2 seconds

    They'll be exploring that possibility?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 00:54:51
    1 second

    Yes, absolutely.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 00:54:52
    3 seconds

    Good. Thank you.
    General, do you agree with that?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 00:54:55
    30 seconds

    Chairman, I do think that's worth exploring.
    There are a number of areas in which -- if there were Russian
    cooperation with respect to the Central Asian states and Afghanistan
    and the effort there; with respect to activities surrounding Iran --
    and even others where Russian cooperation could make the situation
    much more doable if you will and would help enormously.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 00:55:25
    40 seconds

    On the economic side, the National Solidarity
    Program inside of Afghanistan has established community development
    councils in about 21,000 villages throughout every province.
    I have spoken to both of you -- and I don't know, Admiral, if
    I've ever asked you about this -- but I've spoken to both Secretary
    Flournoy and General Petraeus about the National Solidarity Program.
    And you both have expressed to me your belief that it is one of the
    real success stories in the economic development inside of
    Afghanistan. Is that -- I want to ask a question about that, but I
    don't want to misstate anything. Is that true that you both feel that
    is a success story?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 00:56:05
    8 seconds

    I do. I think it's one of the examples of the
    kind of bottom-up approach that we need to be doing more of in the
    Afghan context.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 00:56:13

    It is, Mr. Chairman.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 00:56:13
    1 minute

    All right.
    And then my question, General, is to you, it has to do with the
    wonderful capability that's provided to us with these SERP funds. And
    I agree with you very much in terms of what you said about those
    funds, those commanders' funds that are basically on the authority of
    commanders to spend with great flexibility and speed for a lot of them
    being economic development purposes.
    Could, and should, that funding be coordinated at least with
    these community development councils, so that they at least have a
    voice, suggestion perhaps, as to where these SERP funds are used for
    economic development -- as to what would be the most effective use?
    I'm not giving them a veto. I'm not suggesting they control.
    Obviously these are going to be commander-controlled. But would it be
    worthwhile to have an input from those councils?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 00:57:13
    32 seconds

    Our experience, Mr. Chairman, has always been
    that the more that you can get locals involved in the decision-making
    process, within reason -- and there are limits, as you know -- but
    within reason that that is absolutely what we want to do. What, of
    course, we're trying to do is build their capacity and capability and
    that is one way of doing that. And we did, in fact, as you know, do
    that extensively over time in Iraq as we were able to transition from
    us funding programs over time to Iraqis funding the programs.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 00:57:45
    3 seconds

    Thank you. I now call on Senator McCain.

  • SEN. MCCAIN

    At 00:57:48
    38 seconds

    Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the
    witnesses and I'd like to repeat, again, I believe that the strategy
    that the president and his team have developed for addressing the
    enormous challenge of Afghanistan is a good one and I think it has
    every chance of success. And I'm very pleased with the leadership
    that we have, like General Petraeus and General McKiernan and others.
    General Petraeus, are you worried -- can I just for a second --
    are you worried about the continuing level of violence in Diyala
    Province?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 00:58:26
    24 seconds

    Certainly there are concerns in Diyala Province
    and in Nineveh Province as well, Senator McCain. There are other
    concerns, frankly. There are latent capabilities. We see some
    activity by Iran to continue to develop, again, proxies -- now called
    Katim (ph) Hezbollah. Assah Melhok (ph) promised a brigade. We have
    to keep a very close eye --

  • SEN. MCCAIN

    At 00:58:50
    11 seconds

    So the Iranians continue -- the Iranians continue
    to try to meddle and interfere and harm our efforts in Iraq, including
    taking American lives?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 00:59:01
    29 seconds

    They do and there is a continued residual Sunni
    extremist element as well. Certainly al Qaeda, worldwide, if they
    could, would try to provide additional reinforcements to that. Having
    said that, the level of violence is significantly lower -- as you
    know, somewhere between 10 and 15 attacks per day compared with, say,
    180 attacks per day back in the late spring of 2007.

  • SEN. MCCAIN

    At 00:59:30
    1 minute

    Thank you. Secretary Flournoy, as I said, I
    support the strategy; I think it would be far, far better to announce
    that we will have the additional 10,000 troops dispatched and they
    will clearly be needed. It is obvious that the Afghan army would have
    to be around 250,000. It's a big country. We know that was a vital
    element to our success in Iraq. To dribble out these decisions, I
    think, can create an impression of incrementalism. We all know what's
    needed. I would make those announcements and would've made them at
    the time.
    General Petraeus, we've seen now in Mumbai and now in the attack
    on the police academy a change in tactics on the part of al Qaeda --
    or Taliban, in this case. Instead of just walking into a place with a
    suicide vest on, they have teams of well-trained, professional, well-
    armed people who go in and kill a hell of a lot of people before they
    either surrender or kill themselves.
    Two questions. One is, isn't that basically true in this change
    in tactics that they're employing? And is it of great concern?
    Should it be of great concern to us that the Taliban's reach has now
    extended to the police academy in Pakistan?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:01:02
    54 seconds

    It is a big concern. It underscores the fact
    that the extremist threat inside Pakistan is, indeed, the existential
    threat, the most important existential threat, to that country, we
    believe, more than the traditional enemy of Pakistan -- India. And
    there does appear to be a growing attraction among the extremist
    elements for Mumbai-like attacks. They saw the impact that that had;
    they saw the degree of coverage, the sensational aspects to that.
    There is some positive aspect to the attack in Lahore in that,
    indeed, the Pakistani security forces did respond and over time did
    kill or capture what appear to be a substantial number of those that
    carried out the attack on the police academy.

  • SEN. MCCAIN

    At 01:01:56
    2 seconds

    And that took a heck of a long time --

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:01:58

    It did.

  • SEN. MCCAIN

    At 01:01:58
    35 seconds

    -- as you well know.
    Secretary Flournoy, Pakistan obviously is very critical. I don't
    think it's the determinant but we can discuss that at a later time.
    Pakistan concluded an agreement with some Taliban elements in the Swat
    Valley that allowed for full adoption of Shari-a law. Do you believe
    that this arrangement supports our objectives in the region?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 01:02:33
    3 seconds

    (Off mike.) I do not, sir.

  • SEN. MCCAIN

    At 01:02:36
    20 seconds

    Do you think that the government -- and this is the
    conundrum -- of Pakistan and the military are so closely tied to ISI
    that it prevents us from having the degree of effectiveness and
    cooperation from the Pakistani government that we need?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 01:02:56
    25 seconds

    Sir, I think ISI is a -- or parts of ISI are
    certainly a problem to be dealt with. But I think we have a new
    democratic government and I think we have strong parts of the military
    who see the extremist threat, who want to deal with that extremist
    threat. And part of our policy challenge is to empower them to be
    more effective in doing that.

  • SEN. MCCAIN

    At 01:03:21
    15 seconds

    So you see progress in trying to reduce the
    cooperation that exists between the Pakistani military and the ISI,
    which has been significant and deep?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 01:03:36
    11 seconds

    Sir, I don't see adequate progress at this point,
    but I think one of the things we're trying to do with this strategy is
    provide additional incentives for that progress to take place.

  • SEN. MCCAIN

    At 01:03:47
    7 seconds

    General Petraeus, an individual who is, I
    understand, a young Taliban leader named Massoud -- is that correct?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:03:54
    2 seconds

    Baitullah Mehsud, the Pakistani Taliban leader.

  • SEN. MCCAIN

    At 01:03:56
    12 seconds

    He said that there would be -- he would orchestrate
    -- he would arrange an attack -- there would be an attack on
    Washington, D.C. How seriously do you take that threat?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:04:08
    38 seconds

    Well, I think any time there is any threat that
    could be against the homeland, I think you have to take it seriously.
    We are doing what is -- in the intelligence circle is called a "deep
    dive" to determine the possibility of that, if you will. There are
    some questions about capacity of that organization in terms of
    transnational activities. But I can assure you -- and I just talked
    to a senior member of the National Security council staff this morning
    about that. And obviously everyone is quite riveted on analyzing that
    and seeing what further we can find out about that.

  • SEN. MCCAIN

    At 01:04:46
    7 seconds

    Well, we certainly wouldn't want to call it a
    global war on terror. I thank you, thank the witnesses.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 01:04:53
    2 seconds

    Thank you very much, Senator McCain. Senator
    Lieberman?

  • SEN. JOSEPH LIEBERMAN (ID-CT)

    At 01:04:55
    1 minute

    Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to
    the three of you for your service and for the service of all those who
    work under your leadership, it's really quite extraordinary.
    I appreciated very much the president's announcement of policy
    with regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan on Friday. I think
    particularly our effort in Afghanistan has really been under-resourced
    for too long and the commitment of additional researches, both
    military and civilian, is very significant to our success there. Just
    as importantly, I think, was the president's unambiguous political
    commitment to defeat the Islamist extremists of South Asia and to
    relate that to our security.
    Secretary Flournoy, I wanted to ask you first, as the
    representative of the civilian side of The Pentagon and the
    administration, to answer a question about South Asia that was once
    asked not so long ago about Iraq and that I suspect some Americans are
    asking now and maybe more will ask as we send more of our troops
    there, our best, and they suffer more casualties. What is the
    relationship between what is happening in Afghanistan and Pakistan and
    the security of the American people, the security of The United States
    of America?
    In other words, is it necessary to succeed in Afghanistan for
    America to remain safe in the world and here at home?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 01:06:32
    41 seconds

    The short answer is, yes. But I believe the link
    is that in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region you have continued
    safe haven for al-Qaeda and other extremists, who we know are actively
    plotting against American interests, American allies, and the American
    homeland. So this is a matter of vital national interest. It is
    something that we must deal with effectively. It's going to take
    time. As General Petraeus said, it's not going to be easy. But I
    think part of the strategy review was refocusing on that objective and
    on the core interests that are at stake in this campaign.

  • SEN. LIEBERMAN

    At 01:07:13
    26 seconds

    General Petraeus, is it fair to say that we're
    -- though we're focused, clearly, on al Qaeda, but that the success of
    -- or failure of allied groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, such as
    the Taliban and the Massoud group and others, Hakani, is also relevant
    to our security in the world and the stability of the region on which
    we depend?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:07:39
    34 seconds

    It is, Senator. In fact, I think a good way to
    describe the extremists is a term that General McKiernan uses. He
    calls them the syndicate. It's al Qaeda and the syndicate of elements
    plus, of course, the Afghan Taliban.
    And all of them together represent a threat, not just in
    Afghanistan and Pakistan, but certainly a regional extremist threat
    and, in certain cases, a truly global extremist threat.

  • SEN. LIEBERMAN

    At 01:08:13
    1 minute

    But one of my impressions, on both visits to the
    region and talking to people from Afghanistan and Pakistan here, is
    that there is an unsettling perception in Afghanistan and Pakistan
    that the U.S. is not in this for the long haul, that we are making a
    temporary commitment to them.
    And they fear -- and unfortunately, this is based on some history
    not so long ago -- that we will leave before the job is done. No one
    wants to stay there forever, but the question is will we leave before
    the job is done.
    And as you know, there -- that perception has really
    counterproductive effects and a lot of hedging behavior by the -- in
    both countries, the worst being the excuse given -- that being given
    as an excuse for ISI terrorist linkages.
    So I want to know if you agree with that concern and whether you
    feel that we're turning it around now, most significantly, by the
    announcement by President Obama last Friday of our new commitment.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:09:25
    49 seconds

    I strongly agree with that, Senator. In fact,
    that's why I've repeatedly used the term "sustained, substantial
    commitment," as you know.
    In fact, it's important in both countries. There is history
    there. Pakistan will quote that history to you in the first paragraph
    of any conversation. There is a 12-year period where Pakistani
    officers, for example, did not come to the United States.
    There are some understandable reasons for this, but the fact is
    that there's a lost generation, and the entire military remembers the
    very much up-and-down relationship that we have had over the years.
    If I could, the Kerry-Lugar bill that is, I think, being
    considered by the Senate represents the kind of sustained, substantial
    commitment that we're talking about -- I think it's five years, $1.5
    billion per year --

  • SEN. LIEBERMAN

    At 01:10:14

    Right.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:10:14
    6 seconds

    -- as do some of the DOD requests that will be
    coming up with the budget.

  • SEN. LIEBERMAN

    At 01:10:20
    1 minute

    Let me ask you a different kind of question
    about the command structure in Afghanistan.
    In Iraq, it seemed to me that you helped to put together, and we
    had a superb command structure with yourself as a four-star strategic
    commander in MNF-I and then a three-star operational commander,
    previously General Odierno, under you. Now he's obviously a four-
    star, and General (Austin ?) doing an extraordinary job, both of them,
    as three-star.
    In -- I think that worked, and I assume you agree continues to
    work. In Afghanistan, as you know, we have the four-star in General
    McKiernan, but no three-star operational commander.
    It sure looks to me, anyway, from here that underneath General
    McKiernan we have an unfortunately balkanized structure, with regional
    commanders and not the kind of line of authority that we'd like.
    I will tell you that we had some witnesses before this Committee
    in the last couple of months who made clear that as we increase our
    resources in Afghanistan, it would be a mistake not to tighten up the
    command structure and add a three-star operational commander.
    And I wanted to ask you what you think about that idea and my
    assessment of where we are currently.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:11:36
    20 seconds

    Well, the first step, frankly, to achieve greater
    unity of effort and a cleaner command structure, if you will, was the
    step that we took a few months ago to dual-hat General McKiernan as
    the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, as well as the NATO ISAF
    commander. That was very important.

  • SEN. LIEBERMAN

    At 01:11:56

    I agree.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:11:56
    1 minute

    We have then begun the process of building a
    pretty substantial U.S. Forces Afghanistan staff to support him and to
    take the burden off what currently is the combined Joint Task Force
    That's typically the division that has been in Regional Command
    East, which has also had a command line that used to go directly from
    CENTCOM to them, directly to CSTCA, directly to CJIS ODEF and some
    other elements.
    We have now cleaned that up. It all now goes through General
    McKiernan, supported by this growing U.S. Forces Afghanistan staff,
    which is also a place that we can build up the strategic
    communications, information operations task force, and a host of other
    activities that can support him in a way not quite like the
    operational headquarters, certainly, in operational terms, but in some
    of, if you will, the important additional enabler duties.
    We talked about, in this past Saturday's session, that the
    chairman of the Joint Chiefs hosted here with General McKiernan, the
    SACEUR, and myself.
    We talked about the wisdom of an operational headquarters; for
    the time being, that is not something that we're going to recommend or
    go forward with, but is something that we'll certainly continue to
    assess as we go along.
    There are other areas as well, Senator, if I could, in which we
    need to make some additional changes. We think we need to achieve
    greater unity of effort in the special operations arena and, in fact,

  • SEN. LIEBERMAN

    At 01:13:42
    30 seconds

    I thank you very much for that answer.
    My time's up. I just want to read one sentence from your
    statement that I think we all should think about, and it -- which is
    Iran's actions and rhetoric have in fact prompted our partners in the
    Gulf to seek closer relationships than we have had with some of these
    nations in some decades.
    So threats often strengthen alliances and, in that sense, can
    help us strengthen our own security. And I thank you for pointing
    that out.
    Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral Olson provided us a brigadier general on the U.
    S. side that we
    think, over time, perhaps could be joined together with the NATO SOF.
    That would also help.
    There's thought of making CSTCA Alpha also, perhaps, a NATO
    element. And there are some other measures in the counter-IED world
    and others that we can clean this up and improve it over time, and
    we're intent on doing that.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 01:14:12
    3 seconds

    Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
    Senator Inhofe.

  • SEN. JAMES INHOFE (R-OK)

    At 01:14:15
    1 minute

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Some times in these hearings we get bogged down in a lot of
    details that are very, very significant, and we need to get into them.
    But I know when I go back to Oklahoma and other places, the first
    question always is why is it we're not as successful as we should in
    getting NATO to come up to --
    I noticed this morning in the Earlybird, and I think this came
    out of today's New York Times, it makes an issue of the fact that
    France will send 150 paramilitary police officers to Afghanistan as
    part of -- and it goes on and on, and then some of these other NATO
    countries that are talking about this as if that's a great
    contribution.
    I wonder if there's anything --
    Well, first of all, anything further that you haven't already
    stated in terms of what we might do on this side of the dais, or what
    you might do to encourage more of an involvement of NATO over there.

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 01:15:21
    55 seconds

    Senator, I would just let you know we spent a lot
    of time in the development of this strategy consulting with allies to
    try to create a sense of ownership on their part.
    And one of the things we've done is to broaden the nature of our
    requests, not only for military troops and capabilities where they can
    provide them, but to things like police trainers, where a number of
    our European allies have national police forces -- Gendarmerie,
    Carabinieri, et cetera -- who are actually quite good at police
    training.
    We don't have a national police force. That's not an area of
    particular strength for us. So we're asking them to step up on
    trainers for the army, trainers for the police, contributions to the
    (NAF ?) trust fund, the law and order trust fund, sending civilian
    advisers, civilian assistants, and so forth.
    So we've tried to broaden the aperture with the expectation that
    everyone will step up in some meaningful way to support a
    comprehensive approach.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:16:16
    49 seconds

    Senator, as part of the consultation phase of
    this, as the Af-Pak strategy review was launched, I went to the Munich
    security conference, to NATO headquarters, E.U. -- addressed all the
    E.U. delegates, and also went to London, Brussels, and Paris and
    talked with each of them.
    There have been and there will be some more contributions made.
    We'll see what happens at the summit in the coming days. There are
    some that still may be forthcoming that people are reticent to talk
    about right now, but I think Secretary --
    I would stand very much with what Secretary Gates has noted about
    NATO contributions and his concerns about NATO being almost also a
    two-tier alliance in which some will fight and others may not.

  • SEN. INHOFE

    At 01:17:05

    Yeah.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:17:05
    3 seconds

    So this is a challenge for the alliance, without
    question.

  • SEN. INHOFE

    At 01:17:08
    36 seconds

    Well, thank you. And I agree with all that. And
    Madame Secretary, I appreciate your phrase, create a sense of
    ownership. That seems to be what needs to be done.
    Each one of you -- General Petraeus, you mentioned the CERP
    program, and of course Secretary Flournoy mentioned the 1206. And of
    course I always try to get on the record on these, just briefly, the
    value of the IMET program, the CERF program, the CCIF program and the,
    in your case, Admiral Olson, the 1208 program.
    Do you have any comments to make on those programs?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:17:44
    38 seconds

    With respect to CERP, again, I think it's of
    enormous importance. Actually, I would support very strongly 1206,
    1207 and 1208. Again, I don't want to get ahead of a budget
    submission.
    And with the next one, there is something out there that you may
    hear -- may have heard about -- it was discussed with the chairman and
    Senator McCain -- called the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability
    Fund.
    And with the next one, there is something out there that you may
    hear and may have heard about, we've discussed with the chairman and
    Senator McCain, called the Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capability
    Fund. This will be coming along with this package. It is something
    that we believe in CENTCOM is of enormous importance to be able to
    target assistance that will help them develop the capabilities for
    those who are truly conducting counterinsurgency operations.

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 01:18:22
    26 seconds

    I would just echo that. I mean, these tools are
    generally very important throughout the AOR, and globally in many
    cases. But they are absolutely critical to the success of the
    strategy. If we don't back up the troops we're deploying with these
    additional authorities and funding streams, we can't reach our goals.
    They're absolutely critical to the success of the strategy.

  • SEN. INHOFE

    At 01:18:48
    3 seconds

    Admiral Olson, you would agree with that, with

  • ADM. OLSON

    At 01:18:51
    13 seconds

    Absolutely, sir. I have more responsibility for
    1208, but the Special Operations Forces are also customers of 1206,
    IMET and some others. I think we can point to many examples of
    progress that was enabled by those programs.

  • SEN. INHOFE

    At 01:19:04
    26 seconds

    Okay. Seeing Senator Ben Nelson here, I had
    occasion to talk to some of the Nebraska Guard on what they're doing
    up on the Pakistani border. And they're up there now, and we had an
    opportunity to talk to them and the value of that program of crop
    substitution and this type of thing, working with them. It happens
    that the Oklahoma Guard will be going up to relieve them, I think, in
    October sometime. Would you make any comments about that program?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:19:30
    28 seconds

    I can't say enough about that program, actually.
    This is a case where the National Guard -- individual states have
    pulled together agriculture teams. These are individuals, of course,
    that are serving in the National Guard but either are farmers or farm
    experts, agriculture experts. They've even been doing the rotation
    system themselves. Frankly, the more of those that we could get, the
    better, at this stage as we expand the areas in which our forces are
    operating, and would convey that --

  • SEN. INHOFE

    At 01:19:58
    2 seconds

    They seem to be getting good results.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:20:00
    11 seconds

    -- (inaudible). They get very good results.
    They have all the attributes of soldiers in terms of being able to
    secure themselves, communicate -- move, shoot and communicate -- and
    yet they're also experts in agriculture.

  • SEN. INHOFE

    At 01:20:11
    26 seconds

    I was going to -- thank you very much. I was going
    to get into -- there's not time, but just very briefly on the fact
    that I didn't learn till this morning that the solution has come from
    the supreme court over there in terms of Karzai's term ending in May
    and then, of course, the elections in August. But I guess that's
    resolved now by the supreme court. Is that my understanding, that he
    will remain there during the time frame?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 01:20:37
    21 seconds

    Sir, we hope so. But we've thought at many points
    that this was resolved before, so -- but we hope that this interim
    arrangement will stick. I mean, our interest is having secure, free,
    fair elections. We're not backing any one candidate. We just want to
    make sure a peaceful and legitimate process moves forward.

  • SEN. INHOFE

    At 01:20:58
    25 seconds

    Okay. Well, my time is up. But lastly, Admiral
    Olson, you mentioned just a few minutes ago that you represented 2
    percent of the budget. I have read your background and some of the
    great heroic things that have happened in Special Ops. And I just
    have to ask you -- this is the right forum to get a response -- do you
    think that 2 percent is adequate?

  • ADM. OLSON

    At 01:21:23
    12 seconds

    I obviously don't want to get ahead of the budget
    discussions that are taking place now, but I do want to fully credit
    the investment that the services each make in Special Operations
    capability.

  • SEN. INHOFE

    At 01:21:35

    Yes.

  • ADM. OLSON

    At 01:21:35
    9 seconds

    We depend heavily on them. And each of the services
    carves out a portion of their budget to pile on top of that 2 percent
    that's peculiar to the Special Operations needs.

  • SEN. INHOFE

    At 01:21:44
    3 seconds

    Yes. Well, you're doing great work.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 01:21:47
    2 seconds

    Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
    Senator Bill Nelson.

  • SEN. BILL NELSON (D-FL)

    At 01:21:49
    23 seconds

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Good morning.
    Admiral, the MRAP vehicle is not necessarily well-adapted to the
    terrain in Afghanistan. What would you like for your Special Forces
    troops over there in developing a vehicle for that terrain?

  • ADM. OLSON

    At 01:22:12
    40 seconds

    Sir, the laws of physics work against us in
    Afghanistan. Protection requires mass, and mass doesn't work well in
    the bridges and the roads and the terrain of especially the
    mountainous regions of Afghanistan. So I support the full range of
    vehicle development activities that are occurring across the services.
    We are tied into all of them, I believe, contributing our particular
    needs to the development process. I don't know what the outcome of
    that will be, but certainly a more agile protective vehicle is
    something that we all are striving for.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:22:52
    3 seconds

    Senator, if I could on that --

  • SEN. BILL NELSON

    At 01:22:55

    Please.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:22:55
    43 seconds

    -- there is, in fact, a very urgent effort
    ongoing to let a contract for what's called currently, I think, a
    light MRAP. In the meantime, what we have done is we have sent the
    lightest of the existing MRAPs to Afghanistan. We diverted some, in
    fact, from the flow into Iraq and from Iraq. Those work much better
    on the roads but still are -- again, they defy the laws of physics on
    some of these roads, as my swim buddy pointed out.
    But there is an urgent effort in this light MRAP arena, and I
    think the contract is literally to be let within a month or so is the
    latest that I saw on this. And so -- and we appreciate it. I believe
    that's something that was very strongly supported up here, because it
    was, again, a very significant effort.

  • SEN. BILL NELSON

    At 01:23:38
    25 seconds

    Last week the president stated, and I quote, "Going
    forward, we will not blindly stay the course. Instead, we will set
    clear metrics to measure progress and hold ourselves accountable."
    And he was talking about Afghanistan. So, General, what metrics do
    you want to see that we will evaluate our progress?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:24:03
    45 seconds

    Well, in fact, there's an effort, actually an
    interagency effort, that includes the intelligence agencies right now,
    and obviously those who are out in the field in the embassies and the
    military forces, to develop those kinds of metrics.
    There are the existing metrics, frankly, right now that exist to
    show attacks by region, by day, by type, that talk about -- that
    capture a host of the kind of data points that the chairman mentioned
    during his opening statement. But over time we have to expand these
    more and more into the development of -- that capture the legitimacy
    of the government, the development of capability and capacity by
    Afghan authorities and so forth.

  • SEN. BILL NELSON

    At 01:24:48
    10 seconds

    Are those metrics -- you mentioned the IC, the
    intelligence community. Are these metrics such that we'll be able to
    discuss them in public?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 01:24:58
    43 seconds

    Sir, I think we're in the process of developing
    them to complement the sort of tactical metrics the commanders on the
    ground are using, a strategic set of metrics that we can use in an
    ongoing assessment process. We do want to be able to make as many of
    those public as possible, and we'd like to actually have a
    conversation with you, getting your input on what meaningful metrics
    would look like.
    There's a real commitment to not -- to continue to re-evaluate
    the situation, evolve the strategy, build on what's working, correct
    when something's not working. And so it's going to be a dynamic
    process going forward.

  • SEN. BILL NELSON

    At 01:25:41
    3 seconds

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 01:25:44
    3 seconds

    Thank you, Senator Nelson.
    Senator Collins.

  • SEN. SUSAN COLLINS (R-ME)

    At 01:25:47
    1 minute

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Madame Secretary, let me follow up on the essential question that
    Senator Nelson just asked you.
    He's really asking a fundamental
    question, and that is, how will we assess whether the new strategy is
    working? How will we know if we're winning?
    It seems to me that, prior to going forward with the commitment
    of additional troops, that the administration should have already
    established specific benchmarks that it's going to use to measure
    whether or not the new strategy is successful.
    So I want to press you further on the question that Senator
    Nelson asked you. How will you know whether or not this new strategy
    is working? It seems to me that you need a set of clear benchmarks,
    clear metrics, going in and that we should not be committing
    additional troops until we have a means of measuring whether or not
    the strategy is successful.

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 01:27:12
    1 minute

    Senator, I would just say that I think we have
    some very broad metrics on the Pakistani side, looking at measures of
    their cooperation on the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight,
    as well as in terms of support for other common objectives.
    I think, on the Afghan side, there are a whole host -- much more
    developed set of inherited metrics, given that we've been conducting
    these operations for a long time. What we're trying to do is sort
    through those more carefully. Some of them are more input-related.
    And what we're really trying to focus on is outcomes and actual
    impacts. So we aren't starting with a blank sheet, but we are in the
    process of refining the metrics that have been used in Afghanistan.
    The decision to deploy the additional forces was driven -- there
    was a sense of urgency by our commanders on the ground that with the
    fighting season coming, the need to reverse momentum, the need to get
    in there and begin protecting the population, secure things for the
    election, and not lose ground, that there was a sense of urgency that
    we needed to go forward even as we were refining our metrics and so
    forth.
    But I can promise you we will, in a very short amount of time, be
    able to come back and talk to you in detail about metrics. I just
    don't want to get out ahead of my interagency colleagues and make sure
    that we're all willing to back the same -- or sing off the same sheet
    of music before I come back and talk to you.

  • SEN. COLLINS

    At 01:28:44
    1 minute

    Okay.
    General, you testified this morning that it is in Pakistan that
    al-Qaeda's senior leadership and other transnational extremist
    elements are located. Similarly, Ambassador Holbrooke has said that
    western Pakistan and the Talibanization of the SWAT region is the
    chief concern.
    And I agree with both of those statements.
    To address this threat, you've testified that the United States
    will provide additional intelligence capabilities to the Pakistanis.
    However, there have been numerous reports that the Pakistani military
    officers have very close and troubling ties with the Taliban, both in
    Afghanistan and Pakistan -- that's some military officers in Pakistan
    and the ISI. Isn't there a considerable risk that if we provide the
    increased intelligence capabilities to the Pakistan military, that
    those capabilities will fall into the hands of the wrong individuals
    and end up actually helping the Taliban to avoid attacks?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:30:11
    2 minutes

    Well, again, the effort in Pakistan, Senator,
    absolutely has to be one that they take forward, and one that we do
    everything we can to enable -- to assist, and, indeed, to provide
    intelligence capabilities as part of all of that.
    How we do that has to be done very carefully, and we will have to
    go through a process, I think, where we literally do build some of the
    trust, because there are both troubling events in the past, and there
    are troubling accusations out there. Some of these, frankly, when you
    dig into them are a bit more ambiguous than they seem to be on the
    surface, although some are not.
    There are -- it is difficult, in some cases, to sort out what is
    an intelligence agency contact that is trying to develop a source, or,
    on the other hand, what is an intelligence agency contact that is
    warning them of an impending operation. There have been examples of
    the latter. Those are troubling. We have discussed those with the
    head of Pakistani intelligence -- of the ISI, Lieutenant General
    Pasha. I have done that, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, others;
    Ambassador Holbrooke and I had a session with them together.
    The Pakistan military, again, we've had these same conversations
    with them. There is going to have to be a process of building trust.
    This starts, frankly -- all of this in Pakistan begins with them
    embracing the idea that the biggest threat to their country's very
    existence is the internal extremist threat rather than the threat to
    their East.
    That is a recognition that they have stated verbally. The
    chairman quoted it in his opening statement.
    We have heard it
    privately. We now need to help them operationalize that; to watch
    them, and among -- again, the metrics needs to be measures of their
    commitment to truly go after this threat that could literally take
    down their state, if it's allowed to creep out and to grow, and
    certainly to cause bigger problems regionally and, potentially,
    globally.

  • SEN. COLLINS

    At 01:32:26
    2 seconds

    Thank you.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 01:32:28
    12 seconds

    Thank you, Senator Collins.
    Let me now call on a senator who's had the foresight and
    persistence for many, many years on focusing on the importance of
    milestones and metrics, Senator Nelson.

  • SEN. BEN NELSON (D-NE)

    At 01:32:40
    3 minutes

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    I am encouraged by the suggestion, Madame Secretary, that you
    would be willing to work with Congress in establishing the benchmarks
    that could be transparent. I suspected that it's true that there are
    some pieces of the mission that would require classification because
    of the very sensitive nature of the operation, but I would hope that
    most of the benchmarks could be public, transparent metrics to measure
    progress.
    I assume that they could range from measuring our capabilities in
    intelligence-gathering on the ground; it could be how the country is
    doing economically. I would hope that we might have a metrics to --
    which might be difficult in some respects, but not, certainly, in the
    contributions to the Trust Fund, of how the NATO countries are doing
    in terms of their response. I was saddened by how small the
    contributions were, by comparison to what our expectations were,
    recently when some numbers were shown. And I would hope that the
    effort that you've made, General, will result in perhaps a better
    response than we received at that time.
    In establishing the benchmarks, what it truly enables us to do --
    and the American people, is to gauge how we are doing in our efforts.
    In the past, it's been somebody from one party -- same party, somebody
    saying we're winning, others saying we're losing. And anecdotal
    responses of that type are not particularly helpful. As a matter of
    fact they're confusing to the American public -- (laughs) and I think
    they confuse Congress as well if we're not able to be on the same
    page, with the same approach. And we may question whether it's 20
    percent or 30 percent, but we wouldn't be questioning whether it's
    zero or 100, I would hope.
    I also want to thank my friend from Oklahoma for mentioning the
    Nebraska Guard and the efforts they're undertaking. We have the
    "Agribusiness Development Team," 52 members stationed at Bagram, and
    probably it's not surprising that there would be people from Nebraska
    that would understand agriculture, given the fact that we're "the
    Cornhusker State."
    But, we're very pleased and we're very proud of this team that's
    there and with the work that they're doing, because overcoming
    narcoterrorism is critically important, and (there is) probably not
    much better way to start than directing away from the production of
    poppies -- poppy crops to legitimate agriculture that can help feed,
    and, in some instances, clothe their -- and perhaps even, ultimately,
    power with biofuels, their operation and improve their economy.
    My question is, in looking at the ability of Pakistan to deal
    with the Swat, the FATA areas that are under attack, I guess the
    question is, the basic question is, is there a general willingness
    from the top to deal with the insurgents in that area?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 01:36:28
    1 minute

    Senator, let me start -- and I know that General
    Petraeus may want to weigh in on this as well.
    I think it -- you know, the leadership in Pakistan is not a
    monolith. I think there are some who are -- who do understand, many
    who understand the problem and who want to get after it.
    Pakistan has been a victim of terror, and these extremists, in many
    ways. Recent attacks attest to that. And there are many who want to
    do the right thing.
    I think part of what -- part of the equation here is reassuring
    them that they have (a) strategic partner; they have someone who's
    trying to reduce other threats that they are concerned about; they
    have a partner that will help them gain capability to be more
    effective when they do take on these extremists, and so forth.
    So, I think we need to lean forward and try to provide that
    reassurance and those capability enhancements, but then we also need
    to expect performance, and we need to measure performance, and we need
    to follow up on that to see if they are doing their part of this
    important work.

  • SEN. BEN NELSON

    At 01:37:41
    1 minute

    In that regard, former ambassador and former --
    and our national security adviser to the Pakistan government, Mr.
    Durrani, told me some time ago, on at least more than -- at least one,
    perhaps two to three occasions, that the difficulty that they had in
    being able to deal with the largely unregulated and ungoverned area is
    that they didn't have the equipment. They had gotten money from us
    but they didn't have the equipment to do the kind of job that they
    wanted to do.
    And so, General Petraeus, I know I've communicated that to
    Admiral Mullen, and I wondered if we -- I don't, we're not going to
    turn over all of our best equipment, and our trade secrets, and what
    have you, to somebody else, but are we in a position, and have we
    begun to give them the kind of equipment that we would expect them to
    use to be successful in that area?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:38:41
    1 minute

    We have begun that, Senator. This is why the
    Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capability Fund is so important. Their
    military operations come down, at the end of the day, to "will and
    skill."
    In the "will" category, the will is growing. But the will is
    also helped enormously by a sense that we are going to be with them,
    because if they don't sense that, they will cut another deal. They'll
    have a short time perspective -- short-term perspective that says,
    let's get -- "no car bombs for a few months," and that's worth another
    deal with -- but then the deal allows the insurgents to expand their
    area of control.
    When it comes to skill or capability, there is some, certainly,
    resident. Admiral Olson's Special Operators are doing a terrific job,
    but in small numbers. And, as he noted, we are doing as much as they,
    in a sense, will allow us, or facilitate us, in doing. That is
    gradually growing.
    And in truth, it is growing based on trust at small units going
    all the way up to the level of the Frontier Corps and the 11th Corps
    out in western Pakistan. Again, this is, though, where that resource
    provision is so important.

  • SEN. BEN NELSON

    At 01:39:59
    2 seconds

    Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 01:40:01
    4 seconds

    Thank you, Senator Nelson.
    Senator Graham.

  • SEN. LINDSEY GRAHAM (R-SC)

    At 01:40:05
    26 seconds

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you all for your service, particularly Admiral Olson and
    General Petraeus.
    All those under your command have done a great job,
    and I do appreciate what the administration is trying to do in
    Afghanistan. I think you're generally on target and want to give you
    all the support I can to continue to win this fight.
    Admiral Olson, the likelihood of fighting going up in Afghanistan
    this summer and spring is great. Is that correct? There'll be more
    fighting?

  • ADM. OLSON

    At 01:40:31

    Yes, sir.

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:40:31
    10 seconds

    The likelihood of foreign fighters coming to
    Afghanistan, is that going to increase also?

  • ADM. OLSON

    At 01:40:41

    There is potential for that, yes, sir.

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:40:41
    12 seconds

    Okay. Would you consider someone captured on the
    battlefield in Afghanistan an enemy combatant to be held by our
    forces, if we capture somebody involved in the insurgency?

  • ADM. OLSON

    At 01:40:53
    3 seconds

    Sir, it depends on who that is and what he was doing
    in Afghanistan.

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:40:56
    3 seconds

    He was over there trying to kill us.

  • ADM. OLSON

    At 01:40:59
    5 seconds

    Yes, sir. If he's a lawful combatant and a declared
    hostile person, then he's certainly -- yes.

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:41:04
    6 seconds

    Okay.
    General Petraeus, we have foreign fighters in detention now in
    Afghanistan. Is that correct?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:41:10
    3 seconds

    It is.

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:41:13
    2 seconds

    What are we going to do with these people?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:41:15
    3 seconds

    I am not sure about that right now.

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:41:18

    Madame Secretary --

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:41:18
    3 seconds

    (Inaudible) -- my policy guidance here, if I may.

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:41:21
    3 seconds

    -- that is still a work in progress, I take it?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 01:41:24
    13 seconds

    Yes, Senator. I think that the record has been
    that many of these we have to turn over within a certain period of
    time to the Afghans. Some of those are further detained. Some of
    them are prosecuted. Some of them will have then released.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:41:37
    5 seconds

    Well, and we have also returned some to their
    home country when you're talking about international fighters.

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 01:41:42
    2 seconds

    I'm sorry, I thought you were talking about
    Afghans.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:41:44
    4 seconds

    No, I mean, that's -- but the challenge is what
    to do about those who --

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:41:48
    4 seconds

    Who are not going to be turned over.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:41:52
    4 seconds

    Well, or who we can't return to the foreign
    country because that country doesn't treat them humanely.

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 01:41:56
    9 seconds

    With the closure of -- with the planned closure of
    Guantanamo Bay, I think the administration is in the process of
    figuring out exactly what do we need to do with those who are too
    dangerous --

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:42:05
    30 seconds

    Mr. Chairman, I think that this committee could be
    helpful. We need to get ahead of this problem. There are some that
    will not be repatriated to their country. There are some that we're
    not going to turn over to the Afghan legal system, because that would
    be a disaster. And we need to find out as a nation what to do with
    these folks, because I think they're very dangerous just to let them
    go.
    From the 30,000 foot level here, General Petraeus, due to the
    success in Iraq, would you now consider Afghanistan the central front
    in the War on Terror?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:42:35
    2 seconds

    I think you'd have to take Afghanistan and
    Pakistan together --

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:42:37

    Okay, those two together.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:42:37
    6 seconds

    -- as a problem set, those two together, yes,
    sir.

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:42:43
    3 seconds

    And you would consider that now the central front.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:42:46
    4 seconds

    In fact, our focus is truly shifting to that
    front.

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:42:50
    9 seconds

    Okay. The Kerry-Lugar legislation, how empowering
    would that be to our efforts in Afghanistan if the Congress would pass
    that?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:42:59
    15 seconds

    It would be of enormous importance, not just
    because of the tangible resources that it provides to Pakistan, but
    also because of the sense of commitment that stands behind it as well
    and the sustained nature of it.

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:43:14
    4 seconds

    Do you believe we should pass that as soon as
    possible?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:43:18
    3 seconds

    I hate to intrude in your affairs, sir, but --

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:43:21

    Well, I asked --

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:43:21
    2 seconds

    -- if you're asking my best professional military
    advice, yes.

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:43:23

    I am.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:43:23
    2 seconds

    That's correct.

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:43:25

    All right. But it would help the effort.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:43:25
    3 seconds

    Absolutely.

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:43:28

    Do you agree with that, Madame Secretary?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 01:43:28
    3 seconds

    Absolutely.

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:43:31
    15 seconds

    Now, this idea of repatriating or absorbing some
    Taliban members back into the Afghan society, do you support that
    generally as a policy, General Petraeus?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:43:46
    32 seconds

    I do. Again, it's one that has to be applied.
    In fact, as you'll recall, it was in the Munich security speech. It
    is something that has to be applied with a very nuanced, thorough
    understanding of local situations. This is the case of trying to
    identify and separate from the population those who truly are
    irreconcilable, who have to be killed or captured or run off, and then
    allowing those who are reconcilable to rejoin society, if you will,
    and to become part of the solution instead of a continuing part of the
    problem.

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:44:18
    15 seconds

    In a recent poll, 42 percent of Americans surveyed
    on that particular day said it was a mistake for the United States to
    have gone into Afghanistan. What would you say to those Americans who
    believe that, General Petraeus?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:44:33
    15 seconds

    Well, I think it's very important to remember
    where all of this started, and it started with al Qaeda, transnational
    extremists who were based in Afghanistan, and, of course, who carried
    out the 9/11 attacks.

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:44:48
    9 seconds

    Do you believe it's in our national interest not
    only to defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan but to make sure
    that the Taliban do not come back in Afghanistan?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:44:57
    12 seconds

    Absolutely, Senator. When the Taliban were in
    power when al Qaeda was allowed and invited in to establish the
    sanctuaries in Afghanistan, from which the 9/11 attacks were --

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:45:09
    12 seconds

    When it comes to Iran, what role are they playing,
    if any, regarding our efforts in Afghanistan? Are they supporting the
    Taliban insurgency, al Qaeda elements?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:45:21
    44 seconds

    There is a very small level of support that has
    been provided over the years by Iran to the Taliban that we have seen.
    There was a period a couple of years ago where they provided some
    explosively formed projectiles and others. We think there's a case
    recently where they provided a small amount of arms, ammunitions and
    explosives as well, but it has not been a significant, a strategic
    factor in Afghanistan.
    They're also working to increase their influence, some of that
    understandably, in Afghanistan, to establish relationships with the
    leadership of the Afghan government, and also, of course, locally out
    in Herat and the western portions of the country as well.

  • SEN. GRAHAM

    At 01:46:05
    34 seconds

    One final question. Is it fair to say, General
    Petraeus, that the American public can expect casualties to go up this
    year in Afghanistan, that there will be more fighting?
    And Madame Secretary, can American taxpayers expect that the
    expense of operations in Afghanistan will dramatically increase in
    terms of dollars to be appropriated?
    And to both of you, is it worth the cost of injured American
    military members, lives lost and money spent?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:46:39
    23 seconds

    Senator, I think that Vice President Biden had it
    exactly right when, after his last trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan,
    he said that this is going to get harder before it gets easier. That
    is correct. That is our assessment. And it is worth seeing this
    through to completion.

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 01:47:02
    21 seconds

    Senator, I would say there will be higher human
    costs and higher financial costs to this effort. Those facts were
    considered very carefully before the president made his decision. And
    we're going forward with the strategy because we believe that it's
    vital to the safety and security of the American people.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 01:47:23
    3 seconds

    Thank you, Senator Graham.
    Senator Udall.

  • SEN. MARK UDALL (D-CO)

    At 01:47:26
    1 minute

    Good morning, General. Good morning,
    Madame Secretary. Good morning, Admiral.
    General, I read with real interest the last day that David
    Kilcullen has written a book about his experiences and insights, and
    he draws a number of conclusions that I think would be useful to us as
    we move forward.
    One comment that he makes is that we should be careful about
    lecturing Islamic countries and countries in other spheres about
    terrorism and about the dangers of it. And it piqued my interest and
    curiosity.
    In that spirit, I heard you and, I think, Madame Secretary say
    that you believe the Pakistani government now does really see the
    Taliban as their enemy. And I also hear you say that we need to give
    them a clear sense that we will stay until the job is done.
    In that spirit -- and I wonder what Rudyard Kipling would write
    in this era; probably much of what he wrote over 100 years ago -- much
    of Pakistan's focus is to the east, into Kashmir. And is there any
    discussion about urging India and Pakistan to continue finding a way
    forward on Kashmir? Perhaps all three of you might comment.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:48:46
    2 minutes

    If I could just start with that, Senator.
    Together with my great diplomatic wing man, Ambassador Richard
    Holbrooke, this effort actually has started. I met, together with
    him, with the Indian national security adviser, for example, in
    Munich. We had a very -- what we thought was a very good discussion.
    That was followed up when the foreign minister of India came to
    Washington more recently.
    When Ambassador Holbrooke went out on his maiden trip through the
    area, my deputy went with him, and they were joined by the Pacific
    Command deputy for a swing into India as well after having been in
    Pakistan.
    It would be of enormous importance were the tensions to be
    reduced sufficiently between the two countries to where
    intellectually, as well as physically, Pakistan could focus more on
    what we, again, see as a much more important existential threat to
    Pakistan in the internal extremists than continuing to have that
    massive face-off against India to their east.
    One of the many tragedies of the Mumbai attacks -- which, of
    course, were a 9/11 moment not just for India but even for Pakistan, I
    would argue -- was that the Pakistani military once again focused on
    India for a period, and that continues to some degree. There's been,
    again, a diminution of the tension between the two countries over
    time, but it literally took their eye off the ball, one that they were
    really starting to focus on with the operations in the FATA, in Baijor
    (sp) and Moman (sp) and others developing, and even actually shifted
    forces; only about 6,000 or so, not hugely significant in their
    number, but it was almost the intellectual shift of focus that was as
    concerning to many of us as was the physical shift.

  • SEN. UDALL

    At 01:50:46

    Madame Secretary?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 01:50:46
    56 seconds

    Senator, I think you put your finger on a really
    critical matter.
    This is the issue -- one of the issues that really drives a more
    regional approach in our strategy -- that part of helping Pakistan to
    shift its attention and its resources and its efforts is reducing the
    tensions it has with India.
    If you look historically about why Pakistan helped to fund some
    of these militants groups, who've now become extremist or terrorist in
    their organization, part of it was to try to drive the Soviets out of
    their neighborhood, but part of it was also as a hedge against India.
    So I think to the extent we can reduce those tensions, we will help
    shift their attention and resources towards their really urgent
    threat, which is the extremist threat from within.

  • SEN. UDALL

    At 01:51:42
    3 seconds

    Admiral, do you care to comment?

  • ADM. OLSON

    At 01:51:45
    27 seconds

    Sir, I think I would just agree.
    It's very important to recognize the impact of India on the
    Pakistani psyche. It's important to recognize the capabilities of the
    Pakistani military were built to address the threat they felt from
    India -- that's primarily a conventional army focused to the east.
    And in order to reorient that army to a more counterinsurgency army
    focused to the west, any reduction of the tensions on the Indian
    border would be very helpful.

  • SEN. UDALL

    At 01:52:12
    39 seconds

    Yeah. There are certainly parallels between the
    shift we've had to make and other militaries have had to make. The
    preparations we made for the (fill-the-gap ?) scenario. Of course,
    we've had to now set aside and actually face the 21st century as it
    presents itself to us.
    General, you talked about the greater mil-to-mil contacts between
    the Pakistani and Afghani militaries. Do you see a similar dynamic
    emerging -- and this would also be directed to the secretary --
    between the civilian leadership in those two countries -- because, of
    course, you have to mirror those contacts for them to be effective
    overall?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:52:51
    1 minute

    In fact, as President Zardari assumed office,
    there was really an unprecedented number of backs and forths between
    the heads of government and some of their ministers.
    And as you may know, Senator, we hosted here in Washington --
    three weeks ago it was now, I think perhaps four weeks -- what was
    called the Tripartite. And it was delegations from Afghanistan and
    Pakistan, led by their foreign ministers -- with other ministers
    present as well -- and then very high level on this side as well with
    the secretary of State in the lead.
    There will be further tripartite meetings like that. So that
    will continue to foster the growing relationships between those two
    countries. Candidly, we have to do a great deal of work in the
    intelligence arena. The relationship between the intelligence
    services of Afghanistan and Pakistan would be an understatement to say
    that it is not cooperative. There is an enormous amount of suspicion
    and really outright enmity that's built up over the years. So we have
    a lot of work to do there.
    And the efforts to build the Joint Coordination Center, Torkham
    Gate, at the western edge of the Khyber Pass are among a variety of
    different initiatives that are being taken at the military level -- as
    well as, again, there's a military tripartite group that meets also.

  • SEN. UDALL

    At 01:54:14
    4 seconds

    Madame Secretary, I see my time's run out, but if
    you could answer shortly that would be --

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 01:54:18
    23 seconds

    I would just add that the trilaterals will
    continue.
    One of the most important byproducts that we've seen from that
    process is that it's encouraged a host of interim bilateral meetings
    between the Afghans and the Pakistanis and their various counterparts
    that are ongoing between the trilateral meetings. So I think the
    level of dialogue and constructive interaction is increasing.

  • SEN. UDALL

    At 01:54:41

    Thank you.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 01:54:41
    6 seconds

    Thank you, Senator Udall.
    Senator Chambliss to be followed by Senator Webb.

  • SEN. SAXBY CHAMBLISS (R-GA)

    At 01:54:47
    1 minute

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And let me thank all of our witnesses again for your great
    service -- be it military or public service. We appreciate you very
    much.
    General Petraeus, there has been some comments coming out of the
    administration over the last several days with respect to the so-
    called new strategy in Afghanistan that has been a little bit
    troubling to me.
    And statements concern the fact that it's being said that we have
    been operating Afghanistan on the cheap. And obviously, it's a
    concern to all of us as policymakers that we provide our military with
    whatever they ask for.
    Now, I understand you obviously were the commander in the Iraqi
    theater and you've only been at CENTCOM now for a few months. But are
    you aware of anything that has been asked for by either CENTCOM or by
    General McNeil or General Eickenberg (sic/Eikenberry) or anybody else
    in Afghanistan that has not been given to them in the way of resources
    or commitments on the part of the Pentagon to that theater?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:56:05
    29 seconds

    Throughout 2009 -- all the way out through 2009 --
    the requests that were made by General McKiernan that I supported and
    sent forward have all been approved. There are requests beyond that
    period that are still out there. And frankly, we think it's prudent
    to do some assessments, see how this moves forward and there's
    certainly no need for decisions on that now.

  • SEN. CHAMBLISS

    At 01:56:34
    12 seconds

    I understand going forward, but I'm talking
    about previous requests that may have come from former commanders in
    theater or commanders at CENTCOM that weren't positively addressed.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 01:56:46
    7 seconds

    I can only talk about the period in which I've
    been in command since the 31st of October last year, I'm afraid,
    Senator.

  • SEN. CHAMBLISS

    At 01:56:53
    5 seconds

    Okay.
    Secretary Flournoy, do you have any comment on that?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 01:56:58
    54 seconds

    Sir, I do believe that there have been some
    requests that have not been fulfilled and the one that we looked at
    very closely in the review was the one for trainers.
    We were over, you know, I think 1,300 short for trainers for ANA,
    over 1,000 short for trainers for the police. That's one of the
    reasons why the president agreed to deploy the additional brigade.
    And that request for forces had not been fulfilled for quite some
    time. And as we put greater emphasis on building the Afghan forces we
    felt it was very important to fully resource that request, which had
    been on the books for a while.
    So I think there are some examples which, you know, that we found
    looking at it from an historical perspective.

  • SEN. CHAMBLISS

    At 01:57:52
    1 minute

    Okay.
    Secretary Flournoy, General Petraeus made a statement -- I want
    to make sure I'm quoting you right, General, so if I say anything
    incorrect, please correct me -- but in talking about what's going on
    in Iraq, in response to Senator McCain, you said that the Iranians are
    still aiding our enemies in Iraq with respect to providing munitions
    or whatever to those who are attacking American soldiers. They are
    still part of the process that's being addressed in Iraq today.
    And what concerns me, Secretary Flournoy, is that we have the
    Iranians, who we know have provided munitions to our enemy in Iraq and
    who have -- that enemy has sought to do harm to American soldiers on a
    daily basis. And yet, beginning yesterday at The Hague, we have
    invited the Iranians to sit down at the table to discuss Afghanistan
    and the way forward in Afghanistan.
    So what's puzzling to me and what concerns me is are we engaging
    the Iranians with respect to just Afghanistan? Are we going to talk
    to them about Iraq and try to move the peace process forward in that
    respect? Of is this just with relation to Afghanistan -- the
    discussion that's taking place right now?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 01:59:24
    53 seconds

    The meeting at The Hague was really to bring them
    into the discussion of Afghanistan, because they have been part of the
    problem in Afghanistan. And we believe they actually have interests in
    Afghanistan becoming stable over time and we want them to change their
    behavior and become more a part of the solution by ceasing some of the
    more troublesome activities they've exhibited there.
    I do think that over time we want to make clear to Iran the full
    range of behaviors that we find problematic that we would like to see
    changed. I know that in Iraq, in the meantime, we've continued to put
    military pressure on them where possible to try to prevent them from
    continuing those unhelpful activities.

  • SEN. CHAMBLISS

    At 02:00:17
    30 seconds

    Picking up again on Senator Graham's question
    with relation to the prisoners in Afghanistan that are there today,
    and ones that may be taken over the next several weeks or months or
    whatever period of time we may be there: General Petraeus, is it the
    intention now to keep those prisoners in Afghanistan for some
    indefinite period of time, or is that part of the policy decision that
    is outside your realm that you mentioned?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:00:47
    3 seconds

    That is part of a review that's ongoing, Senator.

  • SEN. CHAMBLISS

    At 02:00:50
    12 seconds

    If we should pick up a high-value target in
    Afghanistan, what would happen to that high-value target? Where would
    they go?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:01:02
    5 seconds

    They would go to the theater internment facility
    at Bagram.

  • SEN. CHAMBLISS

    At 02:01:07
    9 seconds

    Okay.
    Secretary Flournoy, is there any potential for any of those
    prisoners to be transferred to U.S. soil? Is that under
    contemplation?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 02:01:16
    9 seconds

    Sir, I know this is a policy that is under review
    and I am not aware of the details of where this is coming out, but I
    can get back to you on that.

  • SEN. CHAMBLISS

    At 02:01:25
    3 seconds

    Okay.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 02:01:28
    3 seconds

    Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
    Senator Webb.

  • SEN. JIM WEBB (D-VA)

    At 02:01:31
    1 minute

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Flournoy, let me start by asking you a question.
    First, I would say I appreciate what the president was saying
    when he talked about focusing this strategy more directly toward
    countering insurgency and eliminating the presence of the Taliban.
    At the same time, I'm a little concerned with how we're going to
    pull this off with respect to cooperation in Pakistan, whether there
    really is a true incentive at the right levels in the Pakistani
    government and military to strongly cooperate with NATO in this
    effort.
    It's been reported -- I think Arnaud de Borchgrave is probably
    the most comprehensive, does the most comprehensive reporting in terms
    of the situation in Pakistan.
    He has a piece, actually, this morning on this, pointing out that
    Pakistani intelligence inspired and nurtured the Taliban movement with
    a view of taking over Afghanistan in the wake of the Soviet defeat in
    1989, that there are currently, according to Mr. de Borchgrave,
    Pakistani intelligence agents operating in Afghanistan to support the
    Taliban.
    How are we going to address that situation?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 02:03:07
    1 minute

    Senator, I think it is an open question, and I
    think we need to test the proposition.
    And I think one of the things that is a -- that is changing in
    the Pakistan context is the degree to which the threat is manifesting
    itself within Pakistan at a level that is really affecting public
    attitudes, that it is affecting leadership attitudes, et cetera.
    So I think we need to test the proposition by -- and the way we
    do that is to put a substantial offer of assistance and a substantial
    commitment to work with them to take this on, to reduce tensions
    elsewhere in the region so they can refocus and take this on.
    I think we need to test the proposition, but I also think we need
    to -- and this is where the metrics become very important -- we need
    to monitor their performance, their actual track record in
    implementing the necessary steps.
    I think that's the point where we are, and that's what the
    strategy recommends going forward.

  • SEN. WEBB

    At 02:04:09
    1 minute

    I would also submit that there should be ways to try
    to measure the true incentive, not simply from the current top
    leadership in Pakistan, but from other elements that have considerable
    power in Pakistan.
    This is a situation that we have been monitoring for some time at
    a committee level, rather than at a operational level. But there's
    been considerable reporting that, for instance, the Pakistani military
    operating in these tribal areas had had a fairly soft hand when it
    comes to Taliban, as opposed to al Qaeda -- the apprehensions that
    they've made and the operations that they've conducted.
    So I think this clearly should be on our radar screen in terms of
    truly measuring the incentives and the intentions in Pakistan.
    How are we going to know when our national task is finished? And
    I would ask Secretary Flournoy to answer that and then, General, or
    Admiral, if you'd like to add. How are we going to know? What is the
    end point?
    Actually, I think General Petraeus is kind of famous for having
    asked this question at the very beginning of the Iraq war, to a
    reporter.
    But how are we going to know when this is over? When is -- how
    does this end?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 02:05:30
    51 seconds

    Sir, I'll give you my answer and then let the
    person who asked the question try to give his. (Laughs.) But --
    I think that a key point of defining success is when both the
    Afghans and the Pakistan -- Pakistanis have both the capability and
    the will to deal with the remaining threat themselves -- that the
    period of extraordinary intervention and assistance comes to a
    transition point and we go to a more long-term, normal development
    assistance relationship with both countries.
    To me, it is when that -- when they -- when we have reduced the
    threat and built that capacity locally to the point where they can be
    much more self-reliant in managing this problem.

  • SEN. WEBB

    At 02:06:21
    6 seconds

    That puts us sort of at the mercy of their policies.
    General, can you give me a more practical -- (word inaudible)?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:06:27
    3 seconds

    Well, I guess I'd echo that --

  • SEN. WEBB

    At 02:06:30
    4 seconds

    Or maybe more mechanical. What physically -- how are
    we going to know?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:06:34
    35 seconds

    Well, I think, again, frankly, in Iraq we have
    known when we were able to transition responsibilities to not just the
    Iraqi security forces, but to other institutions of the Iraqi
    government.
    Now, Afghanistan's a very different country, does not have some
    of the blessings, certainly, that Iraq has when it comes to oil and
    revenue. But nonetheless, the task will be for them to shoulder the
    responsibilities of their own security and other responsibilities of
    governance.

  • SEN. WEBB

    At 02:07:09
    17 seconds

    When is the last time that Afghanistan had an actual
    functioning national army that could clearly be said to be in control
    of operations inside its own country?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:07:26
    3 seconds

    Probably more than 30 years ago, at least,
    Senator Webb --

  • SEN. WEBB

    At 02:07:29

    If then.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:07:29
    37 seconds

    -- in the '70s, in that period. And certainly it
    was a combination of security arrangements.
    But I think that as a student of history as well that you would
    agree that between the period -- most recently, for example, say 1900
    and, again, the 1970s -- that there was a -- in Afghanistan there was
    a conception of a nation-state, and that there was the exercise of
    governance within an Afghan model that did exist.
    And of course it's been the intervening more than three decades
    of war that have done so much to damage all that.

  • SEN. WEBB

    At 02:08:06
    37 seconds

    I would say, perhaps, a brief period, more than 30
    years ago for about 30 years, you could say that there was some sort
    of a functioning national army in Afghanistan. Not previous to that
    and not since.
    And it's a little bit different in terms of the challenge, even
    that we were -- we're facing in Iraq.
    My time is up, but I would like to ask one other question that
    goes on -- goes along with this.
    When you're talking about this policy of living among the people,
    holding areas that have been cleared, who do we anticipate are
    actually going to hold these areas?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:08:43
    1 minute

    Well, it will literally vary from location to
    location. The options, of course, are local police; their version of
    national police, the national civil order police, can assist with
    that.
    And then the Afghan National Army as well as now the Afghan
    Public Protection Force, which is a pilot program -- just concluded
    the first iteration of this. About 240 or so members graduated.
    They'll be partnered with Special Forces.
    We'll learn, undoubtedly, some hard lessons from this effort and
    apply them as we carry out subsequent of these.
    This is not quite a Sons of Iraq. In fact, it's actually a more
    institutionalized and, frankly, more rigorous Sons of Iraq program,
    because it included weeks of training, specific equipping, and then a
    specific partner force. But that is how we would see that.
    If I could also, Senator, there is an -- also a difference in the
    way we literally live with the people in Afghanistan. You don't -- as
    in Iraq, where we plunked ourselves down, as you know, and your son
    did, that is not as likely here, given that the -- much greater rural
    population than urban population.
    And it will be probably even more likely that in coordination
    with tribal elders and the local mullahs that we'll actually occupy on
    the edge of a community, not literally right in the center of it.

  • SEN. WEBB

    At 02:10:12
    8 seconds

    Right. So it -- largely will depend on the
    confidence and the will power of the local Afghanis --

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:10:20

    Exactly.

  • SEN. WEBB

    At 02:10:20
    3 seconds

    Right. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 02:10:23
    4 seconds

    Thank you, Senator Webb.
    Senator Sessions.

  • SEN. JEFF SESSIONS (R-AL)

    At 02:10:27
    47 seconds

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Well, General Petraeus, I asked Secretary Gates about, in effect,
    what kind of unease he had and -- about moving this additional troop
    level there, in light of his strong comment that we wanted a Afghan
    face on the situation.
    Would you just share with us the tension between greater American
    involvement, greater activity, and the need to have the Afghan army
    and police and government be the force that takes -- survives -- saves
    that country?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:11:14
    57 seconds

    Senator, the concern there is that, taking into
    account Afghanistan's history and the people that -- who have never
    looked kindly on those who are seen as invaders or would-be
    conquerors, that the additional forces have to be seen by them to be
    there for them, to help secure them, to serve them, to be good guests,
    good neighbors, good partners.
    And that's why I mentioned that piece in my statement and pointed
    out the counterinsurgency guidance that General McKiernan has
    published that gets at the heart of this as well.
    The additional forces can't be seen as coming in and taking over
    a country that has never accepted that kind of activity. It has to be
    seen as a force that is coming in to be their partners and to help
    them against a common threat.

  • SEN. SESSIONS

    At 02:12:11
    6 seconds

    You're satisfied that that's given enough
    attention in your plans?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:12:17
    10 seconds

    I am. It is something we will need to continue
    to work on, as with civilian casualties, as with a number of other
    activities that -- (inaudible).
    (Cross talk.)

  • SEN. SESSIONS

    At 02:12:27
    10 seconds

    Now, we do have this shortage of trainers still,
    do we not, to reach the level of training the Afghan army that we'd
    like it to --

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:12:37
    1 minute

    We do, and I actually made a note that I want to
    see what that will be when we project out, with the addition of the
    4th Brigade of the 82nd, the elements that will provide the additional
    trainers and advisers.
    I should point out that there really has been a shift that
    McKiernan has asked that all of the additional forces that are
    provided, and that actually started with the Marines that went into
    the Regional Command South area, that they be dual-capable or dual-
    mission, if you will. That they could partner with Afghan forces and
    provide advisory and assistance tasks in that regard, even as they're
    also conducting their own operations.
    As you know, this is a shift that we're also going to make in
    Iraq over time as we move away from combat brigades to advisory and
    assistance brigades. And that's the concept. This will be the
    biggest force that we have sent in, by far, that will have that
    capability. But we've already been experimenting with the initial
    elements of the Marines, and the other Marine units that go in will
    have this same kind of capability and preparation. Again, we'll keep
    learning about this as we do.

  • SEN. SESSIONS

    At 02:13:49
    33 seconds

    Well, we learn as we go. And anybody that thinks
    that -- I think the reason we have to learn and change is because the
    enemy does not desire to be defeated, captured or killed, and they
    change. As soon as you confront one of their tactics, they will
    develop another. And so it's not -- when you suggest for all of us
    and the American people to understand that when tactics changes, it's
    because often the enemy and their agenda has changed.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:14:22
    31 seconds

    Absolutely, Senator. And you'll recall in the
    counterinsurgency guidance that you read that we had in Iraq, that the
    final bullet on there was learn and adapt. The enemy does change.
    This is a thinking and intelligent enemy. And we must adapt.
    Ideally, you try to get ahead of the enemy, of course, in what it is
    we're doing. But what works today won't necessarily work tomorrow,
    and what works today in one place won't work necessarily in the other.

  • SEN. SESSIONS

    At 02:14:53
    42 seconds

    Secretary Flournoy, I won't repeat questions
    about the Pakistan situation, but Pakistan has been a long-time ally
    of the United States. This is a very important issue. It has a
    history of democratic leadership. It waffles back and forth over
    time, but we can hope it will continue to maintain its democratic
    traditions. And I just believe we need to be respectful of them, not
    lecture them, and see if we can't find common interests that represent
    their interests and to acknowledge some of the difficulties they may
    be facing internally on some of these issues.

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 02:15:35
    2 seconds

    I couldn't agree more, Senator.

  • SEN. SESSIONS

    At 02:15:37
    1 minute

    Sometimes I hear our talking heads and our
    politicians talk about Pakistan like we can order them around. This
    is a sovereign nation and an important nation. And I hope that we can
    all remember that. And I would share that I think Senator Webb's
    comments about the difficulty of creating a fully functional
    government in Afghanistan is correct. This is a long time. They've
    never really had that in any sophisticated degree. And we don't need
    to be too optimistic in our abilities.
    Admiral Olson, the Special Operations forces were the key to the
    fall of the Taliban originally. How many forces did we have in
    Afghanistan when the Taliban collapsed and we partnered with the
    Northern Alliance? And how many of those were Special Operations
    forces?

  • ADM. OLSON

    At 02:16:45
    32 seconds

    Sir, I'll ask those who have a better knowledge of
    the total count to weigh in if they disagree. But I believe the total
    number of U.S. forces the day that the Taliban abandoned Kabul was on
    the order of 8(,000) to 10,000, about 2,000 of those had been provided
    by United States Special Operations Command. It was essentially a
    Special Forces group of operational detachments of green berets that
    was the core of that.

  • SEN. SESSIONS

    At 02:17:17
    33 seconds

    Well, they did a fabulous job. They're not able
    to -- 2,000, not able to run the whole country of Afghanistan or help
    it be secure, but I do hope that your budget is sufficient to meet the
    needs for the future of the Special Operations forces within the
    entire military defense establishment that we have. Are you
    comfortable, do you have enough there?

  • ADM. OLSON

    At 02:17:50
    19 seconds

    Again, I'm not going to get ahead of the budget
    discussions on this one point yet. But as I said earlier, we are
    robust enough to meet the requirement to respond to crises, but we
    depend heavily on each of the services.

  • SEN. SESSIONS

    At 02:18:09
    23 seconds

    Do you feel like that your people are stressed to
    a level that they can't sustain now? Of course, I would hope there
    was some reduction in performance. But what is your basic feeling to
    us today about the stress level of your fabulous troops?

  • ADM. OLSON

    At 02:18:32
    12 seconds

    Sir, I think we're operating at a pace that we can
    sustain. There is unmet demand for Special Operations capability
    around the world, but we are settled into a sustainable pace at this
    point with the force we have.

  • SEN. SESSIONS

    At 02:18:44
    28 seconds

    That's good. General Petraeus, I would just say
    thank you to your soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. I know that
    I remember so vividly when President Bush had to ask them to extend
    their tour, some of them had already reached Germany. And they said,
    yes, sir, and they went back and served their country. And things
    were dark in those days. And it's improved so much. And I just think
    we need to thank the men and women in uniform who made that happen.
    They are the key people.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:19:12
    3 seconds

    I agree, Senator.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 02:19:15
    2 seconds

    Thank you, Senator Sessions.
    Senator McCaskill.

  • SEN. CLAIRE MCCASKILL (D-MO)

    At 02:19:17
    14 seconds

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Petraeus or Secretary Flournoy, either one, can you give
    me an estimate of how many contracting personnel you're going to
    expect in Afghanistan?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:19:31
    10 seconds

    I cannot, Senator. We can do a scrub of that and
    see what the projection is, but I cannot give that to you right now.

  • SEN. MCCASKILL

    At 02:19:41
    35 seconds

    And I think you probably understand, Secretary
    Flournoy, why I'm concerned. As we moved into Iraq, if somebody would
    have told us in the early days of that conflict that we were going to
    end up with 140,000 -- no, even worse, that we weren't really sure
    ever at any given time exactly how many contracting personnel we had
    engaged in the conflict -- I want to make sure that we're not going
    down this same road without having a very clear view of what the
    contracting needs are going to be, how many people are going to be
    involved and what it's going to cost.

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 02:20:16
    51 seconds

    Senator, I can assure you that Secretary Gates
    has asked the same question. He wants to understand what the
    contractor support footprint is going to look like for this larger
    force. I think the other thing that we're looking at is not only the
    numbers and the costs but also the composition. Can we place an
    emphasis on indigenous contractors so that when we do have to rely on
    contractors, we're actually contributing to the Afghan economy and
    creating job possibilities for Afghans. So it's a sort of, you know,
    there's at least an additional benefit there when we do have to rely
    on contractors.
    And I do think that historically that has been more of the case
    in Afghanistan. There's been a higher percentage of the contractors
    that we have used that have been indigenous.

  • SEN. MCCASKILL

    At 02:21:07
    9 seconds

    Well, I -- and is there a new operational plan
    for the new strategy?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:21:16
    1 minute

    There is an existing military campaign plan,
    Senator, that incorporates already these forces because these requests
    were made and they've been approved over time, as you know. So that
    strategy exists. We are obviously working very hard to establish the
    infrastructure in terms of bases, logistical support systems, command
    and control structures, communications and all of the rest. That is
    ongoing. A substantial amount of that work certainly is being done by
    contractors. The creation a few years back of the Joint Contracting
    Command for Iraq and Afghanistan has improved, we believe very
    strongly, the conduct of these different contracts and so forth.
    I should also add that we have certainly all tried to learn
    lessons from the findings of the SIGIR in Iraq. And the establishment
    of former General Fields as the SIGAR, the special inspector general
    for Afghanistan reconstruction, is a very good move, in our view, as
    are the other oversight mechanisms that the secretary and the
    president mentioned.

  • SEN. MCCASKILL

    At 02:22:38
    2 minutes

    I would like to deprive him of as much work as
    possible. I would like us not to have 400 or 500 different reports on
    how badly we have handled contracting in Afghanistan, like we do
    candidly with what happened in Iraq. And I just want to emphasize
    that the time to deal with this is now. The time to get on this and
    have a very good view because here's what our military does so well,
    better than anybody on the planet, and that is going after the
    mission. With honor, integrity and leadership we go after the
    mission. And contracting has been an afterthought, and we can't
    afford it.
    I don't want to cut you off, Secretary Flournoy, but I do want to
    get to one other area, and we can come back to what you wanted to say,
    and that is how we're transitioning out of Iraq with contracting
    personnel.
    I do have a very clear org chart now, General, about the
    contracting command in Afghanistan and Iraq.
    But the most recent report from GAO says that there is no unified
    structure that exists to coordinate the teams and units engaged in
    efforts to manage and execute the return of materiel and equipment
    from Iraq. And we're talking about 170,000 pieces of equipment worth
    16.5 billion (dollars). And of that, 3.5 billion (dollars) is within
    the control of our contractors.
    And I am worried that we are not paying enough attention on that
    front as we transition out of Iraq and into Afghanistan and that
    there's not any uniform, unified effort coordinating these two
    entities as to all this equipment and material and contractors. And
    you know, are they just disbanding? Are we drawing contracts to a
    close? We know the men and women are moving out in some kind of
    timetable for that, but we don't really know much about the contracts.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:24:38
    8 seconds

    Well, first of all, we actually have a plan that
    is to bring down the number of contractors. And I can share that
    slide with you --

  • SEN. MCCASKILL

    At 02:24:46

    That would be terrific.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:24:46
    2 minutes

    -- in fact because we've put a great deal of
    emphasis on this. And also, to the point the secretary made, we have
    had an effort ongoing for some time, as you know, to give Iraqis the
    shot at the contract. There was a period, frankly, where we lacked
    trust in our own ability to vet and so forth, so we used a very large
    number of third-country nationals in addition to the smaller number of
    U.S. contractors. So the Iraqi First effort has gone quite well
    actually with the Iraqi transportation network and a whole host of
    other initiatives.
    But those numbers literally are coming down. As that does
    happen, there is a process to account for the equipment that
    contractors have that were purchased for tasks they're performing on
    our behalf or on behalf of the other U.S. government agencies there to
    get a handle on that and then to bring that out with us as well or to
    dispose of it in some other manner that is legal and appropriate. But
    there is also our logisticians are doing a tremendous amount of work
    not just to build up the infrastructure and so forth for an effort
    that more than doubles what we are doing in Afghanistan.
    The surge in Iraq logistically was a miracle of modern military
    activities, but it was a surge that was only 30-plus-thousand on top
    of what was already 133-or-something-thousand in a country that had a
    great deal of infrastructure. In Afghanistan, we're pushing over
    30,000 and more than doubling it in a country that does not have the
    infrastructure. And so the absorption is a big challenge, and that is
    one reason that we have to space this out, and we have to build this
    up. But your points are very well-taken about getting a grip on that.
    In fact, the Joint Contracting Command in Iraq and Afghanistan
    has helped a great deal, so also has Congress's and the department's
    focus on increasing literally the number of contractors that we had in
    uniform. As you know, there was a period where the Army had no
    general officers in the contracting ranks whatsoever.

  • SEN. MCCASKILL

    At 02:26:53

    Right.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:26:53
    19 seconds

    I think there are now going to be five, but I
    don't want to speak for the Army on that. But again, all of these
    efforts are hugely important, given the rise in contractors that we
    have had, we think, in general, for good reasons, although there are
    also going to be some initiatives, I think, coming out of the
    department in this area. But I don't want to get ahead of the
    secretary on that.

  • SEN. MCCASKILL

    At 02:27:12
    3 seconds

    Secretary.

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 02:27:15
    35 seconds

    I think actually General Petraeus covered a lot of
    the ground I was just going to add. But the one thing I will say on
    the issue of revising the operational plan or the campaign plan, if we
    are successful and really plussing up the civilian side of the effort,
    I think the president will be asking the new ambassador and General
    McKiernan to put their staffs together to come up with a civil
    military, a whole-government campaign plan and to work that very
    closely with the U.N. and with other international partners to really
    get more synergy in our civil military efforts.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:27:50
    44 seconds

    If I could add to that, Senator. In fact, there
    is an existing military campaign plan, but the piece that very much
    needs to be added now is a much more robust and complete joint
    campaign plan along the lines of what Ambassador Crocker and I were
    able to do there in Iraq, and that is the full intention. In fact,
    Ambassador Holbrook has some instructions for that as the new team
    goes into the embassy (in addition ?).
    For what it's worth, in a few weeks from now, he and I are going
    to host an on-site actually in Washington on a Saturday to bring
    together civil and military and to talk about the kinds of policy
    guidance that is needed to help that effort move forward.

  • SEN. MCCASKILL

    At 02:28:34
    33 seconds

    Well, and in the contracting area particularly,
    we had a little bit of this always going on, you know. AID said,
    well, they aren't letting us do enough, and then State said, well, the
    military took it away, and the military said, well, we've got to have
    more CERP funds. Then meanwhile, we had LOG CAPs going to heights
    that no one ever anticipated that LOG CAP would go to in terms of the
    amount of money the American taxpayers spent. So cautionary warning
    that some of us are paying very close attention to how we do
    contracting in Afghanistan to see if we've learned any lessons.
    Thank you, all, very much for your service.
    And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 02:29:07
    3 seconds

    Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
    Senator Martinez.

  • SEN. MEL MARTINEZ (R-FL)

    At 02:29:10
    10 seconds

    Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
    Welcome, all, Admiral Olson, Secretary.
    And General Petraeus, I wanted to thank you for hosting me on
    Monday at CENTCOM.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:29:20

    It was great to have you, sir.

  • SEN. MARTINEZ

    At 02:29:20
    8 seconds

    General Hood and General Allen were very kind,
    and we had a very good briefing. And I appreciate that very much. We
    continue to be very proud to have CENTCOM in the state of Florida.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:29:28

    Proud to be there, Senator.

  • SEN. MARTINEZ

    At 02:29:28
    40 seconds

    Nice to have you, sir. I know some of this has
    perhaps been asked, but I wanted to just dip in a little bit more into
    the area of fully resourcing the effort in Afghanistan and whether or
    not, in addition to those, I guess, 17(,000) plus 4(,000), 21,000
    troops that are moving into the theater, have begun to move into the
    theater, the additional 10,000, I guess, which have been talked about
    by General McKiernan. And I realize that those might not be
    immediately needed. I wanted to ask, when will we know where we are
    in the fully resourcing of that additional 10,000?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 02:30:08
    1 minute

    Sir, the way this was presented to the president
    was sort of on a time line of when decisions would have to be made in
    order for troops to deploy to meet the requirement. And my
    understanding is that the remaining brigade decision and the
    headquarters decision are for troop arrivals in 2010. So those
    decisions will have to be made sometime in the fall.
    At the same time because we are redoubling our effort in
    Afghanistan and we expect to be making progress throughout this year,
    we also expect the commander to be reassessing his needs over time,
    and we expect that new or different requests may be put on the table
    over time. So that's part of this commitment to continuing to measure
    progress, continuing to evaluate how we're doing to see that. But I
    think the president's made every decision that he needed to make at
    this point in time. And I think those other decisions will be made at
    the appropriate time when the commander needs to know.

  • SEN. MARTINEZ

    At 02:31:19
    5 seconds

    I guess what I'm trying to understand is the
    level of commitment. If the troops were needed, would they be sent?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 02:31:24
    30 seconds

    I think this president has demonstrated with not
    only the troops you mentioned, there are also some additional
    enablers. I mean, we've gone from a posture of about 38,000 to now
    projected 68,000. I think his commitment -- I would never have used
    the phrase incrementalism to describe this. This is a very strong
    commitment on the military side and on the civilian side and the
    economic side by this president to try to make this mission
    successful.

  • SEN. MARTINEZ

    At 02:31:54
    50 seconds

    And I don't underestimate the importance of the
    civilian and economic side which I think are tremendously important in
    this effort, as they have been in Iraq as well. Here even more so
    because I think it's very clear we're not talking about a rebuilding
    effort. In many instances, it's building in the first instance which
    I think is very dramatically different.
    With regards to our NATO partners, the words of Secretary Gates
    continue to haunt me about the two-tier alliance, those that might
    fight and those that might not, and the continuing caveats with NATO
    partners. How and when will we be approaching NATO? Are we
    continuing to be committed to their participation in the fight as
    opposed to just civilian and support participation?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 02:32:44
    49 seconds

    Sir, we have been in consultation with NATO and
    with many of our NATO allies bilaterally in the development of the
    strategy. I will be going on behalf of Secretary Gates to the summit
    along with the president tomorrow and Friday, Saturday to really try
    to secure those commitments. And then following on in April, we will
    have further donors conferences, one for Pakistan and we're hoping to
    schedule one for Afghanistan to try to actually nail down exactly.
    But I think many of our allies have been waiting to be able to come to
    the summit with their commitment as a deliverable for that they
    promise to do. So I expect by next week we should have a much better
    sense of who is going to step up with what type of contribution.

  • SEN. MARTINEZ

    At 02:33:33
    37 seconds

    That's great. Good luck in that and appreciate
    your efforts in that regard.
    General Petraeus, I was going to ask you regarding Iran, there
    seemed to have been some statements as recent as the last day by Iran
    indicating some willingness to combat drug trafficking and developing
    and some reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan. Do you perceive
    that there's opportunity for Iran to become a more helpful partner in
    the Afghanistani effort, understanding that there share a long border
    and that the issues of drugs as well as refugees are of internal
    interest to them?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:34:10
    1 minute

    Well, there certainly are some shared concerns,
    Senator.
    And as you know, in the beginning they did play a part in the
    process. They also do not want to see the Taliban return to control
    of Afghanistan as a Shi'a nation. The last thing they want to see is
    a Sunni ultra-fundamentalist group that allows extremists to have
    sanctuaries on their soil.
    So there are some very good reasons why they should want to see
    the effort in Afghanistan succeed. But there are times when it
    appears that they are conflicted in their views of Afghanistan because
    there's a sense, at times, that they don't want an enterprise that
    we're a part of to succeed. So you have that dynamic. And, of
    course, you also have overshadowing that some pretty serious
    differences over other issues, as we look to the other side of the
    Central Command area of responsibility, into some of their activities
    in the nuclear realm.

  • SEN. MARTINEZ

    At 02:35:10
    35 seconds

    I understand. I suppose we don't have a really
    clear indication, as it's always difficult to read where they may be
    coming from and I guess that continues to be part of the haze that we
    have as it relates to Iran and their intentions.
    One last question in the moment I have left, Madame Secretary.
    China's participation. I'm intrigued as to how we're approaching
    China as perhaps of some help in the Afghanistani theater, their
    economic participation in the country. How do you view the potential
    for that to develop over the months ahead?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 02:35:45
    31 seconds

    I think it's a very important development that
    we've -- we're engaging them, we're bringing them to the table. They
    have a long-standing, historical relationship with Pakistan. They
    have long-standing interests in the region. And I think they are
    coming to the table sort of open to exploring ways that they can be
    helpful.
    Obviously, they're going to do it in ways that try to safeguard
    their interests. But I think where we find common interests, we
    should explore that as fully as possible.

  • SEN. MARTINEZ

    At 02:36:16
    20 seconds

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just in closing,
    General Petraeus, just say a word of thanks to you and your
    leadership, as well as your troops, for the tremendous success. I
    know fragile and I know reversible but I continue to believe that it
    is, hopefully, a lasting success in the Iraqi situation. And you
    deserve great credit and congratulations on that, thank you.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 02:36:36

    Thank you, Senator.

  • SEN. MARTINEZ

    At 02:36:36
    8 seconds

    And I guess, Admiral Olson, I shouldn't overlook
    the very great contribution of the special forces to this effort as
    well. Thank you.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 02:36:44
    2 seconds

    Thank you, Senator Martinez. Senator Begich?

  • SEN. MARK BEGICH (D-AK)

    At 02:36:46
    40 seconds

    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
    echo the comments that the senator just said and really appreciate the
    work you all have done. It's been actually an interesting couple of
    hours here listening to all the questions. The good news is most of
    my questions were answered, so you're lucky about that. But I do have
    some very specific ones I want to kind of rapid-fire, if I can.
    First, General, in regards to Iraq. As we start to draw down and
    turning the efforts over to the Iraqi government, are there any one or
    two things that really stand out that could become show-stoppers or
    issues that we've just got to keep our eye on as this process starts?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:37:26
    3 minutes

    There are -- actually there are several, Senator.
    The residual capacity that, as I mentioned, Iran does continue to
    provide support for in terms of what essentially are proxy extremist
    elements. We still see those.
    By the way, the Iraqi government is watching that very carefully
    and, in fact, their security forces will go after them when they have
    the intelligence to do that. And I should note that our special
    operations forces have trained those individuals and still do provide
    a variety of support and assistance -- although the Iraqi forces take
    the lead against the former militia and the other elements that used
    to be called the "special groups."
    There are residual al Qaeda -- and it's more than residual, it is
    still a force to be reckoned with -- it is the al Qaeda and other
    extremist allies that continue to carry out the suicide attacks that
    we have seen periodically. Touch woodph), those have generally been
    spaced out farther but we have seen some very tough ones in recent
    weeks nonetheless. Again, the Iraqi forces are very much going after
    those as well but they do require continued assistance in certain
    areas -- as we discussed, Diyala and Nineveh Provinces, in particular,
    in certain parts of Baghdad.
    Of big concern is the bundle of issues that is wrapped up in
    what's called the "disputed boundaries issues." Some of these are
    Arab-Kurd issues; some are Sunni-Shi'a issues. They are potentially
    very dangerous and we're quite worried bout the developments in some
    of these areas, although the United Nations' element there is about to
    make an announcement we hope that will start the ball moving forward
    in resolving -- at least for the near term -- some of these different
    issues.
    And then you have a host of other issues wrapped up in politics.
    Interestingly, the constitution, as it has played out, has an enormous
    amount of safeguards, and you actually see the council of
    representatives, their congress, executing its prerogatives and checks
    and balances on the power of the executive branch. You see this play
    back and forth, efforts by one to centralize, by others to hold that
    in check. But some of that can result in actual insecurity challenges
    and that's something else that we have to keep an eye on.
    Finally, the budget pressures because of the reduction in the
    price of oil have dramatically reduced the size of the budget that
    they have available to them -- the revenues available for them for
    this year. And that has caused some very painful decisions for them.
    They're working their way through that. A related one of those is the
    integration of the Sons of Iraq. It truly is an oversight. We do
    believe that money was moved and then came off the plate; it's back on
    the plate. And they keep finding short term solutions to what could
    be a long term problem, if not resolved properly over time. But the
    vast majority of the Sons of Iraq are now being paid by the government
    of Iraq, although each monthly payroll has certain degrees of emotion
    and tension connected with them.

  • SEN. BEGICH

    At 02:40:45
    31 seconds

    Thank you very much. I have another quick one, a
    follow up to Senator McCaskill's question regarding the -- as you deal
    with the contractors and the equipment they maintain and handle and
    how that gets transferred to you. Do you feel confident that you are
    resourced enough to handle that process? And when I mean resource,
    dollars for supporting your staff and other activities to make sure
    that process goes forward in a way that has limited the missing
    equipment and other types of things?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:41:16
    40 seconds

    I believe that we are. We have learned some
    tough lessons in this arena, as you know, and in other accountability
    arenas, frankly, over the years. We believe that we have implemented
    safeguards and are properly resourced. I do believe that there is
    still progress required in terms of increasing our capability broadly
    in the field of contracting in general. That process has begun and
    it's a little bit like training leaders, or developing leaders, for
    the Afghan National Security Forces. You just don't have those to
    pull off the bench and throw in at more senior levels.
    But the momentum has shifted in that regard and I think that's a
    positive direction.

  • SEN. BEGICH

    At 02:41:56
    1 minute

    Thank you very much. I'm going to shift now, if I
    can, to Afghanistan and look toward any one of you -- but I'll start
    with you, General.
    I'm going to read -- we kind of did some analysis. According to
    the Field Manual, 3-24, which I know you had some involvement in
    developing and authoring that, it talks about the density that you
    need to have and the ratio of 20 to 25 per 1,000. When you look at
    Iraq, which, again, I want to echo the comments throughout the day
    here that talked about the work that you have done there and the
    success that we have had there, the ratio when you look at that is 28
    to 1,000, based on our troops, the coalition, Iraqi Security Forces,
    and the army. All of those pieces added in is about 28 to 1,000.
    When you look at Afghanistan and where we are today and where we
    will be in 2001, based on the numbers, as well as, again, the same
    kind of analysis of apples to apples; today we're about seven to
    1,000. In 2011, we'll be at nine to 1,000 -- dramatically, it's half
    of what the manual talks about. I'd be interested in your comments.
    This is one area that is of concern to me and I recognize that we may
    reevaluate it in 2011, but at 2011 we're still at nine to 1,000 based
    on all the training that we do for their troops and other activities.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:43:17
    1 minute

    It is a concern, Senator. For what it's worth,
    not only did I obviously oversee the production of that manual and
    actually got into some serious editing, I personally made the decision
    to put that ratio in there because there was a dispute about whether
    it should go in and so forth.
    I have heard about it at almost every hearing that I've had since
    then but I stand by that because I think, intellectually, it was
    absolutely the right thing to do -- and in terms of integrity -- that
    we required that. Now, one area where, believe it or not, we actually
    have to get some more work by the intelligence community is literally:
    how large is Afghanistan? There is a dispute right now as to whether
    it is 30 million or perhaps even as low as 23 million to 25 million
    and the intelligence community is working on that; that, of course,
    affects the ratio.
    But the bottom line is, your point is exactly right, that even at
    the end of the additional coalition forces, the accelerated
    development of the Afghan National Army and the other Afghan National
    Security Forces, that certainly, according to that ratio -- if you
    assume that there's an insurgency throughout the country, which is not
    necessarily the case and that's another important factor, that you
    need more forces.
    Again, I think that's something, as the assessment goes forward,
    I would defer to the undersecretary on that.

  • SEN. BEGICH

    At 02:44:39

    Madame Secretary?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 02:44:39
    8 seconds

    Senator, if I could just -- there were several
    faithful students of General Petraeus's manual in the strategy review.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:44:47
    4 seconds

    She was present at the very first seminar as we
    developed that manual.

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 02:44:51
    1 minute

    We actually had several discussions on this very
    issue. What I will tell you is, we asked the intelligence community
    to give us their best assessment of where the insurgency had its
    deepest roots and where it was really focused and concentrated
    geographically in the country.
    And while there are pockets in the north and west that are
    important, the concentration really is in the south and up into the
    east. And so when we were looking at the troops required on our side
    by our allies, the Afghan troops, Afghan police, Afghan local security
    forces of sum total of all, we were trying to concentrate our efforts
    in that sort of insurgency belt in the south and the west to try to
    get to those kinds of ratios in those geographic areas where the
    insurgency is strongest.
    So we actually did take that into account, not so much in a
    countrywide fashion, but focused on the areas where the insurgency
    really has taken root.

  • SEN. BEGICH

    At 02:45:51
    41 seconds

    Thank you. My time is up and I'm also late for a
    noon event, but let me ask you if I could if you could prepare or
    share whatever level you can how those ratios look in those areas of
    concentration. I recognize -- as a former mayor I always had my
    police department tell me what the ratio should be, and then we had to
    manage based on situations throughout the city. So we always had a
    ratio. But I want to make sure that's the one area and to be very
    frank with you, I want to make sure you're resourced properly here and
    be aggressive about it so we're not kind of three quarters of the way
    in. So let me end there and Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the
    opportunity to ask some questions.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 02:46:32
    22 seconds

    Thank you, Senator Begich. We'll just have a three
    or four minute second round; there's only a few of us here so
    hopefully you'll be able to get some lunch before your next
    appearance.
    First on this 10,000 troop request, is there a pending request
    that is unfilled at this point for those 10,000 additional troops?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:46:54
    14 seconds

    There is a request for forces for those elements,
    Senator, and it did move through me. My understanding is that it has
    not been sent beyond the Pentagon at this time.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 02:47:08
    9 seconds

    Has that been sent -- I should look to you then
    Secretary Flournoy -- has that been sent by Secretary Gates? Has that
    request been made by Secretary Gates?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 02:47:17
    15 seconds

    The request was laid out along with all of the
    others on a timeline. And what the president was told is that that
    request is out there but he doesn't have to make it --

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 02:47:32

    Make the decision?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 02:47:32
    25 seconds

    -- make the decision until the fall so that the
    troops would arrive as planned in 2010. So that -- I think the
    president was focused on making every request he needed to be made in
    the current timeframe and I think he wanted to reassess where we are
    when -- you know, when that -- you know, at the time the decision has
    to be made.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 02:47:57
    5 seconds

    So that decision will be made in a timely way so
    that the troops, if the president --

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 02:48:02

    (Inaudible).

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 02:48:02
    8 seconds

    -- so determines can get there on the timeline that
    General McKiernan has requested them.
    Is that a fair statement?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 02:48:10

    Yes.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 02:48:10
    2 seconds

    Is that -- do you agree with that, General Petraeus?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:48:12
    2 seconds

    Well it would begin --

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 02:48:14
    4 seconds

    But they'd also may be --
    (Cross talk.)
    -- changing.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:48:18

    -- to make the --

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 02:48:18
    6 seconds

    No, it's up to the --
    (Cross talk.)
    -- the president will decide whether or not to --

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:48:24

    Right.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 02:48:24
    5 seconds

    If he decides in the fall to approve those 10,000 --

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:48:29

    Absolutely.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 02:48:29
    11 seconds

    -- they would then arrive in a timely fashion
    according to a timetable which General McKiernan more importantly I
    guess you, you're the commander of CENTCOM, have approved?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:48:40

    That's correct, Senator.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 02:48:40
    19 seconds

    Okay. So it's not like it's rejected or deferred,
    it's just that a decision will be made in a timely way one way or the
    other. And if it's made in a positive way in the fall, that would
    then respond positively to the current request for 10,000?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:48:59

    That's correct Chairman.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 02:48:59
    1 minute

    Okay.
    Just one -- sort of a comment and a question on this aid for
    Pakistan, the money which has been or will be requested, I guess it's
    called Kerry-Lugar money.
    My own feeling is that I'm willing to support that if I think
    it'll be effective. Whether it's going to be effective will depend on
    whether or not the Pakistanis have adopted the goals of dealing with
    the religious extremists in their midst and do it where necessary
    forcefully. And we've got ambivalent evidence as to whether or not
    they're committed to that goal.
    So I need to, as far as this one vote is concerned, to believe
    that those goals not only are at the top but sufficiently permeated
    the down below elements of the Pakistani government and military so
    that the aid would be effective. And would you think that's a fair
    position to take? I don't know, maybe that's an unfair way to state
    it but do you think that that is a fair view to take on my part?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 02:50:17
    50 seconds

    Senator, I think we're all looking for those
    indications that the intent of the assistance would be met. What I
    can tell you in this intensive dialogue and trialogue we've been
    having in the development of the strategy is that the Red Mosque
    attack, the assassination of Bhutto, the attack on the cricket team,
    the attack on the police station, these are really starting to have an
    impact on both average Pakistanis but also the leadership. They are
    -- you know, the problem is making itself very much felt. And so I do
    think we are at a different moment of opportunity now.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:51:07
    30 seconds

    Senator, can I just note by the way that your
    comments similar to that were in the newspaper I think it was
    yesterday, the comments that you made. And I shared those with a
    senior -- there's a senior Pakistani officer here right now in fact
    for a conference, in fact the undersecretary addressed all these
    central and south Asian chiefs of defense staff and other senior
    officers. And I will also share those with the Pakistani ambassador
    who I'm meeting tomorrow night.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 02:51:37
    1 minute

    All right. Now finally, it's a different aspect of
    the same problem. We cannot appear to be buying support for our
    policies, it's got to be that we are supporting Pakistan policies.
    Because if we appear to be buying something they otherwise would not
    pursue, it's counterproductive in terms of the reaction of the
    Pakistan people who want to believe that we're supporting their goals,
    not that we're buying something they otherwise wouldn't do because
    that is a domineering kind of a position to take. If we're buying
    something, now you know money can be used for two different purposes,
    one you go to the store, you buy something, or you can use money to
    support something like something you believe in like your family's
    goals.
    And it's a subtle difference in a way because it's still money,
    but it's a critical difference. It's maybe too nuanced for public
    consumption, I don't know, but it's a critically important difference,
    I believe in how then if there is a difference, if you accept that
    difference, can we make it clear that it is our goal to support a
    Pakistan government which has the goals of a stable Pakistan without
    religious extremists dominating or controlling things without the
    downside possibility that it would look like we're trying to persuade
    them to do something they otherwise wouldn't do.
    How do we, if you can follow that distinction, how would you --

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:53:19

    Chairman --

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 02:53:19

    -- pursue it?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:53:19
    41 seconds

    -- in fact in all of the recent studies, there
    has been a recognition of the importance of moving from what we have
    terms a transactional relationship with Pakistan to a partnership.
    And I think that captures exactly what you're getting at but as you
    also rightly note there is nothing easy about this. This is about
    relationships, it's about building of trust and confidence, it's about
    their recognition of the existential threat that it is a threat to
    them, not just a threat to us and the rest of the world and all the
    rest of that.

  • ADM. OLSON

    At 02:54:00
    1 minute

    Senator Levin, I think a point worth making is that
    as we strive for an increased and enhanced relationship, partnership
    with Pakistan, that we do recognize the sacrifices and contributions
    that they've made to date. They have been a strong ally and I think
    the forces that I provide feel that because they have been working one
    on one at a unit level and a training relationship with Pakistani
    forces who have captured thousands, killed hundreds, and lost numerous
    lives in the border region. And they fought -- there was a serious
    fight in Bajaur before a successful outcome there and there was a
    serious fight in Swat before an unsuccessful outcome there that they
    still hope to reverse.
    So at the unit level and where I've been able to visit the
    Americans and the Pakistanis working together in a training
    relationship, there is a solid statement of partnership. I know we're
    looking for a much more over demonstration of commitment by the
    Pakistani government, but I would like to be on the record as saying
    that the soldiers themselves, many of them have fought hard in the
    western regions of Pakistan.

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 02:55:28
    2 seconds

    And I would echo that, Chairman.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 02:55:30

    Thank you. Senator Lieberman.

  • SEN. LIEBERMAN

    At 02:55:30
    2 minutes

    Thanks very much. Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all
    of you. I want to make two quick statements and ask one question.
    The first statement is to thank you for the exchange that you had
    with Senator Levin about that pending request for 10,000 additional
    troops and the answer that the door is essentially open and a decision
    has not been made at the highest levels of our government. You know,
    I say that for the obvious reason that we learned, one of the lessons
    we learned painfully in Iraq is that numbers matter. And it's not
    numbers alone of troops as you always remind us General Petraeus it's
    how they're used and also that military strength is a necessary but
    not sufficient basis for achieving our objectives.
    But the lesson that, you know, I think should be with all of us
    from the time, the resources, the lives that we've lost over a period
    of time when we inadequately researched that war is that sometimes
    those short range decisions really cost you in the long run and I
    appreciate the fact that the request is pending and that the
    administration has not made a decision on it and is open to it this
    fall.
    Secondly, it may sound a little odd but I want to say a word on
    behalf of the Afghan people and there was some questions raised that I
    think you answered well General Petraeus. this is a remarkable people
    with a remarkable history.
    I'm not closing my eyes to any of the problems we have now, but
    they have survived a lot in their history, they have a real sense of
    nationhood. And one might argue in fact that though there are
    Pashtuns and Tajicks there that the divisions between them are
    actually much less than we found in Iraq between the Shia's and the
    Sunnis and Kurds, not in that the comparisons are not exact. But as
    we know, and as you know better than I, two things. One is their
    fighters are really committed, most of them. And they've now held an
    election and the people have showed in great numbers that they want a
    better future. Some of the people, a lot of the people at the top of
    that government are really quite impressive.
    So I think -- and they seem quite supportive comparatively
    speaking of our presence there and what we're trying to do for them.
    So I understand all the problems but I think this is a, not only do we
    have a security interest in how this comes out, ends in Afghanistan,
    the people want it to end well. Why wouldn't they? I mean, look at
    how every time there's a poll there, the Taliban comes out about at
    the bottom, lower even in numbers Congress had a short while ago,
    that's how bad the Taliban is doing in Afghanistan --
    Okay, now to my question --

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 02:58:26
    4 seconds

    Time is up. (Laughter.)

  • SEN. LIEBERMAN

    At 02:58:30
    45 seconds

    My question is this, I thought the president
    spoke very eloquently on Friday about the fact that there hadn't been
    adequate civil military cooperation partnership in Afghanistan, about
    the need to make that happen. So I wanted to ask -- and of course we
    know during a period of time when, particularly when Ambassador
    Khalilzad, General Barnwas here, certainly seemed like their offices
    were together, they were working together, the model that you built in
    Iraq with Ambassador Crocker.
    So what are doing to try to create that here and I know some
    people laugh at plans, but is there a coordinated civil military plan
    being written for the war in Afghanistan?

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 02:59:15
    1 minute

    I would just say we're working it at multiple
    levels at this sort of operational level if you will or the strategic
    operational levels, General Petraeus and Ambassador Holbrook are
    leading the effort that he mentioned.
    We've also tasked, or will be tasking a new, our current
    commander and the new ambassador to put together a campaign plan
    that's truly joint at their level. But even more important, or as
    important we are engaged in discussions with Kai Eide, the UN
    representative and our allies to try to ensure that we have an
    overarching sense of, you know, priorities and what we're doing, but
    that we've really encouraged Mr. Eide to move the UN presence into
    provincial presence so that province by province we have a much more
    coordinated effort on the part of the international community working
    hand in hand with the ICF forces.
    So it's complicated but we're trying to work the problem at
    multiple levels that are interconnected --

  • SEN. LIEBERMAN

    At 03:00:22

    Good.

  • SEC. FLOURNOY

    At 03:00:22
    2 seconds

    -- (inaudible).

  • SEN. LIEBERMAN

    At 03:00:24

    General?

  • GEN. PETRAEUS

    At 03:00:24
    24 seconds

    Well, in fact there's direction already been
    given to call Eikenberry, General Eikenberry right now who I think was
    reported out of committee yesterday and there is every intention to do
    just that. In fact, even the new DCM who goes in may start that
    process with General McKiernan. It was a topic that we talked about
    on Saturday as well.

  • SEN. LIEBERMAN

    At 03:00:48
    40 seconds

    Excellent, very encouraging. Thank you all, I
    will tell you that three of you, the testimony has been really
    excellent and really the three of you operate at such a high level
    that it should give all of us confidence. Admiral Olson, you asked a
    few less questions probably inherent to the nature of your covert
    special operations, you stayed relatively covert this morning but I
    appreciated your opening statement. You said really quite directly
    that the behavior of the enemy we're facing in Afghanistan ranges from
    malicious to evil, and it's because I agree with you that I'm so
    grateful that we have three people of your caliber leading the effort.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

  • SEN. LEVIN

    At 03:01:28
    1 minute

    I think you heard hear this morning a great deal of
    support for the president's direction and strategy. It's cohesive,
    it's strong, it's clear, it's goals are important goals and I hope
    you're all reassured by what you heard from this side but we're
    reassured from what we heard from you and your testimony was very,
    very helpful, it was important for the American people that the kind
    of questions which were asked be asked, you gave answers which I
    consider to be highly reassuring and we will now stand adjourned with
    our thanks.