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• 

  REP. REYES

  At 00:00:39
  15 minutes

  Good morning. The committee will please come to
  order. Today we convene the first public hearing of the House
  Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for the 111th Congress.
  Before I welcome our new members I want to remind everybody we're
  having this hearing today in what I call the home of Chairman Sonny
  Montgomery, someone that championed issues for America's veterans,
  someone that's highly regarded and revered, not just in Congress but
  by veterans everywhere. So we are very appreciative to Chairman
  Filner for allowing us to borrow this very historic hearing room here.
  With that I would like to extend a warm welcome to the new
  members of the committee, Mr. Smith and Mr. Boren, Ms. Myrick, Mr.
  Miller, Mr. Kline and Mr. Conaway. And I'd also like to welcome back
  to our returning members from previous service with the committee, my
  vice chair, Mr. Hastings, welcome back, and Mr. Blunt as well.
  Director Blair, welcome. This morning we're pleased that you are
  here, and happy to see you today. We also want to congratulate you on
  your recent confirmation and wish you well as you go forward under
  these difficult times that we're facing today as a nation.
  As the nation's third Director of National Intelligence, you will
  be required to continue to refine the role of the DNI and advance the
  goals of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
  while at the same time never losing sight of the threats to our
  national security. I think we often make reference that this will be
  much like flying a plane and building it at the same time. So we are
  definitely prepared to stand with you and support your efforts.
  Before we get started I also wanted to thank the director for
  meeting with members of the committee yesterday in an informal
  session. Feedback that I have gotten has been very positive, and we
  intend to do more of those meetings, being mindful and respectful of
  the challenges you face and the time limitations that you have. We
  deeply appreciate your willingness to do that.
  There were a few things about our discussion yesterday that I
  personally found very encouraging. First, I am pleased, Mr. Director,
  that you are looking carefully at the situation in Mexico and are in
  the process of determining whether we need to redouble our efforts in
  helping President Calderon and the Mexican government deal with
  threats posed by the drug cartels. Second, I am encouraged that the
  administration is conducting a comprehensive review of our policy in
  Pakistan and Afghanistan. And, third, I was interested to hear your
  thoughts on dealing with the detainees at Guantanamo Bay.
  When discussion turns to what our options might be with respect
  to closing Guantanamo Bay, I think it's important to remind everyone
  that the United States has been capable of detaining and holding
  terrorists on our soil for many, many years. By way of examples,
  today the U.S. prison system holds Ramzi Yousef, who is Khalid Sheikh
  Mohammed's nephew, and one of the planners of the first World Trade
  Center attack. He was captured in Pakistan, extradited to the United
  States, convicted, and he now sits in a U.S. jail.
  The U.S. prison system also holds Omar Abdel-Rahman, better known
  as "the blind sheep," a participant also in the first World Trade
  Center attacks, as well as Zacarias Moussaoui, convicted of
  participating in the September 11th attacks, also in a U.S. prison;
  Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, who has been labeled an enemy combatant by
  the Bush administration, has been securely held in a Navy brig. Those
  are just some of the examples of terrorists that are being held in the
  United States.
  Today I'm going to make a few general remarks and then address
  some specific areas of concern for our nation. This is the third
  annual threat assessment that I have presided over as chairman of this
  committee, and we are in a unique position this year. Although the
  new administration is just over a month old, we have seen some major
  changes to some of the most controversial issues which impact the
  intelligence community. President Obama's executive orders on
  detention and interrogation policies and on Guantanamo Bay represent a
  significant departure from the previous administration's policies.
  I know that many of us have strong opinions on what should be
  done in these critical areas. My intention, though, is to give the
  president and his new appointees some space to work through these
  issues as they propose a way forward. However, I think we all
  recognize that we don't have an unlimited amount of time, so I hope
  that the executive branch will move quickly on these critical issues.
  Director Blair, I am also hopeful that you and the new
  administration will bring about an improved interaction between the
  executive and legislative branches on intelligence matters. Too often
  in the past we've been left in the dark or simply told things too
  late, or told only part of the story. You heard some of those
  comments yesterday in the informal session. I am truly optimistic
  that you would bring positive change in this area as we see our way
  forward.
  One thing that will not change in the new administration is the
  strong character and drive of the men and women of the intelligence
  community. I have traveled throughout the world, as we mentioned to
  you yesterday, and have met with our intelligence personnel and have
  consistently come away impressed by the level of their dedication,
  their skill, their commitment and their bravery. I know, in talking
  with you, you intend to spend some time traveling and meeting these
  same men and women around the world that are doing such critical work
  for our nation.
  I hope that as you meet with them you will deliver to them our
  message of gratitude, support and encouragement. In the coming months
  we will also be asking you questions about funding and resource needs
  for the intelligence community. One of the principal functions of our
  committee is to ensure that the men and women working on the front
  lines have the tools that they need to combat terrorism and to protect
  our national security. We look to you for a frank assessment of what
  those needs may be.
  With respect to the substance of the threats facing the United
  States, I'll outline four very basic principles on which I hope we can
  all agree, and we'll seek your comment on them. First, al Qaeda
  remains a significant threat. Second, American security policy will,
  for years, continue to be driven by Iraq and Afghanistan. Third,
  while we will continue to focus on the hot spots around the globe, we
  simply cannot forget about growing threats from China, Russia, Iran,
  and about long-standing problems in Latin America and Africa. And,
  fourth, our nation's cyber infrastructure remains vulnerable to
  attack. Our intelligence community must be deeply engaged as we
  respond to these threats.
  On the subject of al Qaeda, I think it is beyond dispute that the
  last few years have seen expansion of the influence of al Qaeda and
  the Taliban in the federally administered tribal areas of Pakistan, a
  region known as FATA. This simply, in my opinion, cannot continue.
  With the freedom to recruit, train and plot new attacks on the FATA,
  new safe havens across the globe continue to grow and emerge. Of
  particular concern are the expanding al Qaeda networks in the Sahel
  region of North Africa and the emerging and intensifying al Qaeda
  presence in Yemen. The fight against al Qaeda is not simply a matter
  of warfare. We've also go to make progress in countering the
  extremist ideology. This committee needs to know what has been done
  to counter the extremist message throughout the world. What threat do
  we face from radicalization in the homeland? What advances have our
  allies made in combating this threat? And, simply stated, what can we
  do better to address these threats worldwide?
  With respect to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, our national
  interest will be tied to the outcome of these conflicts. Our children
  and grandchildren will pay the cost of these wars and will either reap
  the benefits or suffer the consequences of what we do here.
  The past two years have seen some success in Iraq, and thanks to
  the heroic efforts of our military, intelligence and diplomatic
  personnel, we are very grateful for all of their efforts. At the same
  time, while significant progress has been made in Iraq, we are losing
  ground to the Taliban and insurgents in Afghanistan who are now
  virtually indistinguishable from al Qaeda. These terrorists who have
  long found sanctuary in the border area between Afghanistan and
  Pakistan not only directly threaten U.S. national security, they
  threaten our allies by insisting on spreading their violent and
  distorted interpretation of Islam. So as we balance forces from Iraq
  to Afghanistan, how will we protect the gains in Iraq while stopping
  the slide in Afghanistan?
  As I noted at the outset, while we maintain focus on al Qaeda and
  on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we've also got the rest of the
  world to worry about. We must continue to focus on the threats posed
  by state actors such as Iran and North Korea. As we have recently
  read in the open press, Iran placed its first domestically built
  satellite in orbit. But the same technology that can launch a
  satellite and put it in orbit is also useful for launching missiles.
  Coupled with the possibility of Iran's nuclear ambitions, what is the
  intelligence community's assessment of this threat? What is the
  community's assessment of Iran's openness to increase diplomacy and
  engagement with the United States? Similarly, what progress has been
  made in the efforts to disarm North Korea? And what more needs to be
  done in both these critical and vital areas of the world?
  Russia continues to pose challenges to our country. It has
  engaged in an aggressive foreign policy designed to provide an
  alternative to the United States, and has positioned itself as a
  counter to U.S.-led international efforts. Through its military
  offensive in Georgia last summer, as well as its continuing
  intelligence efforts around the globe, Russia shows that it remains a
  threat to U.S. interests and our allies. Do we have, Director Blair,
  our intelligence resources adequately deployed to deal with this
  resurgence from Russia? In the last Congress I expressed my desire
  for the intelligence community to focus on areas that had long been
  neglected in favor of other high-priority issues. Latin America and
  Africa come to mind. We previously believed threats from these
  regions to be much less urgent, but they continue to have the
  potential to seriously threaten core U.S. national security interests
  and will continue to grow in scope and severity. The security of the
  United States is directly affected by events in these important
  places.
  Like many people on the southwest border of the United States, I
  am specifically concerned about the increase in violence and drug
  trafficking coming from Mexico. How has President Calderon managed
  this issue, and how will it affect the security of the United States?
  Colombia's long-term efforts to bring terrorism and narcotrafficking
  under control have had great success, yet Colombia continues to be the
  primary source of cocaine entering the United States. How can we help
  the Colombian government move forward? Africa-based terrorist groups
  such as al Shabab and al Qaeda have grown in influence and capability.
  How will we address these threats, especially when our resources are
  stretched so thin elsewhere?
  Finally, a word about cyber security. It is only in the past
  couple of years that we have really begun to appreciate the threat to
  our cyber infrastructure. This is a problem of enormous proportions,
  and I want you to know that we intend to work with you to address this
  vital and important national security asset from an intelligence
  perspective. There are a host of other concerns that I could address,
  such as the ongoing conflict in Israel, the threat of WMD
  proliferation, and the security impact of the global economic crisis.
  I will leave those subjects for the question period and conclude
  by reiterating my thanks to the brave men and women of our nation's
  intelligence community, and I want them to know that as chairman of
  this committee, I am reminded on a daily basis of their sacrifices as
  I look for our work here to be worthy of their commitment and their
  efforts. I trust and hope that you will consider us your partners in
  this effort.
  So I look forward to a productive hearing this morning and a
  productive Congress, and now I'd like to recognize our ranking member,
  Mr. Hoekstra, for any opening statement that he may wish to make.
  

• 

  REP. PETER HOEKSTRA (R-MI)

  At 00:16:15
  8 minutes

  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
  Welcome, Director. It's good to have you here. This is always a very
  interesting hearing. It is really one of the few opportunities where
  the American people have the opportunity -- they have the opportunity
  to see and to hear from you a description of the wide range of threats
  that we face as a nation and how we are organized to contain and
  defeat those threats. We recognize that much of the information that
  we potentially could talk about is of a sensitive nature, and that we
  will get into that in closed session.
  I would like to really just address three specific areas that I
  would be interested in hearing you talk about how you will deal with
  these. One is what I perceive as a lack of accountability in the
  intelligence community. You know, I've been disappointed, sometimes
  appalled, by the attitude of certain people within the intelligence
  community who mistakenly believe that they are not accountable to
  anyone outside of the intelligence community. The shocking disdain
  for outside oversight was most recently displayed in one of the
  documents produced inside the intelligence community, the report that
  was produced by the inspector general and the CIA on the Peru counter-
  narcotics program.
  According to this report, the CIA helped a foreign government
  shoot down an aircraft believed to be operated by drug smugglers. The
  report also found that the CIA did not follow proper procedures to
  protect innocent lives. The CIA's carelessness led to the death of
  Veronica Bowers and her infant daughter Charity, two American citizens
  who were my constituents. In fact, Veronica Bower's parents are also
  the constituents of one of our new committee members, Mr. Miller from
  Florida.
  The inspector general also found that certain CIA employees
  misled and withheld information from the Justice Department, Congress
  and the White House regarding the repeated lack of proper procedures
  in this program. In short, CIA officers disregarded the rules. Their
  carelessness resulted in the death of innocent Americans, and they
  then tried to cover up their carelessness, including perhaps lying to
  Congress.
  Congress hasn't been very well in following up on this, and I
  don't believe the community has been either. You know, we learned
  about the CIA inspector general's report in November. It's February.
  It's almost March now. This committee has not had one hearing or one
  briefing on the IG report about the Bower shoot down, what happened
  after it. No investigations have been launched, no witnesses
  interviewed, no reports filed -- nothing. Perhaps if those suspect
  flights in Peru involve banned steroids bound for professional
  baseball players, this Congress would have paid more attention. With
  all the attention generated by the steroids in baseball hearings, we
  finally see major league players being investigated and perhaps going
  to jail for lying to Congress. What more will it take for the same
  thing to happen to CIA employees who may have lied to Congress?
  Director, I think it is important that we get to the bottom of
  this issue. I think many of us on this committee believe that over
  the years it has been too difficult to get information from the
  intelligence community on specific areas where they are involved. We
  call it the 20 questions, where, you know, unless we ask the specific
  right question, we're not going to get the information that we need to
  do our job. In this case, specifically the information appears to be
  very compelling.
  Again, it comes out of the CIA inspector general's report that the
  information about what happened in this situation was available, was
  in the community, was known to many people within the CIA and within
  the community, but yet was never shared with Congress, and the problem
  -- not only this particular shoot down, but the pattern of what
  happened to this program and how it was run. And I hope that you
  aggressively go after this particular circumstance because it's still
  hanging out there. The trouble is, you know, it's five, six, seven
  years later and there is no accountability. You need to work on
  restoring the trust between the community, this committee, Congress
  and the American people, and by dealing with this case I think we can
  make a -- we can make significant progress in that direction.
  Secondly, with the administration's decision to close Guantanamo
  Bay, I'd like to hear when the administration is going to lay out a
  plan for addressing the threat from radical jihadists, in a
  comprehensive way. Tactical decisions are being made regarding the
  threat from radical jihadism, but I've yet to hear the administration
  outline its long-term strategy for containing and ultimately defeating
  the threat. How are you going to ensure that efforts to combat
  radical jihadists are properly resourced in light of planned budget
  cuts? In what direction do you see the administration leading
  America's fight against radical jihadism, and what would you
  recommend?
  And finally, your own office, the director -- what will the
  Office of the Director of National Intelligence look like? I'm
  concerned by what I perceive -- and I think many others on this
  committee perceive -- is a dramatic shift away from the Congress's
  vision of the size, composition and function of the Office of the
  Director of National Intelligence.
  When we passed the Intelligence
  Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, we created a new position
  to help manage the community and break down barriers between agencies.
  We deliberately broke apart the functions of the old director of
  Central Intelligence and gave the CIA its own director. The DNI was
  to be a coordinator of the intelligence community, a community
  organizer of sorts. The DNI staff was intended to be small and
  efficient. It was supposed to stay away from operational management.
  In four years, Mr. Director, we now have ODNI that we hardly
  recognize. The ODNI under your predecessors became entangled in
  management, grew enormous in size, and has amassed too many scarce
  intelligence resources for itself. Instead of a lean coordinating
  body, we got fat -- layer upon layer of bureaucracy in this community.
  We wanted this bill to transform the community, to coordinate the
  community -- and I appreciated some of the words that you shared with
  us yesterday that -- you know, you said, when I look at the community,
  it's working together more effectively than what it was the last time
  you saw it. And I feel -- I give the legislation credit and the
  leadership of the community, for making that happen and integrating
  the various aspects of the community.
  The other thing that we saw, though, that we wanted to have
  happen was that the ODNI would force key strategic decisions to be
  made, and in a number of areas we have seen that the ODNI has not
  forced these strategic decisions to be made and instead it has
  enmeshed itself in the tactical day-to-day operations of the
  community. And how we experience that is things that we used to get
  from the community relatively quickly by asking an agency, hey, we
  need this information, and getting it a few days later, we now find
  that we make the request to the community; a few days later we ask
  where is it, and they say, oh, we had to send it over to the DNI's
  office because before anything comes back to Capitol Hill, they've got
  to sign off on it, and instead of it being, you know, faster, more
  efficient, it's another layer of bureaucracy and controls, which has
  slowed the process.
  So I hope that under your direction you can create the foundation
  and the long-term direction for the ODNI that says, this is the
  strategic arm of the community that integrates the community and makes
  sure that the tough and broad decisions get made, but we are not going
  to try to manage the community on a day-to-day basis because that will
  just slow the community down. We need a flexible and agile community
  that can respond quickly to the threats that are out there. The ODNI
  was intended to transform the community and create that type of a
  community, not to be another layer of bureaucracy.
  So those are the three points that I would hope that we would
  hear from -- that we would hope you would address a little bit today.
  And with that, Mr. Chairman, I'll yield back the balance of my time.
  

• 

  REP. REYES

  At 00:25:06
  1 minute

  Thank you, Mr. Hoekstra. And I want to remind our
  members and witnesses that we are in open session this morning. If
  there is doubt about the classification of a particular subject or
  statement, reserve those issues for the closed session that will
  follow after this open hearing this morning. Without objection, the
  written statement from our witness will be made part of the official
  record of this hearing.
  This morning, Director Blair, you've heard from the ranking
  member and myself framing some of the issues. You come to this
  position very highly regarded, highly respected, with a tremendous
  management background. I, for one, want to give you the time and the
  flexibility to address these critical areas, as I said in my
  statement. You have a sense of the frustration from the members from
  our meeting yesterday, and also from the ranking member's statement
  this morning, that we're here to support you, we're here to make sure
  that as you go through this process in taking over from the previous
  administration, that you are measured and balanced and give us a clear
  accounting and your best judgment, and we're ready to work with you.
  With that, you are recognized, Mr. Director, for your opening
  statement.
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 00:27:05
  52 seconds

  Do I have to do something? Oh, there we go. It
  seems that it's on now. But it seems that there are two sets of
  questions that you're concerned with this morning. My main
  preparation for the hearing was to give a sense of the threats, the
  opportunities, the strategic landscapes that the United States faces.
  There are also a series of questions about the capabilities and
  management of the community. I would propose that I first give the
  summary remarks that I prepared on the overall strategic landscape and
  then perhaps, after that, get into some of these specific issues,
  which will also be with us for a long time, and perhaps we'll have
  other times to pursue if we don't cover them. Is that satisfactory?
  

• 

  REP. REYES

  At 00:27:57
  3 seconds

  That is satisfactory. You can proceed.
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 00:28:00
  16 minutes

  All right then. Then, gentlemen, ladies, my
  assessment is based on the work of thousands of patriotic, hard-
  working, both collectors and assessors and the many other people in
  the 16 intelligence services. The report that I submitted, the
  remarks that I'm making involved a lot of work of all of them. And
  it's a report not just of threats, but also of opportunities for this
  country and a tour of the strategic landscape, which is dynamic and
  which is complex. Let me begin with the global economic crisis,
  because I believe it already looms as the most serious one in decades.
  Since September 2008, 10 nations have committed to new IMF programs,
  three European governments have fallen because of economic issues,
  Central and Eastern Europe are under tremendous strain, both in terms
  of their currency and their internal economies, and unlike the 1997 to
  1998 Asian financial crisis, countries will not be able to export
  their way out of the crisis in one region of the world because it's so
  widespread.
  And the stakes are high. Mexico, which the chairman mentioned,
  with its close trade links to the United States, is vulnerable to a
  prolonged American recession. Europe and the former Soviet Union bloc
  have experienced anti-state demonstrations. Much of Eurasia, Latin
  America and sub-Saharan Africa lack sufficient cash reserves and
  access to international aid. Our analysis indicates that economic
  crisis increase the risk of regime-threatening instability if they
  continue for a one or two-year period. Instability can loosen the
  fragile hold that many developing countries have on law and order.
  There are some silver linings. With low oil prices, Venezuela
  will face financial constraints this year, Iran's President
  Ahmadinejad faces less-than-certain prospects for a re-election in
  July over his -- in June, excuse me -- because of his handling of his
  economy. However, the reverse of that is that a serious energy supply
  crunch may happen in the longer term if sustained low prices leads to
  cuts or major delays in new investments in energy sources in the short
  term.
  The crisis presents challenges for the United States, since we
  are generally held responsible for it. The November G-20 summit
  elevated the influence of emerging-market nations -- more than just
  the G-8 who, previously, were the main meetings -- but the U.S. also
  has opportunities to demonstrate increased leadership.
  Our openness, developed skills, workforce mobility put us in a much
  better position to reinvent ourselves than other countries. Moreover,
  Washington will have the opportunity to fashion new global structures
  that benefit all in this crisis. The president certainly talked at
  length last night about the steps he's taking in the domestic economy,
  and there's much to do in the international economy as well.
  Moving now to terrorism, we have seen progress in Muslim opinion
  turning against terrorist groups. Over the last 18 months, al Qaeda
  has faced public criticism from prominent religious leaders and even
  from some fellow extremists. In 2008, these terrorists did not
  achieve their goal of conducting another major attack on the United
  States, and no major country is at immediate risk of collapse from
  extremist terrorist groups. Replacing the loss of key leaders since
  2008 in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas has proved
  difficult for al Qaeda. Al Qaeda in Iraq has been squeezed. Saudi
  Arabia's aggressive counterterrorism efforts have rendered the kingdom
  a harsh operating environment for al Qaeda.
  But despite these setbacks, al Qaeda does remain dangerous.
  Yemen is re-emerging as a jihadist battleground. The capabilities of
  terrorist groups in East Africa will increase next year. And we are
  concerned about the potential for homegrown American extremists,
  inspired by al Qaeda's militant ideology, to plan attacks inside the
  United States. There are many challenges in that region that
  stretches from the Middle East to South Asia, despite the progress
  that I mentioned in countering violent extremism. The United States
  has strong tools, from military forces to diplomacy, good
  relationships with the vast majority of states in the region, and we
  will need all of these tools to help forge a durable structure of
  peace and renewed prosperity in the region.
  The revival of Iran as a regional power, the deepening of ethnic,
  sectarian, economic divisions across much of the region, the looming
  leadership successions among U.S. allies are all shaping the strategic
  landscape in that region. Hezbollah and Hamas, with support from
  Iran, champion armed resistance to Israel, a development that
  complicates efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and
  undercuts legitimacy of moderate Arab states that support a negotiated
  settlement. Battle lines are increasingly drawn not just between
  Israel and Arab countries, but also between secular Arab nationalists
  and ascendant Islamic nationalist movements inside moderate states.
  The Iranian regime views the United States as its enemy and as a
  threat. A more assertive regional Iranian foreign policy, coupled
  with dogged development of two of the major components of a nuclear
  weapons capability, alarms most of the governments from Riyadh to Tel
  Aviv. The Levant is a key focal point for these strategic shifts.
  Recent fighting between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip has
  deepened Palestinian political divisions. It's also widened the rift
  between regional moderates, led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and
  hardliners, including Iran, Hezbollah and Syria.
  With Hamas controlling Gaza and Hezbollah growing stronger in
  Lebanon, progress on a Palestinian-Israeli accord is more difficult.
  With Iran pursuing uranium enrichment and Israel determined not to
  allow it to develop a nuclear weapons capability, there is potential
  for an Iran-Israeli confrontation or crisis. Moderate Arab states
  fear a nuclear-armed Iran, but without progress on a Palestinian
  settlement, they are harder put to defend their ties to the United
  States. Turning to Iraq, coalition and Iraqi operations and dwindling
  popular tolerance for violence have helped to sideline the extremists
  there.
  Fewer Iraqis are dying at the hands of their countrymen than at
  any time in the past two years. Nevertheless, disputed internal
  boundaries, perceptions of government repression, or potential
  increased foreign support to insurgent or militia groups could reverse
  political and security progress. Baghdad will also be coping with
  declining oil revenues. In Afghanistan, the Taliban-dominated
  insurgency forces have demonstrated greater aggressiveness recently.
  Improved governance and extended development were hampered in 2008 by
  lack of security. Afghan leaders must tackle endemic corruption and
  the extensive drug trade.
  Progress has been made in expanding and fielding the Afghan
  national army, but many factors hamper efforts to make the units
  capable of independent action. The upcoming 2009 presidential
  election will present a greater security challenge than did that in
  2004, and insurgents probably will make a concerted effort to disrupt
  it. No improvement in Afghanistan is possible without Pakistan taking
  control of its border areas and improving governance and creating
  economic and educational opportunities throughout the country. In
  2008, Islamabad intensified counterinsurgency efforts, but its record
  in dealing with militants has been mixed as it balances conflicting
  internal and counterterrorist priorities.
  The government is losing authority in the North and the West, and
  even in the more developed parts of the country, mounting economic
  hardships and frustration over poor governance have given rise to
  greater radicalization. The time when only a few states had access to
  the most dangerous technologies is, unfortunately, long over. Often
  dual-use, they circulate easily in our globalized economy, as does the
  scientific expertise to put them together into weapons. It is
  difficult for the United States and its partners to track them;
  components and production technologies are widely available.
  Traditional deterrence and diplomacy may not prevent terrorist
  groups from using mass-effect weapons. One of the most important
  security challenges facing the United States is fashioning a more
  effective nonproliferation strategy with our partners. The
  assessments in our 2009 National Intelligence Estimate about Iran's
  nuclear weapons programs are generally still valid. Tehran, at a
  minimum, is keeping open the option to develop deliverable nuclear
  weapons. The halt, since 2003, in nuclear weapons design and
  weaponization was primarily in response to increasing international
  scrutiny and pressure, so it leads us to believe that some combination
  of threats of intensified internal scrutiny and pressures, along with
  opportunities for Iran to achieve its security goals, might prompt
  Tehran to extend the halt to some other nuclear weapons-related
  activities.
  Turning to Asia, rapidly becoming the long-term focus of power in
  the world, Japan remains the second-largest global economy and a
  strong ally, but the global downturn is exacting a heavy toll on
  Japan's economy. To realize its aspirations to play a stronger
  regional and global role will require political leadership and
  difficult decisions there. The rising giants, China and India, are
  playing increasing regional roles, economically, politically and
  militarily. China tries to secure access to markets, commodities and
  energy supplies that it needs to sustain domestic economic growth.
  Chinese diplomacy seeks to maintain favorable relations with other
  powers, and especially the United States.
  The global economic slowdown threatens China's domestic
  stability, and Chinese leaders are taking economic and security steps
  to deal with it. Taiwan, as an area of tension in U.S.-China
  relations, has substantially relaxed. Taiwan President Ma,
  inaugurated in May, has resumed dialogue with Beijing, and leaders on
  both sides of the straits are cautiously optimistic about less
  confrontational relations. Preparations for a possible Taiwan
  conflict nonetheless drive the modernization goals of the People's
  Liberation Army, but at the same time, China's security interests are
  broadening.
  A full civilian and military space capability, formidable
  capabilities in cyberspace, are rapidly developing. China will
  attempt to develop at least a limited naval power-projection
  capability, and we've already seen it deployed for peaceful purposes
  in an anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia. Like China,
  India's expanding economy will lead New Delhi to pursue new trade
  partners, gain access to vital energy markets and generate other
  resources to sustain economic growth. India's growth rate will slow
  this coming year, but ample foreign reserves and a sound banking
  system will help ensure relative stability there.
  Determined efforts by Indian and Pakistani leaders to improve
  relations could unravel unless Islamabad, for its part, takes
  meaningful steps to cut support to anti-Indian militant groups and New
  Delhi, for its part, in turn, makes credible efforts to allay
  Pakistan's security concerns. The increase in violent attacks within
  India is a cause of great concern to its government, as is instability
  in neighboring countries in South Asia in addition to Pakistan.
  On the global stage, Indian leaders will continue to follow an
  independent course. That we and India are both democracies does not
  guarantee congruence of interests. Nonetheless, good relations with
  the United States will be essential for India to realize its global
  ambitions. Although the Middle East and Asia have highest call on our
  attention, our concerns are broader. Russia is actively cultivating
  relations with regional powers, including China, Iran, Venezuela.
  Moscow also is trying to maintain control over energy networks that
  go to Western Europe and to East Asia.
  Now, Russian leaders have recently spoken positively about the
  possibilities for change in the U.S.-Russian dynamic, but NATO
  enlargement, the conflict over Georgia's separatist regions, missile
  defense all pose difficulties in the relationship. In Latin America,
  populist, often autocratic, regimes pose challenges to the region's
  longer-term success. Basic law-and-order issues, including rising
  violent crime, powerful drug trafficking organizations confront key
  hemispheric nations, as do uneven governance and institution-building
  efforts, in confronting chronic corruption.
  The corruptive influence and increasing violence of Mexican drug
  cartels impede Mexico City's ability to govern parts of its territory.
  Unless the United States is able to deliver market access on a
  permanent and meaningful basis, its traditionally privileged position
  in the region could erode with a concomitant decline in political
  influence. Africa has made substantial economic and political
  progress over the past decade, and the level of open warfare has
  declined significantly, especially in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the
  Ivory Coast.
  The drop in commodity prices and global recessions, however, will
  test the durability of the region's recent positive growth trend.
  Even before the current crisis, the 6-percent GDP rate, which Africa
  was achieving, although impressive, could not bring about the
  necessary structural changes to reduce poverty there, and a number of
  intractable conflicts persist in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
  Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia. In Darfur, U.S. peace talks remain stymied
  and larger peacekeeping forces are slow to deploy.
  Let me finish with the long-term challenges of environmental
  security and the threats to our information technology infrastructure.
  Adding more than a billion people to the world's population by 2025
  will put pressure on clean energy sources and on water supplies. Most
  of the world's population will move from rural to urban areas, seeking
  economic opportunity, and many, particularly in Asia, will achieve
  advanced lifestyles with greater per capita consumption and generation
  of pollution.
  According to the U.N.'s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
  Change, physical effects of climate change will worsen in coming
  years. Multilateral policy-making on climate change is likely to be
  substantial, and a growing priority within traditional security
  affairs. The world sees the United States in a pivotal leadership
  role; as effects of climate change mount, the U.S. will come under
  increasing pressure to help the international community set goals for
  emission reductions and to help others through technological progress.
  Finally, threats to our information technology infrastructure are
  an important intelligence community focus. Our information
  infrastructure is becoming both indispensable to the functioning of
  our society and vulnerable to catastrophic disruption in a way that
  the previous, analog, decentralized systems were not. Cyber-systems
  are being targeted for exploitation, and potentially for disruption or
  destruction, by a growing array of both non-state and state
  adversaries. Network defense technologies are widely available to
  mitigate threats, but have not been uniformly adopted.
  A number of nations, including Russia and China, can disrupt
  elements of the U.S. information infrastructure. We must take
  protective measures to detect and prevent intrusions before they do
  significant damage. We must recognize that cyber-defense is not a
  one-time fix; it requires a continual investment of hardware, software
  and cyber-defenses. In conclusion, then, the international security
  environment the United States faces is complex. The global financial
  crisis has exacerbated what was already a growing set of political and
  economic uncertainties. We, nevertheless, are in a strong position to
  shape a world reflecting universal aspirations and the values that
  have motivated Americans since 1776: human rights, the rule of law,
  liberal market economics, social justice.
  Whether we can succeed will depend on actions we take here at
  home: restoring strong economic growth, maintaining our scientific and
  technological edge and defending ourselves at reasonable cost while
  preserving our civil liberties. It will also depend on our actions
  abroad, not only how we deal with regions, regimes and crises, but
  also in developing new, multilateral systems, formal or informal, for
  effective international cooperation in areas such as trade and
  finance, in neutralizing extremist groups using terrorism, in
  controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
  developing codes of conduct for cyberspace and space and in mitigating
  and slowing global climate change. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my
  remarks and I'm happy to turn to questions.
  

• 

  REP. REYES

  At 00:44:56
  8 seconds

  Thank you, Mr. Director, and I will save my
  questions for later and yield my time to the vice chair of the
  committee.
  

• 

  REP. ALCEE HASTINGS (D-FL)

  At 00:45:04
  6 minutes

  Thank you very much, Mr.
  Chairman.
  Mr. Chairman, let me congratulate you on holding this
  hearing and Mr. Director, Admiral, as others have welcomed you, so do
  I. I will not take a lot of time. I'd like to make a statement and
  then to give you something to get back to me on that I consider of
  critical importance to your mission.
  There is a lot of discussion regarding Guantanamo, and there will
  continue to be a lot of discussion regarding Guantanamo. Admiral,
  when I was president of the parliamentary assembly of the Organization
  for Security and Cooperation in Europe -- and I'm fond of seeing if
  you can say that, you ought to be the president of the organization --
  (chuckles) -- but there are 56 countries that are represented by
  parliamentarians in that organization.
  After Abu Ghraib, what I found was a continuing harangue,
  specifically directed at Guantanamo more than anything. And then,
  with the considerable information that appeared in the public realm
  regarding renditions, Guantanamo continued to loom large. A
  delegation for France and Belgium came to me as president and said
  that they wanted to go to Guantanamo. It took me a year, but I
  appointed a taskforce within the organization led by the then-
  President of the Belgian senate, a woman named Anne-Marie Lizin.
  I contacted the Defense Department and Secretary Rice and they
  assisted in allowing Ms. Lizin and her entourage visit Guantanamo.
  They did so on two occasions -- came back, reported to Secretary Rice
  and then to the organization -- and it ameliorated some of the concern
  that members in the organization had -- the mere fact that they had an
  opportunity to see it. Now, we have persons at Guantanamo that are
  going to raise genuine concern among the American citizenry as to
  where they're placed.
  That said, I'm of a mind that we need to rethink Guantanamo and
  allow, among other things, as I said to you yesterday, that it be made
  manifestly clear why certain individuals are required to be held
  somewhere, no matter whether it's Guantanamo or a prison in the United
  States or in places where our allies or others may take them. But as
  long as our allies know these things and as long as the
  nongovernmental organizations know these things -- if Amnesty
  International and the Red Cross are permitted to see the actual
  circumstances, then I believe that Guantanamo, different than most,
  can stay open with a greater understanding in the world as to why the
  individuals are being held there.
  At least it's a different thought concerning how we go forward
  and contain individuals that simply cannot be released to the general
  public and cannot be released in many places, in many instances, in
  countries where they are likely to cause harm to U.S. interests and
  our allies. That said, you and I -- I returned to this committee
  after a considerable amount of service, having taken myself off for a
  year, returning now for what will be a final two years. So you and I
  are three-and-a-half weeks on the job, and it's a steep learning
  curve.
  And I don't expect that you have had an opportunity to do
  everything that I believe, knowing your background, that you are going
  to be able to do and accomplish in this job. However, I do wish that
  in your examination, that you pay specific attention to something that
  many members on this committee, and many members past on this
  committee, have continuously brought to the attention of the
  intelligence community, and that is diversity -- diversity writ large
  -- diversity as it pertains to the number of women in the intelligence
  community, diversity as it pertains to the number of blacks, Latinos,
  Asians, Native Americans and every category, writ large, again,
  dealing with the subject of languages, specifically.
  And the great need that we have, now, to examine the clearance
  mechanism and methodology that we employ so that we can find the
  necessary persons to match up with the circumstances of the day. That
  also includes -- thank you, Mr. Chairman -- that also includes
  cyberspace. I hired a young man, 23 years old, at an entry-level
  salary that could run circles around many persons that are in the
  intelligence community dealing with cyber-technology. We need to be
  able to pay these kids and bring them in and give them long-term
  retention, because there is going to be a problem.
  I hope I have said something. I don't need an immediate
  response. But this is something you will continue to hear from me.
  If I continue to see nothing but white people come in here and nothing
  but men come in here, then you are going to see a continuing harangue
  from me, you and everybody in the intelligence community. Thank you,
  Admiral.
  

• 

  REP. REYES

  At 00:51:04
  3 seconds

  Thank you, Mr. Hastings. Mr. Hoekstra?
  

• 

  REP. HOEKSTRA

  At 00:51:07
  40 seconds

  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Director, I didn't
  hear you address some of the questions that I had brought up about --
  you talked about the worldwide threats that are out there but you
  didn't talk about how the community was going to be organized to
  confront these threats, to get the information, provide this committee
  and Congress and the administration that they might need to structure,
  your visions for the ODNI and how you're going to repair and rebuild
  the trust between the community and Congress -- could you address
  those couple of points?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 00:51:47
  6 minutes

  Yes, sir. Let me turn to some of these
  organizational issues and management issues. First, on diversity,
  raised by Congressman Hastings, in my first week on the job, I met
  with Pat Taylor, who is our director of (qualifications ?) and
  diversity. She showed me the figures in terms of minority and gender
  representation in the intelligence community. They're not bad, but
  they're not as good as they ought to be when you compare them to the
  federal workforce, the workforce at large and the population at large.
  I also share the point that you and Chairman Reyes have made that
  diversity, for the intelligence community, is not simply a matter of
  something nice to have; it's something essential to have because of
  the diversity of environments in which we have to operate in which
  people that look like me are very conspicuous and people who only
  speak Russian and English, like I do, are not that useful. So we're
  very much on that, and we have good programs, including connections
  with learning institutions that can provide the sorts of skills that
  we need and we included in our management evaluations of our managers
  in the community from the executive lever right down. So I look
  forward to continuing to talk to you on that -- to all of you on that
  -- because it's something that's important to me and I think it's the
  right thing to do.
  On the question of accountability, Congressman Hoekstra, every
  time a new administration comes into a job, it inherits a number of
  cases from the past. In my case, just to cite a couple, there's the
  Algerian chief-of-station who is being prosecuted by the Justice
  Department right now for actions that he took. You mentioned the
  Peruvian investigation. There are several others that are going on.
  Of course, there are questions about the interrogations that were done
  by the CIA in the previous regime, and I think we have to deal with
  those in a prompt and fair manner and I pledge to you that we will.
  Ninety-nine percent of the people in the intelligence community
  want to do the right thing for the right reason, but in an
  organization of the tens of thousands that we have, I'm not naive
  enough to believe that somebody out there somewhere isn't screwing up.
  And I think what's more important is how you handle these, the example
  you set, and therefore, the culture that you build into the community
  over time. And I will tell you that my background has to do with
  accountability. I intend to exercise it; I intend to exercise it
  through the leaders of the organization in the community.
  I don't dive down into an organization and pull a case up to my
  level if it's being handled correctly where it should be, which is by
  the directors of these 16 agencies.
  But I pledge to you that we will
  have a culture of accountability in the organization. And I know I've
  heard many individual concerns, all of which I will look into. On the
  size of the DNI staff, I have -- I'm getting a feeling for it right
  now. I'm getting a feeling for the magnitude of the challenges. I
  will tell you that coordination can happen with ex cathedra
  pronouncements and with simply giving out orders, but integration is
  often harder and takes staff, in order to understand what the carrots
  and sticks are at the working level where it counts and how you build
  the right structures to get integration across the community.
  Things like common security systems, common personnel standards,
  don't just happen by me signing an intelligence community directive;
  they have to be checked on and they have to be followed up. So there
  is a staff requirement for all of these integrative functions, which
  were in the IRTPA Act of 2004. And I'm getting a feeling, now, for
  whether we have the right amount of staff to do that, whether we can
  do it through just getting reports from the organizations themselves,
  rather than checking on them. I do feel strongly that we should not,
  from the DNI level, be involved in operations, and I think we're not.
  The only operations that I think we should be involved in are
  directing collection, for example, when we have to make decisions
  among competing priorities across INTs and across targets, and
  somebody's got to make a call that you put the satellites on this, you
  put the human intelligence on this, and that's my job. And I need
  some staff to do that, so it's a complicated situation. But as we've
  talked previously, I don't think that many layers of bureaucracy and
  fat organizations are successful; I think they should be as lean as
  they need to be to do the job and I look forward to talking with you
  about that.
  On Guantanamo Bay, we had a lively discussion yesterday, and I
  certainly gained more perspectives on it than I had when I walked in
  the door. But I do need to emphasize that the intelligence community
  is playing a role in this issue of Guantanamo; it is not running the
  show. The show is run by the three executive orders that the
  president signed a couple of weeks ago that assigns most of the
  responsibility to the Department of Justice, with major chunks of it
  with the Department of Defense and major chunks of it to me.
  I also would point out, in the executive order, that enabling
  legislation will be taken in consultation with the Congress, so there
  will be plenty of opportunity for both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue to
  decide these tough questions, and they are tough questions. The more
  I read about it, the more I realize how few easy answers there are.
  And we're going to have to make some calls -- they are calls of the
  entire executive branch and, of course, they need support from this
  body as well.
  

• 

  REP. HOEKSTRA

  At 00:58:26
  3 seconds

  Thank you, Mr. Director. Thank you, Mr.
  Chairman.
  

• 

  REP. REYES

  At 00:58:29
  12 seconds

  Thank you, Mr. Hoekstra. Mr. Tierney? Mr. Tierney
  is not here? Then, Mr. Thompson.
  

• 

  REP. MIKE THOMPSON (D-CA)

  At 00:58:41
  5 minutes

  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
  Director, thank you very much for being here. I had a couple of
  comments and a couple of questions. I want to reiterate the
  chairman's comments regarding gang activities south of our border and
  would like to hear from you a commitment to work in a coordinated
  effort with all of the pertinent intelligence community -- relevant
  intelligence community -- folks.
  We've got a tremendous problem, not only with gangs, as the
  chairman brought up, but also with illicit drug trafficking and the
  fact that we have cartels now growing marijuana in this country using
  the money to purchase guns, ammunition, bringing it back across the
  border to continue with their cartel wars that also have a spillover
  effect into this country. And my sense is that we can do a lot more
  in regard to a coordinated effort to get ahead of this and would like
  to make sure that we move in that direction.
  You had mentioned in your statement -- or maybe it was the
  ranking member -- said that we wanted to create a lean and coordinated
  body when we developed your office. And there has been a number of
  people -- you heard about it yesterday in our briefing and you heard
  it again today. Many of us feel that we've really strayed from that
  assignment.
  And I want to add onto that list. I think that we have in fact
  created duplications that hamper our ability to do some of the things
  that we need to do.
  And I would like to hear from you a very honest assessment of how
  we break down some of that duplication, some of those barriers, and
  how we could maybe redesign or re-coordinate our efforts to put those
  bodies in the field and make sure that we are able to meet our
  intelligence mission and not get bound up in bureaucracies that
  duplicate efforts and stop us from being able to do our oversight
  work, which -- and I just want to remind you our oversight function is
  something that we work in partnership with the intelligence community.
  We're not here in an adversarial role. The work that we do helps you
  do a better job and make sure that our country is safe and our
  interests are in fact safe.
  And then lastly, I just want to touch on the GAO report. And I
  don't know that everything that is brought up and the answers that we
  need can be discussed in this open hearing. But I want to lay them
  out. If you can in fact respond, I'd appreciate it. If not, you have
  between now and when we move into the closed session to at least think
  about it. But the GAO report was pretty critical on our policies in
  Pakistan. And it stated, and I'll quote, "the U.S. government has not
  met its national security goals to destroy terrorist threats and close
  the safe haven in the FATA and has not developed a comprehensive plan
  reflecting the integration of multiple U.S. government agency
  efforts."
  And I'd like to know what it is that we're not doing, why it is
  we haven't been able to develop this comprehensive plan, what you see
  as the stumbling points in us getting there, and would be interested
  in knowing what you need in order for us to get there. And then
  lastly, again on the GAO report and the recent news out of Pakistan,
  open-source reporting on the Taliban in the Swat Valley and the recent
  cease-fire that's been established. And my read on that is it's going
  to give the Taliban some breathing room. And I would like to know
  what your assessment is on that and if in fact it will allow the
  Taliban to come back and be even stronger. And if so, what does that
  mean for our future in Afghanistan, especially with reports that we're
  moving more U.S. troops in there now and how that plays in regard to
  this cease-fire. And we seem to be acquiescing to a group that
  clearly is not in our best interest -- does not have our best interest
  in mind.
  

• 

  REP. REYES

  At 01:03:51
  6 seconds

  Mr. Director, if you will take a couple of his
  points and then answer the rest for the record so that we have enough
  time for members to --
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:03:57
  37 seconds

  Very -- I'll just go quickly. An integrated
  Pakistan strategy is what we are working on right now in the
  administration. We are part of it in the intelligence community. I
  agree with you. We need to eliminate duplication. And as I said to
  Ranking Member Hoekstra, we'll be in dialogue with the committee about
  that. And I couldn't agree with you more that helping Mexico work
  against the drug gangs is high on our list of priorities. And we will
  be putting additional emphasis on it.
  REP REYES: Thank you. Mr. Thornberry.
  

• 

  REP. MAC THORNBERRY (R-TX)

  At 01:04:34
  19 seconds

  Thank you, Chairman.
  Director, in your statement, you say that sustained pressure against
  al Qaeda in the FATA has the potential to further degrade its
  organizational cohesion and diminish the threat it poses. So what
  happens if there is not sustained pressure, if it is relaxed in some
  way?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:04:53
  2 seconds

  They get stronger.
  

• 

  REP. THORNBERRY

  At 01:04:55
  4 seconds

  And does the threat that it poses to us grow?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:04:59
  

  Yes.
  

• 

  REP. THORNBERRY

  At 01:04:59
  27 seconds

  You say a few pages later in the statement that
  al Qaeda leaders use this tribal area as a base from which to avoid
  capture, produce propaganda, provide training, and the rest of things.
  So is there any doubt in your mind that this tribal area of Pakistan
  is the focus of al Qaeda leadership; it's where they are and where
  they run their operation from?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:05:26
  34 seconds

  Right now, that is where their headquarters is,
  Mr. Thornberry.
  And they've operated from other places in the past.
  In Africa, there are al Qaeda affiliates, in the Maghreb, in northern
  Africa, in Yemen, in Iraq. And so, the most convenient and hospitable
  place for them right now is the place that you described. But we are
  concerned about their ability to move around. It's kind of like
  toothpaste in a tube.
  

• 

  REP. THORNBERRY

  At 01:06:00
  15 seconds

  But based on your previous answer, my
  impression is that you believe it's important to keep that pressure on
  in this area, understanding that if we put enough pressure, they may
  squirt out some place else.
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:06:15
  3 seconds

  And that would be better for us. When they're
  moving, they're more vulnerable.
  

• 

  REP. THORNBERRY

  At 01:06:18
  32 seconds

  Okay, that'd be better. Let me switch briefly
  to Iraq. The president said last night -- he talked about ending the
  war, withdrawing troops. The press reports today say that by August
  2010, all combat troops will be out of Iraq. Or that's the decision
  that the president has made. My question is, is there any -- I
  understand that 19 months was talked about in the campaign -- my
  question is, is there any intelligence basis to say August 2010,
  that's the date that we can have all our combat troops leave and the
  Iraqis can handle their security on their own?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:06:50
  12 seconds

  There's an intelligence basis for the decisions
  that the administration is in the process of making and hasn't quite
  announced yet. And I'd be happy to talk about those a little later on
  in closed session, sir.
  

• 

  REP. THORNBERRY

  At 01:07:02
  54 seconds

  Okay, well, just thinking back, my perception
  is that in the course of Iraq, situations have changed on the ground
  and we were slow to recognize it and even slower to change our
  strategy to deal with it. I guess my concern is that if we get locked
  into some sort of campaign promise, somebody has got to be willing, if
  facts warrant, to walk into the Oval Office and say, Mr. President,
  this would be a disaster if we hold on this arbitrary timetable. And
  it seems to me the only -- one of the few people who can do that is
  you. Are you and do you think the intelligence community is willing
  to take into account the facts on the ground and give that unvarnished
  truth, if indeed facts do change?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:07:56
  1 minute

  Sir, I think the intelligence community has two
  roles in this policy process. Number one is where we are with a lot
  of policies with this new administration: When you make them, the
  intelligence community is to be in there telling what the situation is
  on the ground, what are the likely consequences of policies. And your
  intelligence community has been playing very strongly in that position
  now.
  Once the decision is made and the policy is announced, you know
  what your objectives are. You know what the timescale is. Then, the
  job of the intelligence community is to monitor the situation on the
  ground and say, is that policy working? Is it achieving the things on
  the ground that it said it was going to? And I can assure you, I will
  have no difficulty in being able to bring those judgments forward. And
  I would say the primary reason for that is that this president
  welcomes it. He doesn't want to walk into boxed canyons without
  somebody pointing them out to him.
  

• 

  REP. THORNBERRY

  At 01:08:56
  10 seconds

  Well, I'd just say we all welcome it. And we
  all need that -- the best judgments that our community can provide.
  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
  

• 

  REP. REYES

  At 01:09:06
  2 seconds

  Thank you, Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Boren.
  

• 

  REP. DAN BOREN (D-OK)

  At 01:09:08
  2 minutes

  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
  want to congratulate you, Director Blair, on your new position. I
  know you'll do a fabulous job. I have a few points and then a couple
  questions. You talked a little bit about energy in your opening
  statement. After this hearing, I'm going to the Resources Committee.
  And I'm going to be visiting with some of our energy executives in the
  United States, one being based in Oklahoma, that is drilling some
  offshore wells.
  It seems to me that some of the rhetoric that's come out of the
  administration could be detrimental to our national security in
  exploring all the natural resources that we have in the United States,
  especially natural gas, which is a big component, I think, protecting
  us in using as a transportation fuel. And as you mentioned, the
  prices have gone down and that's good right now. But at some point,
  demand is going to pick back up and we're going to be in the same
  position that we were when we had $147-a-barrel oil. So that's one
  point.
  Second point, Guantanamo. I've visited Guantanamo with then-
  Chairman Duncan Hunter of the Armed Services Committee.
  Yes, maybe
  there were some problems. Yes, I understand that there was a public
  relations issue. But my concern is by closing that facility and not
  really having a plan to do something with these individuals, we are
  setting ourselves up for failure. And so those are my two points.
  Don't need an answer on those.
  The questions I have, I'm really focused on Africa. And a new
  member of the committee, that's where I'm going to be turning my
  attention and AFRICOM. Two questions, one, the intelligence community
  has a shallow bench of experts on sub-Saharan Africa. How will the
  establishment of AFRICOM enhance the intelligence community's ability
  to understand and analyze developments in the region? That's the
  number-one question.. And the second question is about Zimbabwe.
  What do you think is happening on the ground there? And what are we
  doing to prevent any disaster if there's a real breakdown there? And
  what kind of humanitarian efforts can we do to stop that?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:11:29
  56 seconds

  Sir, on the first question, any time that there
  is a executive branch action body like out of the Department of
  Defense or the Department of State, it's a good thing for us in the
  intelligence world because it gives us somebody who is asking the
  questions. It really helps us focus our intelligence assets. So
  AFRICOM, I think, will be good because they're out there doing things
  to protect American interests. They will be asking hard questions of
  the intelligence community. And that helps us more than just sort of
  a general appreciation, which you need but which doesn't really take
  you too far.
  On Zimbabwe, I'd like to get back to you in more detail, since I
  don't have a personal deep knowledge of that country. And I would
  like to reply a little bit later, if I might.
  

• 

  REP. BOREN

  At 01:12:25
  4 seconds

  Okay, I look forward to working with you in the
  future. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
  

• 

  REP. REYES

  At 01:12:29
  3 seconds

  Thank you, Mr. Boren. Mr. Miller?
  

• 

  REP. JEFF MILLER (R-FL)

  At 01:12:32
  21 seconds

  Thank you very much, Mr.
  Chairman.
  I too will be working with my colleague, Mr. Boren, in
  focusing on the continent of Africa as well and the new command that's
  been stood up there. But I'd like to go back, if we could, to
  Guantanamo. Can you tell me any operational reason that Guantanamo
  needs to be closed?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:12:53
  11 seconds

  I can tell you, as an intelligence assessment,
  that the damage it has done to the international American reputation
  makes it difficult for us to achieve objectives in other areas.
  

• 

  REP. MILLER

  At 01:13:04
  4 seconds

  That's a political reason but not an operational
  reason.
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:13:08
  8 seconds

  I mean, it's a realistic reason. Countries
  won't deal with us. Our popularity is down. We don't have blue chips
  to trade for other things we want in other areas.
  

• 

  REP. MILLER

  At 01:13:16
  12 seconds

  Thirty days ago, the president did sign the
  executive order to close Guantanamo. What consultation was done with
  the intelligence community prior to the signing of that?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:13:28
  17 seconds

  Full consultation, meetings with the officials
  at the CIA, representatives in the drafting committees that draft the
  executive orders. There was good consultation.
  

• 

  REP. MILLER

  At 01:13:45
  39 seconds

  In looking at your opening statement, I didn't see
  anywhere in the statement -- and if I missed it, I apologize -- that
  you talk about a potential or the potential for a threat by bringing
  detainees from Guantanamo to the United States. And I -- hopefully,
  you're not asserting that there is no threat, or have you given any
  thought to the consequences of bringing them here? And not
  necessarily the people from the inside breaking out but the
  possibility of people on the outside wanting to come into the
  communities and disrupt things at the facilities.
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:14:24
  33 seconds

  You mentioned that yesterday, Congressman
  Miller. And I've been giving some thought to it. The primary
  objective of al Qaeda in the United States now is another spectacular,
  large, people-killing attack. That's what they seem to be thinking
  about. I will have to go back and see if the -- where the idea that
  you mentioned of a trying to break in, rescue one of their colleagues,
  kill a lot of people, is something that is worthwhile. But thank you
  for bringing that to my attention.
  

• 

  REP. MILLER

  At 01:14:57
  10 seconds

  Thank you, sir. And moving to Pakistan, the
  Zardari government, does he have the full support of the Pakistani
  army right now?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:15:07
  2 seconds

  President Zardari? The Pakistani army?
  

• 

  REP. MILLER

  At 01:15:09
  4 seconds

  Of the army.
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:15:13
  15 seconds

  I talked with General Kayani about two days ago.
  And he supports his president, so that much is sure. And that much is
  important.
  

• 

  REP. MILLER

  At 01:15:28
  7 seconds

  What is the intelligence community's assessment of
  the stability right now in Pakistan that you can give in an
  unclassified setting?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:15:35
  34 seconds

  I'd rather give details in a closed session, if
  I might, Congressman Miller. But it is one of the countries that we
  feel is dealing with a larger number of problems than most. It's a
  very important country, as you know. So there is a cause for quite a
  bit of concern when you have that combination of importance and
  pressures -- economic pressures, governance pressures. We talked
  about the terrorist pressures in a rough part of the world. So it is
  a country that we need to watch closely.
  

• 

  REP. MILLER

  At 01:16:09
  34 seconds

  You know, one of the -- I think, one of the biggest
  disappointments that I've had in watching what's happened in
  Afghanistan in particular is our feeble, at best, attempt to eradicate
  the poppy crop. We have spent hundreds of millions of dollars. And
  now, it appears that opium and the level of poppy production has
  reached all-time levels. Can you give me an idea as to why we cannot
  get a handle on that issue?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:16:43
  53 seconds

  I've watched various campaigns over the years
  against both opium crops and against cocaine problems. And it seems
  that they are -- they have to be multi-pronged. There is no silver
  bullet. They have to be prolonged. And trying to find that right
  combination is difficult and you fail more times than you succeed. So
  I would basically say it's a hard problem. When the profits are so
  high, the alternatives are so few and so many people are on the take
  because of the money involved. So I think it's a hard problem that we
  haven't found the right key to yet.
  

• 

  REP. MILLER

  At 01:17:36
  2 seconds

  Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
  

• 

  REP. REYES

  At 01:17:38
  2 seconds

  Thank you, Mr. Miller. Mr. Schiff?
  

• 

  REP. ADAM SCHIFF (D-CA)

  At 01:17:40
  4 minutes

  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
  Director, thank you for being with us. I wanted to follow up a bit on
  our conversation yesterday on the detainee issue and also on Somalia.
  I will be sharing with you and your staff, as we discussed, some
  legislation that I intend to introduce later this week or next week.
  But I wanted to just amplify a little bit more on it. I think that
  the people detained at Guantanamo should be given another status
  review, not use the same military commissions and tribunals that were
  established under the last administration, but by expanding the
  jurisdiction of the military courts martial to do status reviews. I
  think it's a natural venue to do that.
  I also think that those who are determined to be unlawful
  combatants and are therefore subject may be prosecuted on top of their
  combatant status. Those prosecutions could by and large go forward in
  the military courts martial. Some may be appropriate to be tried in
  federal district courts. I would think the body would be better
  suited for trial in the military courts martial.
  But there will nonetheless be both detainees at Guantanamo who
  will be determined to be unlawful enemy combatants and therefore can
  be legally detained without charges based on their status for the
  duration of the conflict or until they're no longer a threat. And the
  question becomes, where should they be detained? And what I would
  like to throw out -- and this is one of the options that my
  legislation would allow, among many others -- is to establish a NATO-
  run detention facility in Afghanistan, to internationalize the
  detention of unlawful enemy combatants. It is a coalition effort in
  Afghanistan.
  There is no reason the United States should be solely responsible
  for the detaining of unlawful combatants. I think it would address a
  lot of the international issues that you alluded to, in answer to Mr.
  Miller's questions, if, because of the black eye of Guantanamo, we
  can't get cooperation from allies in intelligence operations. That's
  not a theoretical or political impact; that's a very real impact in
  our ability in the war on terror.
  I think the idea of establishing a NATO detention facility also
  has the advantage that we're not just dealing with Guantanamo
  detainees; we're also going to be dealing with prospective detainees.
  And while all the focus right now is on what do we do with the
  hundreds of people at Guantanamo, the reality is, both in Iraq and
  Afghanistan and down the road, probably elsewhere, we're going to have
  people being detained as unlawful combatants who won't be brought to
  Guantanamo anymore, and if they are detained, for example, in
  Afghanistan, who should be detaining them?
  Now, it may be that some, we will want to detain; it may be
  others, we would want to detain in an international setting. So I
  would throw out that as a possibility. There are many of our NATO
  allies who are not able, politically or otherwise, to subject their
  troops to combat operations. This could be a valuable service they
  could provide. It wouldn't be easy, being in charge of detaining very
  dangerous people, but it would be a very valuable service that they
  could provide.
  So I throw that out there. I also wanted to touch on, I think,
  your thoughts both on that, as well as this -- wanted to follow up on
  Somalia, which, as I mentioned to your colleague at CIA yesterday, is
  something I've been concerned about for a number of years as -- if I
  had to choose the next best alternative or the next, you know,
  greatest candidate for the next Afghanistan, it would be Somalia. I
  think our intelligence efforts to ascertain who in Somalia we can work
  with and who, truly, is affiliated with al Qaeda are going to be very
  important -- not lumping all of the Islamic parties there together.
  But I'd love to get your thoughts on both those issues.
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:21:50
  1 minute

  Yes, sir. As you know, one of the three
  executive orders is directed to exactly the question that you raised:
  What do we do going forward, that is with new detainees that we may
  capture or with the ones who are, after some fashion, it's determined
  that they should not be released? The Justice Department heads that,
  we participate in it and we will ensure that the imaginative ideas
  that you described are in the mix. And I've heard some other
  excellent ideas from other members of Congress and I really appreciate
  the thinking that's gone on here as well as in the task forces, and
  we'll make sure that's in.
  On Somalia, I think you're making the exact point that
  Congressman Thornberry made, which I very much agree with, that you
  can't just look at one place here when you have all of these other
  potential spots, and frankly, Somalia has been a no-man's land here
  for what, 10, 15 years. The Ethiopians came in; it was a tough row
  for them and they're just completing their withdrawal. It's a
  patchwork of a country now with some law and order in the North and
  none in the South.
  So I think that it's part of our -- yes, it's against al Qaeda,
  but in general, bad things happen in these ungoverned areas of the
  world and we have to look at the Somalias, the Yemens, as well as the
  FATA areas and have a comprehensive approach to improving conditions
  in them so that they aren't breeding grounds for, not only al Qaeda,
  but for human misery and potential starvation -- the sorts of things
  that drew us into Somalia 20 years ago. So it's something that is on
  the radar screen; it needs to be part of the strategy and I thank you
  for bringing attention to it.
  

• 

  REP. SCHIFF

  At 01:23:48
  

  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
  

• 

  REP. REYES

  At 01:23:48
  5 seconds

  Thank you, Mr. Schiff. Mr. Conaway?
  

• 

  REP. MICHAEL CONAWAY (R-TX)

  At 01:23:53
  17 seconds

  Thank you, Mr.
  Chairman.
  Admiral, welcome aboard. I just got here as well, so
  looking forward to this service. You mentioned a phrase a while ago
  -- al Qaeda in America -- is that -- did you mean, like, al Qaeda in
  Iraq? Is there actually a formalized organization of al Qaeda in
  America here or were you just saying it?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:24:10
  2 seconds

  I must have either said it wrong or --
  

• 

  REP. CONAWAY

  At 01:24:12
  4 seconds

  You said the intent of al Qaeda in America is to
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:24:16
  2 seconds

  Oh, oh, I'm sorry. The intent of al Qaeda in
  America as a target --
  

• 

  REP. CONAWAY

  At 01:24:18
  2 seconds

  Okay, thank you.
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:24:20
  11 seconds

  But there are, in fact, al Qaeda sympathizers in
  this country who would be involved in such an attack. So no, we
  haven't formed a phrase like that but it is a real problem.
  

• 

  REP. CONAWAY

  At 01:24:31
  52 seconds

  All right. America-bashing is a very popular
  sport -- always will be -- I mean, envy is something that I think it's
  involved. You know, currently Guantanamo Bay is kind of a lightning
  rod for any excuse to not do something that somebody would really want
  to do anyway. But we do away with Gitmo, which I disagree with, but
  let's do away with that. There will be other things that we do in our
  own best interest that our allies and many of our enemies will be able
  to point to and say, well, but for that, we would do what you want us
  to do.
  We would take over the prison in Afghanistan, but for whatever.
  Should we make it a practice of constantly deferring to, quote,
  unquote, "world opinion," to do things that aren't in our best
  interests?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:25:23
  42 seconds

  I'm going to step out of my intelligence role
  for just a second, because I've been sort of in the operational role,
  and say there's going to be a certain amount of America-bashing going
  on because we are the most powerful country. I think, though, that
  you shouldn't make yourself an easy target for things that you can fix
  -- that when you do act unilaterally, it ought to be for a really good
  reason. And you'll find, in many cases, that other countries will
  rally around strong leadership properly directed towards common goals,
  so no, we should not be run by international opinion polls, but we
  should be protecting our country's interests.
  

• 

  REP. CONAWAY

  At 01:26:05
  37 seconds

  Okay. And I understand there's a tension there,
  but as long as we can't use that as our own excuse to do something
  that's not in our own best interest, simply because somebody else
  somewhere doesn't like us. The president mentioned last night he's
  intending to dismantle the Cold War weapons systems to pay for
  everything else that's going to get done under what he's doing.
  Anything in the IC community or the intelligence community that is
  Cold War weapons system-like that he's intending to dismantle or to
  take a dividend out of?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:26:42
  1 minute

  Unfortunately, many of those Cold War systems
  are aging out, like satellites and things like that, and need to be
  replaced. And we're in the midst of some tough decisions, on electro-
  optical satellites in particular, that we have to make. I can assure
  you that as we make those decisions, we're looking to the future and
  not to the past, in terms of -- and for intelligence, there's a
  fundamental difference -- in the Cold War, the enemy was hard to find
  and easy to kill; in the new situation, it's hard to -- I mean, it was
  easy to find and hard to kill -- (laughter) -- al Qaeda in America,
  those guys.
  But in the old war, we knew where the enemy was, we just had to
  bring a lot of firepower to bear. Now, the burden on intelligence is
  very much higher because of the smaller, individual nature of the
  targets -- their ability to hide and move across borders, so it takes
  a different kind of intelligence system to do that.
  

• 

  REP. CONAWAY

  At 01:27:44
  23 seconds

  In that regard, and again, you've only been there
  a very short period of time, are there gaps that you would feel
  comfortable talking about in this forum where additional resources
  are, in fact, needed to protect this country so that that intent of al
  Qaeda in -- al Qaeda's intent in America is not fulfilled?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:28:07
  5 seconds

  Yes, sir, there are gaps. I'd rather talk about
  them in closed session, if I might.
  

• 

  REP. CONAWAY

  At 01:28:12
  5 seconds

  All right. Admiral Blair, I'm looking forward to
  working with you. Thank you for it, and I yield back.
  

• 

  REP. REYES

  At 01:28:17
  5 seconds

  Thank you, Mr. Conaway. Mr. Langevin?
  

• 

  REP. JIM LANGEVIN (D-RI)

  At 01:28:22
  2 minutes

  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
  Director, thank you for being here and for your service.
  I want to turn my attention to the issue of cyber-security. We had
  a brief conversation about it yesterday, but for the committee and for
  the public, I want to get your thoughts again on this issue. I have
  paid a lot of attention to it. I appreciate the fact that you raised
  it in your opening statement here this morning.
  As I mentioned to you yesterday, I've spent the last two years
  both chairing a homeland security subcommittee on emerging threats in
  cyber-security and then, was one of the four co-chairs of this year's
  SAIS report on cyber-security for the 44th presidency, and I'm pleased
  with the finding of that report and hoping that the administration is
  going to adopt many of the recommendations that are contained in the
  report. I know that right now, the administration is doing a 60-day
  review of its cyber-security strategy, and I applaud the appointment
  of Melissa Hathaway and the director in the NSC for cyberspace.
  It's my hope that that position will actually be elevated and
  will be a special assistant to the president. But can you give us at
  least a preliminary overview of how you believe the cyber-security
  strategy will be structured, and in particular, where will it be
  housed? The previous administration put a lot of the focus and
  responsibility for securing us in cyberspace in the Department of
  Homeland Security. While I have great respect for the men and women
  that work in the department, it is clearly a department that is
  struggling to stand itself up and, in my opinion, was not the proper
  place to house the major responsibility for cyber-security.
  I personally think it needs to be coordinated out of the White
  House with both policy and budgetary authority across a range of
  responsibilities in government. But can you share with us, at least
  on a preliminary basis, your vision for how our cyber-security
  strategy will be conducted -- what it will look like -- and also talk
  to us about what you see as where the greatest threats would come
  from?
  I have been stung by the amount of penetration across federal
  networks in cyberspace, U.S. assets, as well as the amount of data
  that has been ex-filtrated from our own government networks. It is
  absolutely stunning and an issue that had been ignored for many years
  at our own peril. We're finally paying proper attention to it, but
  I'd like you to share your thoughts on some of those issue. Thank
  you.
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:31:04
  2 minutes

  Thank you very much. I think there's one key
  aspect of this future cyber strategy which this committee and your
  counterpart in the other body can really help us with, and that is the
  role of the National Security Agency outside of the intelligence, its
  intelligence functions. I agree with you; the Department of Homeland
  Security is finding its footing in this area. The National Security
  Agency has the greatest repository of cyber talent. With due respect
  to Congressman Hastings' 24-year-old new hire, there are some wizards
  out there at Fort Mead who can do stuff.
  I think that capability should be harnessed and built on as we're
  trying to protect more than just our intelligence networks or our
  military networks as we expand to our federal networks and to our
  critical infrastructure networks. And the reason is that because of
  the offensive mission that they have, they're the ones who know best
  about what's coming back at us and it's defenses against those sorts
  of things that we need to be able to build into wider and wider
  circles.
  I think there is a great deal of distrust of the National
  Security Agency and the intelligence community in general playing a
  role outside of the very narrowly circumscribed role because of some
  of the history of the FISA issue in years past, a general distrust of
  having -- I mean, the NSA is both intelligence and military: You
  know, two strikes out in terms of the way some Americans think about a
  body that ought to be protecting their privacy and civil liberties.
  I think you all know that the fact of the matter is that the NSA
  -- in fact, the entire intelligence community operates under very
  strict rules. Sometimes people don't follow them, but we find them
  and we hold them to account. So I would like the help of people like
  you who have studied this closely and served on commissions, the
  leadership of the committee and finding a way that the American people
  will have confidence in the supervision, in the oversight of the role
  of NSA so that it can help protect these wider bodies.
  So, to me, that's one of the keys things that we have to work on
  here in the next few months.
  

• 

  REP. LANGEVIN

  At 01:33:38
  38 seconds

  And I know my time was expired, but I just want
  to say that I agree with your assessment about the NSA. I think that
  a great disservice was done to the hard-working men and women at the
  NSA and in the intelligence community because of the FISA issue and it
  was more the issues that took place at the very top and at levels in
  our government and not the hard-working men and women who work there.
  They do have great capabilities and great professionalism and they do
  have a very strong role to play, need to have a very strong role to
  play in securing us in cyberspace.
  So I look forward to our continued discussion and work on this
  issue. Thank you.
  

• 

  REP. REYES

  At 01:34:16
  25 seconds

  Thank you, Mr. Langevin. Before I go to Mr. Kline,
  I just want to remind members, we'll probably be voting between 11:00
  and 11:30. We should be able to complete the open hearing before then
  and then we'll reconvene for the closed session at the Capitol and
  lunch will be available for members. Mr. Kline.
  

• 

  REP. JOHN KLINE (R-MN)

  At 01:34:41
  55 seconds

  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good
  morning, director, welcome. I want to pick up, if I can, with the
  discussion we had yesterday to the extent that we are comfortable
  talking about it in this open forum.
  And this is the issue of interrogation techniques. Much public
  relations discussion about those for the last few years, arguably some
  uncertainty about what those techniques should be. I think most
  Americans thought that the president of the United States, President
  Obama, had cleared that up and announced that everybody was going to
  use the Army Field Manual, everybody in the intelligence community,
  everybody in the military was going to use the Army Field Manual for
  determining what those interrogation techniques could be.
  Could you talk about whether or not that perception is correct
  and what the status is of dealing with the question of interrogation
  techniques?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:35:36
  30 seconds

  Yes, sir. I would like to clear that up. The
  executive order specifies that the Army Field Manual will be the basis
  for interrogation techniques used across the government, that is, by
  the intelligence community as well as by military interrogators. But
  it also specifies that that manual will be reviewed so that it meets
  the unique requirements both of intelligence. So that's the --
  

• 

  REP. KLINE

  At 01:36:06
  23 seconds

  Thank you. I just wanted to kind of get that on the
  record because I believe what your answer is, is that we do not know
  right now what the interrogation techniques are. And the intelligence
  community is not bound by the strict interpretation of the Army Field
  Manual, which was the widely held public perception.
  And so there is an evaluation process that's ongoing. Is that
  correct: to modify or expand --
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:36:29
  2 minutes

  To review.
  To review. But right now, pending that review, the
  Army Field Manual techniques do apply to the intelligence community.
  So you're correct in that, right now, today, tomorrow, it is the
  portions of the Army Field Manual which, as you know, is a human
  intelligence manual, of which interrogation is a part, not the whole,
  but those procedures govern intelligence community interrogations that
  will be adjusted pending the results of the review, pending
  adjustment. Okay, thank you very much.
  Let me move to domestic intelligence, if I could, sort of picking
  up on Mr. Hoekstra's comments and others that the Congress is viewed
  -- and I think the 9/11 Commission Report called on -- your office to
  be a coordinating office to break up the stovepipes that so hampered
  us on 9/11, where we had rules that forbade the FBI from talking to
  the CIA and so forth.
  And, now, I'm from Minnesota and we're very much aware that a
  refugee from Somalia left Minnesota and went overseas and blew himself
  and others up. And so there is a question about the radicalization of
  some in this country. Minnesota happens to have a very large Somali
  population. Certainly not all those Somalis are radical, by any
  stretch of the imagination, but clearly there is concern.
  We see about it constantly in the papers back in Minnesota. That
  story is prominently displayed. There are some fears in Minnesota.
  And I think that we should all be alert to that.
  But that raises the question of, what do we do about that?
  That's an issue here in the United States, but we have now a number of
  organizations: Department of Homeland Security, FBI, CIA and others.
  How is your organization now equipped? How do you feel like it's
  doing? I know you just got there, but in that ability to cross those
  lines so that we are not caught with our feet sort of nailed to the
  floor.
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:38:51
  1 minute

  I am -- that's a high-priority problem and I've
  looked into it in some depth in my first few weeks on the job because
  of the importance. And I'd like to provide details in closed session,
  but I think you would be pleased as to the flow of information between
  the FBI intelligence agents, who have the authority to operate in this
  country, and the rest of the intelligence community, which gathers
  intelligence and takes action overseas.
  The vehicle for that exchange -- at the cap of it is the National
  Counterterrorism Center. And I urge you to come out for a visit when
  you can because you will find that the exact domestic international
  connection that you are questioning, you'll see how it's done
  physically with the role of FBI analysts interspersed with roles of
  analysts from other communities. And individuals are tracked very
  closely. So I -- the structure is very much there in place and, in
  addition, there are other ways to communicate down to state and local
  levels. You will hear different stories from people who operate at
  state and local levels. The old joke, we're from Washington and we're
  here to help you, is alive and well in many -- but I think if you poke
  at it, you see a steady improving trend.
  I would say it's one of those things that I feel sort of good
  about, but you just don't feel really good about it because of the
  possibility that you're missing something and the memory that we all
  have of what happened in 2001. But we can talk about that more, but I
  think it's basically a good-news story, sir.
  

• 

  REP. KLINE

  At 01:40:39
  4 seconds

  Thank you. And I'm looking forward to that visit.
  Again, welcome aboard. I yield back.
  

• 

  REP. REYES

  At 01:40:43
  3 seconds

  Thank you, Mr. Kline. Ms. Schakowsky?
  

• 

  REP. JAN SCHAKOWSKY (D-IL)

  At 01:40:46
  3 minutes

  Mr. Chairman and ranking
  member. First let me thank you so much for having this open hearing.
  I think it is incredibly useful for the American people to hear what I
  think, Director, has been a very constructive dialogue that we've been
  able to raise a lot of concerns. You've been able to respond to a lot
  of them. And even when you can't, I think the fact that we've
  outlined and somewhat demystified what the intelligence community is
  doing, that the American people get a chance to see you and understand
  much better your functions and who you are as a person.
  And I want to encourage you, Mr. Chairman, to consider this kind
  of format going forward more extensively than we've used it in the
  past. And I wanted to suggest, Director, that we also look at the
  issue of classification more carefully. There have been times when
  we've been presented with documents and information where we've kind
  of -- members have kind of shaken their heads and wondered why is this
  classified information?
  I think the more that these issues are aired where we can, the
  better off we are as a nation. And I know that the president has made
  transparency a hallmark of his administration. And I think that does
  require looking at classification.
  I wanted to ask a number of questions. Maybe you could answer
  them here and maybe not. One is about the issue of the prison at
  Bagram in Afghanistan. I know that there's been a ruling about that,
  that those who are incarcerated cannot challenge their incarceration.
  I'm concerned that there are, in fact, some innocent people in Bagram
  and I just wonder what the future is there for those who are detained
  by the United States.
  And, secondly, you outlined as the primary near-term security
  concern of the United States the global economic crisis and its
  geopolitical implications. I know that the president has emphasized
  the need for the United States to act to prevent humanitarian crises,
  which I think may -- we may see growing now around the world, the idea
  of economic refugees and all kinds of instability that may be created,
  humanitarian crises that go beyond that like the one that we see in
  Sudan.
  What I'm wondering is, how can intelligence capabilities provide
  early warning of humanitarian crises so that U.S. policy-makers, the
  intelligence community, can devise strategies to prevent or respond to
  such crises.
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:44:05
  1 minute

  Ma'am, on Bagram, I think the exact same sort of
  issues are there as -- not the exact same -- but many of the same
  issues there as are being sorted out in relation to Guantanamo. And I
  think those principles will have to be applied to those who are
  detained there. So that will have to follow in due course: the issues
  of process, the issues of long-term detention for those who need to be
  held.
  On the humanitarian situations, we have an actual unit within the
  intelligence community whose job it is to monitor the world for
  disasters that rise to that level. A great deal of that information
  is available from other organizations that are not involving secret
  intelligence, but there are some things that we can do with our
  collection mechanisms. That's put together and we provide routine
  warnings of that so that we're not caught unawares.
  

• 

  REP. SCHAKOWSKY

  At 01:45:11
  4 seconds

  Thank you.
  

• 

  REP. REYES

  At 01:45:15
  5 seconds

  Thank you, Ms. Schakowsky. Mr. Ruppersberger.
  

• 

  REP. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER (D-MD)

  At 01:45:20
  3 minutes

  Yeah, I'd like to get
  back into the area of cyber-security. Mr. Langevin brought up the
  issue. It's something extremely important to our national security,
  to our business community, to our privacy generally.
  There was a comment that people do not really trust some of the
  things that happened at the NSA. And it's unfortunate. I have been
  -- NSA happens to be in my district and I chair the subcommittee that
  oversees them. And they are some of the finest, hardest-working
  people. And if they could talk and let the public know what internal
  mechanisms they have to protect Americans and to follow the
  Constitution, we'd be a lot better off. But they couldn't even defend
  themselves when all of the FISA issues were going on.
  And I've been there for a period of time. I go there a lot and
  I've never seen anything that violates the Constitution. With that
  said, one of the biggest issues we do have to deal with is the public
  and educate the public what cyber is about. And I think, in order to
  do that, we have to tell some of the stories that have happened with
  cyber attacks, how Russia literally closed down Estonia's banking
  system because there was a battle about the statue that Estonia was
  taking down; when they went and attacked Georgia how they cyber-
  attacked and got into their communications systems and banking systems
  again.
  There are a lot of classified issues, but I can say there have
  been many newspaper articles about attacks in our Pentagon, about
  NASA, about how possibly China, Russia, if they have been able to
  attack NASA that they have been able to save billions of dollars in
  research that we have done, our business community and business
  secrets. And if you have a server, say, in a bank in North Dakota, a
  rural area, and that bank does one transaction with Bank of America,
  the bad guys could get in through that server and literally shut down
  a lot of Bank of America.
  These are stories that the public needs to know because the
  public doesn't have a clue, in my opinion, how serious this cyber
  attack is. The good news is that President Obama has been briefed now
  since he's been running. He gets it, he understands it. You have
  people -- I know Mr. Schiff and I have been at the NSA being briefed
  on this issue. Mr. Langevin has a lot of expertise in this area.
  So we plan to really, from the technical point of view, look at
  some of the issues that are there. But in your job -- and where I
  really want to ask the question -- do you feel the mechanism in place,
  and I believe it's a good move to bring Melissa Hathaway who probably
  has much knowledge on cyber and also General Alexander, who is as good
  from a technical point of view as anybody in this country.
  With those two people working with us and the president and the
  administration, I think we can come a long way.
  But where do you feel, in your role as DNI, that we need to go to
  deal with this cyber issue? And including with that is billions of
  dollars of money that are going to have to be put out there and
  partnerships between the Verizons and the Microsofts, the AT&Ts. And
  I'd like to hear your opinion, what you can do in an unclassified,
  where we need to go: Is the threat real and what are your
  recommendations?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:48:26
  35 seconds

  I agree with you that we need to have open
  descriptions of some of the damage that has been caused by recent
  attacks. And I'm sure, having seen the inside story, you know that
  that's a fairly complicated process to sort all of that out,
  particularly attribution. And I think it's important to write these
  stories more on the fact of what happened than who the individual
  perpetrator was for that one because there can be many, as you know.
  

• 

  REP. RUPPERSBERGER

  At 01:49:01
  13 seconds

  It could be al Qaeda; it could be other
  countries. One thing I'm going to point out, though, that I think is
  important since this is a public hearing, we don't own the Internet.
  So it's not as if we're controlling the Internet; we just have to
  protect ourselves from these invasions.
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:49:14
  18 seconds

  I think you have that right. Yes, sir. We play
  a big role in the Internet. As you know, it's an international body
  that governs it. I think, on the second point you make, is also
  absolutely vital, is that this has to be a public-private ownership.
  

• 

  REP. RUPPERSBERGER

  At 01:49:32
  

  Partnership.
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:49:32
  47 seconds

  Partnership to move forward because the owners
  of most of the servers and fiberoptic cables and all are private
  companies. On that front, I think there is also -- there is also good
  news because through some of the initiatives that General Alexander,
  whom you know, started, we have good relations with the big IT
  software developers and vendors in a body that's actually organized,
  that we in the intelligence community and others play a role in to
  tackle these problems together.
  And I think both common solutions -- and also, frankly, I'd like
  to bring in some business executives into government to take jobs on
  the inside, to help us with their knowledge on the outside. So I
  think all of those are essential to solving this problem.
  

• 

  REP. RUPPERSBERGER

  At 01:50:19
  5 seconds

  Well, there's a lot of work to do and I look
  forward to working with you.
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:50:24
  

  Sure.
  

• 

  REP. REYES

  At 01:50:24
  21 seconds

  Thank you, Mr. Ruppersberger. Votes have just been
  called and I would remind members that the new policy is they'll go
  two minutes beyond the 15 minutes. At least that's what we've been
  told. We've got Mr. Holt and then Ms. Eshoo.
  

• 

  REP. RUSH HOLT (D-NJ)

  At 01:50:45
  1 minute

  HOLT (D-NJ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
  And, Mr. Director, again, congratulations. You have a lot of the
  skill and background necessary to do a good job in this position. And
  we wish you well, want to work with you.
  Since this is an overview today, I'd like to ask an overview
  question about the relationship between the intelligence community and
  Congress. The 9/11 Commission recommended strongly that Congress show
  more oversight of intelligence activities. So let me ask several
  questions. I'll ask them all at once and then you can -- I mean, do
  you think that vigorous congressional oversight benefits the efficient
  functioning of the intelligence community or could you operate better
  without congressional questioning about the workings and the
  activities of the IC?
  I think of that as a softball question, but it's important to
  answer, I think. And do you and the DNI staff think that in recent
  years Congress -- and by that I really mean the duly sworn members
  with responsibility for intelligence -- that Congress has received all
  of the information and cooperation it needs to conduct full and
  appropriate oversight? More specifically, was it appropriate not to
  brief members about President Bush's domestic electronic surveillance?
  Was it appropriate not to brief all members about certain covert
  activities in the Middle East and Latin America? Was it appropriate
  not to seek advice in these areas?
  Would you do anything different?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:52:25
  1 minute

  For those questions, I'm reminded of that song,
  "Some kind of help is the kind of help that help is all about and some
  kind of help is the kind of help we all can do without." And I think
  vigorous effective oversight of the right kind is nothing but good for
  our community. And we -- I think we're working it out. We're a new
  administration. There are some new members of the committee. There
  are some veterans here and, I think, as a background, the thing I
  should say is, my pledge is to make it as good a partnership as
  possible. And I think if you talk to those who serve on your
  counterpart committees who have dealt with the Armed Forces, you'll
  find that my reputation is one who probably says more rather than less
  to members of Congress because I understand who pays the bills and who
  has the oversight responsibilities.
  

• 

  REP. HOLT

  At 01:53:25
  5 seconds

  So, more specifically, was it appropriate in those
  circumstances that I mentioned? I think you know what I'm talking
  about.
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:53:30
  14 seconds

  Right. And on that question of fully and
  currently informing the committees, I follow the law, Congressman
  Holt. It says that this committee will be fully and currently
  informed of intelligence activities.
  

• 

  REP. HOLT

  At 01:53:44
  17 seconds

  So you would do it differently. In other words, it
  was inappropriate, you're saying, not to brief Congress about that
  surveillance program? It was not appropriate not to brief all members
  about these covert activities that I think you and I know what we're
  talking about.
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:54:01
  31 seconds

  I'd really rather talk about going forward
  rather than looking back because that's what I can affect, sir. And I
  will be leaning forward. I'll be leaning on the side of consulting
  more rather than less. But there is a category of sensitive covert
  actions which, as you know, is covered by a separate article of the
  statute which I am also aware of and which I feel has to be observed.
  And judgment is required always.
  

• 

  REP. HOLT

  At 01:54:32
  15 seconds

  Yeah, which -- what I'm talking about, I just want to
  set some benchmarks here because what I'm talking about, you know, we
  were not briefed at all: no one, not a committee member, not a
  committee chair, no one. Was that appropriate?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:54:47
  5 seconds

  There is no case that I know of in which no one
  should be briefed about an intelligence activity in this Congress.
  

• 

  REP. HOLT

  At 01:54:52
  6 seconds

  That helps. How am I doing on time, Mr. Chairman?
  

• 

  REP. REYES

  At 01:54:58
  

  Less than a minute.
  

• 

  REP. HOLT

  At 01:54:58
  1 minute

  Less than a minute. Well, let me ask for the record,
  then, you've listed a number of specifics. If you were to look at all
  of the risks, threats, events that might affect Americans and
  multiplied the likelihood of these events occurring times the number
  of Americans affected, what would you rank as number one, two and
  three? And is the allocation of resources within the intelligence
  community -- how does that match for those three?
  So whether we're talking about climate change or theft of nuclear
  weapons from Russia or Pakistan and the use of those weapons or a
  series of al Qaeda terrorist attacks on the U.S. --
  

• 

  REP. REYES

  At 01:55:59
  8 seconds

  If you can hit just a couple of those because I want
  to leave time for Ms. Eshoo so we finish up the open session.
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:56:07
  31 seconds

  I'll just say quickly that the greatest threats
  I think do lay in that convergence between non-state actors and
  weapons of mass destruction. And, you know, what would be the factors
  on likelihood and casualties? I think we probably ought to talk about
  it in closed session, but it's people who are not deterrable getting
  hold of weapons that can cause a lot of deaths.
  

• 

  REP. HOLT

  At 01:56:38
  6 seconds

  So if you could look at the top three later and tell
  us how you think the match of resources, the allocation of resources
  matches?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:56:44
  

  Yes, sir.
  

• 

  REP. REYES

  At 01:56:44
  2 seconds

  Ms. Eshoo.
  

• 

  REP. ANNA ESHOO (D-CA)

  At 01:56:46
  2 minutes

  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good
  morning, Mr. Director. The last question really segues very well into
  mine: I think the ultimate nightmare and intelligence community
  challenge is nuclear weapons and materials falling into the hands of
  those that want to destroy us, which leads me to Pakistan.
  I think that Pakistan poses an enormous challenge to us, along
  with Afghanistan. And I think that they are tied together in many
  ways. So I have two quick questions about it. And I think we can
  follow up on this in other forums, probably classified as well. But
  A, A.Q. Khan was released by the Pakistani government from house
  arrest earlier this month. I was shocked and appalled when that was
  announced. So my question to you is, does he still pose a
  proliferation threat in the eyes of the intelligence community? Do we
  know about any restrictions that may still be in place relative to
  this man that a colleague of mine dubbed the Johnny Appleseed of
  nuclear materials and information? And do we know what level of
  access he still has? So that I'd like to ask you.
  And my second question, which you can answer maybe for the record
  later on is -- and you touched on it earlier, I believe, who is on
  climate change. There are many of us that have worked very hard on
  this issue and to the credit of your predecessor, he agreed to -- for
  the intelligence community to produce an NIA. I'd like to know what
  your plans are for the ongoing effort within the intelligence
  community and what the resources are that you're going to commit to
  this, because there isn't any question in my mind and many experts'
  minds that the destabilization that is brought about as the result of
  climate change has a nexus to the intelligence community and vice-
  versa.
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 01:59:05
  1 minute

  On those two questions, ma'am, on A.Q. Khan, I'd
  rather answer in closed session in more detail. But it deserves an
  answer in open forum, which is that there are restrictions on him
  imposed by the government and that they primarily involve insuring
  that he is not connected to the network that he used before for the
  proliferation activities that you referred to and I can tell you in
  detail. But he's not a head of a laboratory, which is in the business
  that he was in before.
  On climate change, I think that the way the intelligence
  community is approaching it now is correct. That is, we are not
  funding scientific research on the important questions involved in it.
  We are looking at, with the range of predictions that are being made
  by science, what would be the national security effects of this on --
  

• 

  REP. ESHOO

  At 02:00:09
  26 seconds

  But there's a whole pool of expertise that has
  existed within the intelligence community. And so I think maybe we
  need to follow up on that on how you're going to capture that and keep
  it moving. I don't think it's -- it just rests under a statement of
  recognition that this poses a threat. That's not good enough. And we
  have tremendous resources. So we can follow up on that. Thank you,
  Mr. Chairman.
  

• 

  REP. REYES

  At 02:00:35
  14 seconds

  Thank you, Ms. Eshoo. And there is less than four
  minutes left but 400 members yet to show up to vote. So we will at
  this point conclude and adjourn the open hearing.
  

• 

  REP. HOLT

  At 02:00:49
  4 seconds

  Mr. Chairman, since there seems to be a moment, may I
  follow up on --
  

• 

  REP. REYES

  At 02:00:53
  

  Very briefly.
  

• 

  REP. HOLT

  At 02:00:53
  32 seconds

  Very briefly. There is precedent for making the
  intelligence community resources available for climate change studies,
  the so-called MEDEA Project. To what extent is that approach being
  revived? To what extent should it be revived? Making available the
  various resources of the intelligence community?
  

• 

  DIRECTOR BLAIR

  At 02:01:25
  6 seconds

  That's a good question. Let me look into that
  and get back to you and Congressman Eshoo, please, since I don't have
  that on the tip of my fingers.
  

• 

  REP. HOLT

  At 02:01:31
  

  Thank you.
  

• 

  REP. REYES

  At 02:01:31
  17 seconds

  Thank you, Mr. Holt. And thank you, Director Blair.
  And with that, the open hearing is adjourned. And we will reconvene
  after votes for the closed session at the Capitol.