Operations in Iraq - Jul 19, 2007

Transcript Text

  • The Chairman

    At 00:00:24
    8 minutes

    The hearing will come to order.
    I've asked our--we welcome all of our guests, and we're
    truly happy you're here. But let me say to you, this is a bit
    of an unusual hearing, in that we are using a telephone
    connection from Baghdad. Our Ambassador, Ambassador Crocker,
    who we know well and I have great respect for--I have--matter
    of fact, I spent some time with him in an underground bunker in
    Afghanistan once we opened up the--he opened up the Afghan
    Embassy, right after the Taliban fell. But I'm going to ask the
    audience if they'd help us out a lot. We don't know exactly how
    good this connection's going to be, and we know there's going
    to be a delay. So, you're going to hear a slight delay, and I'm
    not sure how the--how good the audio is going to be. So, if you
    would all just help us out and be very quiet, it would be
    useful. It may be of no consequence. It may be as crystal clear
    and as wide open as if he were sitting in front of us.
    And--but we're going to wait another moment, because--well,
    I guess we'll start.
    Ambassador Satterfield is going to be here, from State.
    Well, actually, I guess--is he coming now? He's just arriving.
    Welcome, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you very much for being
    here.
    What we're going to do now--and I can see Ryan--I can see
    our Ambassador in Baghdad--I'm going to make a brief opening
    statement, and turn it over to my friend Chairman Lugar, and
    then we'll hear from Ambassador Crocker.
    Ryan, thank you very much for accommodating our schedule.
    It's very important to us and to the Senate that we hear from
    you, and we thank you very much for accommodating us. You
    probably have a longer delay than 1 second in hearing me.
    But, with that, let me begin my opening statement.
    Mr. Ambassador, again, thank you for joining us. And I'd
    also like to, as I said, welcome Ambassador Satterfield, who is
    here in the committee room.
    In case we have a breakdown, we may turn to you, Ambassador
    Satterfield, but you're welcome to chime in, any way you think
    is appropriate. And I'd like to express my appreciation to you
    and the Embassy staff.
    Mr. Ambassador, we recognize the hardships you face, and we
    are truly grateful--truly grateful--for your service. Most of
    us--I think all of us here today have been to Baghdad. We have
    been, in my case, and in many others, seven or more times; I'm
    sure others, as well. And it is not an exaggeration to say you
    are truly, truly risking your good life for our country, and we
    appreciate it.
    The purpose of this hearing is straightforward. Mr.
    Ambassador, we hope to hear from you in a candid and
    unvarnished assessment of the situation on the ground in Iraq,
    especially the political situation.
    The primary goal of the President's military escalation, or
    buildup, or whatever--I don't want to be pejorative--whatever
    you want to call it--was to buy time--was to buy time for the
    Malaki government to make compromises and political
    reconciliation.
    Last week, the administration delivered an interim--an
    interim assessment of the Iraqi Government's performance on 18
    specific benchmarks.
    The government made the least amount of progress, in my
    view, where it matters the most, on the key political
    benchmarks: Oil laws, provincial elections, constitutional
    revisions, and de-Baathification. I am of the view that, absent
    real political movement, there is no ultimate solution. So,
    maybe you will talk to us about whether or not these political
    benchmarks--oil, provincial elections, constitutional
    revisions, de-Baathification--are as important as--
    Sir, would you get out of the way of the screen, there? I'm
    going to ask you to move. Thank you. Because we cannot see the
    screen.
    The final assessment is due in 2 months. And the Iraqi
    Parliament is taking one of those months off. Given the lack of
    progress since the surge began, 6 months ago, what gives you
    the confidence that we will see any progress between now and
    September? And, if you'd be willing to tell us--what can you
    tell us that will give us any confidence that the final report
    has any prospect of being one better than what we just
    received?
    Mr. Ambassador, you're in a tough spot. I believe that the
    President's policy, which you are being asked to execute, is
    based on a fundamentally flawed premise--and, I might add, the
    position of some Democrats, I think, is based on a similarly
    flawed premise--and that is, if we just give the cental
    government time, it will secure the support and trust of all
    Iraqis, that there'll be a unity government that can actually
    deliver security, services, and an effective government.
    In my judgment--and I know you know this, it's been my
    judgment for well over 2 years now--there is no possibility of
    that happening. But that's purely my judgment. It seems to me
    that there is no trust within the government now, no trust of
    the government by the people. And I don't see any realistic
    possibility of a capacity developing, on the part of the
    government, to be able to deliver security and basic services.
    That is, the central government. And I see no prospect of
    building that trust or capacity within the ensuing several
    years.
    I've been saying this for some time. I know I sound like a
    broken record to my colleagues. But I really believe, unless we
    decentralize this process, we're in real trouble.
    And, by the way, it's not just me. The director of the CIA,
    General Mike Hayden, back in November 2006, told the Iraqi
    Study Group, ``The inability of the central government to
    govern is irreversible.'' That was the assessment of our CIA in
    November of last year. Has anything changed?
    The trust--the truth is, in my view, Mr. Ambassador, Iraq
    cannot be governed from the center, absent a dictator or
    indefinite occupation. And neither of these are reasonable
    possibilities. Instead, I believe we should promote a political
    settlement that allows the warring factions breathing room in
    their own regions and control over the fabric of their own
    daily lives, their own police forces, their own laws and
    education, jobs, marriage, religion. And a limited central
    government would be in charge of truly common concerns,
    including protecting Iraq's borders and distributing oil
    revenues.
    None of this is an American imposition. It's entirely
    consistent, as you know, with the Constitution. Probably you
    and I and my colleagues are among only the few people who have
    ever read that Constitution. I've read the Constitution, and
    the Constitution talks about this country being a decentralized
    federal system. We continue to seem to want to centralize the
    federal system. I would argue the Articles of Confederation are
    closer to what they wrote than in the Constitution.
    But, having said that, it seems to me we have to also
    initiate diplomatic offensive to bring in the United Nations,
    the major countries, and Iraq's neighbors to help implement and
    oversee a political settlement. It is past time to make Iraq
    the world's problem, not just our own.
    So, Mr. Ambassador, whether you agree with what I'm
    proposing or not, the bottom line is this. Just about everyone
    now agrees there is no purely military way to bring stability
    to Iraq. We need a political solution. So, I want your best
    assessment of the prospects of a political settlement, what it
    would look like, and how you think it may be achieved. I look
    forward to hearing your testimony. And, again, Ryan, I want to
    thank you. I saw you, firsthand, under incredible pressure in
    Afghanistan, and I have watched you now. I am very--not that
    you need me to be proud of you--but I am very proud we have men
    and women like you, of your caliber, in the Foreign Service. I
    thank you for your service.
    I now yield to Chairman Lugar.
    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
    U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

  • Senator Lugar

    At 00:08:44
    4 minutes

    Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming
    Ambassador Crocker as the Senate continues to debate U.
    S.
    policy in Iraq.
    The future of that policy increasingly appears to depend on
    the administration's report, due in September. Regardless of
    what the report says, however, we must begin now to prepare for
    what comes next.
    It is likely that there will be changes in military
    missions and force levels as the year proceeds. If U.S.
    military leaders, diplomats, and, indeed, the Congress are not
    prepared for these contingencies, they may be executed poorly,
    especially in an atmosphere in which public demands for troop
    withdrawals could compel action on the political timetable. We
    need to lay the groundwork for alternatives so that when the
    President and Congress move to a new plan, it can be
    implemented safety and rapidly.
    I am encouraged that the President has announced he is
    sending Secretary of State Rice and Defense Secretary Gates to
    the region to engage in concentrated diplomacy. I would observe
    this diplomacy must be ambitious, sustained, and innovative. It
    must go well beyond conferences with allied nations. We have to
    consider how diplomacy can change the equation in the region in
    ways that enhance our prospects for success in Iraq.
    Regional diplomacy is not just an accompaniment to our
    efforts in Iraq, it is the precondition for the success of any
    policy that follows the surge. We cannot sustain a successful
    policy in Iraq over the long term unless we repair alliances,
    recruit more international participation in Iraq, anticipate
    refugee flows, prevent regional aggression, generate new basing
    options, and otherwise prepare for future developments. If we
    have not made substantial diplomatic progress by the time a
    post-surge policy is implemented, our options will be severely
    constrained, and we'll be guessing at a viable course in a
    rapidly evolving environment.
    I believe the most promising diplomatic approach would be
    to establish a consistent forum related to Iraq that is open to
    all parties in the Middle East. The purpose of the forum would
    be to improve transparency of national interests so that
    neighboring states, including Syria and Iran, would avoid
    missteps. It would be in the self-interest of every nation in
    the region to attend such meetings, as well as the United
    States, the EU representatives, or other interested parties.
    The existence of a predictable, regular forum in the region
    would be especially important for dealing with refugee
    problems, regulating borders, exploring development
    initiatives, and preventing conflict between the Kurds and the
    Turks.
    A consistent forum in the Middle East is particularly
    salient, because that region suffers from conspiracy theories,
    corruption, and the opaque policies of nondemocratic
    governments. We should be meeting with states on a constant
    basis and encouraging them to meet each other as a means of
    achieving transparency. We should not underestimate the degree
    to which the lack of transparency in the Middle East
    intensifies risks of conflict and impedes solutions to regional
    problems. A constant, predictable, diplomatic forum would allow
    countries and groups to keep an eye on one another. And such a
    forum would make armed incursions more risky for an aggressor.
    It would provide a means of applying regional peer pressure
    against bad behavior. It would also complicate the plans of
    those who would advance destructive sectarian agendas. If
    nations or groups decline to attend or place conditions on
    their participation, their intransigence would be obvious to
    the other players in the region.
    We know the task of initiating even a partial military
    redeployment from Iraq will be an extremely complicated and
    dangerous undertaking. I am hopeful that you, Ambassador
    Crocker, will shed light today not just on prevailing
    conditions in Iraq, but also on what is being done to prepare
    for a post-surge strategy.
    I appreciate very much your making time to hear us. Thank
    you, sir.

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    Again, Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much.
    And the floor is yours. If you--I'm sorry. Thank you very much,
    and the floor is yours, Mr. Ambassador.
    STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN C. CROCKER, AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ,
    DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC (VIA VIDEO CONFERENCE FROM
    BAGHDAD, IRAQ)

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar.
    Thank you for this somewhat unique opportunity to appear before
    the committee.
    I was last before you about 5 months ago for my
    confirmation hearing. I believe you received the statement that
    was prepared in advance. I will not take up the time of the
    committee reading through that. I will make a few observations.

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    Yes, we have.

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Sorry, sir?

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    I said we have received your statement, and
    it will be placed in the record, as if presented.

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I will make a few opening observations that deal with a few
    of the issues that you and Senator Lugar raised, and then look
    forward to questions.
    I've been in Iraq just a little less than 4 months. As you
    know, sir, I served here previously, in 2003, when I had the
    privilege of meeting you out here that summer. I was here
    earlier for a 2-year tour in the late 1970s, when Saddam ruled
    this country. Coming back, at the end of March, I was struck by
    a number of things.
    First, I was struck by the damage that a year and more of
    violence, mainly sectarian violence, had done to the city and
    this country, both physically, psychologically, and
    politically. I was conscious that this damage, as great as it
    was, did not take place simply in its own terms of reference.
    It followed 35 years of Saddam's rule, during which all forms
    of social and political organizations were effectively
    eliminated by terror from Iraq, throwing people back on the
    most basic of identities and loyalties, and inculcating a
    tremendous sense of fear, suspicion, and mistrust. That is the
    legacy from Saddam Hussein, that Iraq, its people, and its
    government have to deal with today--intensified and deepened by
    the sectarian violence of 2006.
    So, the challenges are immense. I, in no way, minimize the
    difficulty that Iraq faces, and that we face in support of the
    Iraqis.
    As a result of the surge, which, as you know, just hit its
    full stride in the middle of June, about a month ago, levels of
    violence, sectarian violence, particularly in Baghdad, have
    come down to a fairly notable degree. High-profile attacks,
    however, continue. Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices
    are the best known and obviously the most devastating. Three
    days ago, there was one in Kirkuk that killed over 80 people. I
    was up in Kirkuk yesterday, meeting with local officials and
    some of our own personnel in the Provincial Reconstruction Team
    there, to get an assessment of the kind of damage these attacks
    do. And they work on fault lines--political, sectarian,
    psychological fault lines. And they continue.
    So, this is the context, Mr. Chairman, in which the Iraqi
    Government and Iraqi people must deal with their present and
    their future. And it is not at all easy.
    I certainly will not try to present the Iraqi Government to
    you as a model of smoothly functioning efficiency, because it's
    not. It faces considerable difficulties. The stresses, the
    strains, and the tensions throughout society are reflected in
    the government. And if there is one word that I would use to
    sum up the atmosphere in Iraq--on the streets, in the
    countryside, in the neighborhoods, and at the national level--
    that word would be ``fear.'' This is the fear with which Saddam
    Hussein so effectively inculcated the country, it's a fear
    that's been intensified by the sectarian strains. For Iraq to
    move forward at any level, that fear is going to have to be
    replaced with some level of trust and confidence. And that is
    what the effort at the national level is about. That is what
    the benchmark process is about--national reconciliation--which
    is another way of talking about some basic level of national
    confidence. You've all seen the report. You know that Iraq has
    a considerable way to go.
    At this stage in the process, many of my efforts are
    focused on not only the push to help the Iraqis achieve
    benchmarks, but to develop the processes by which the work of
    the government might be carried forward, and in which
    confidence of those in government, and the people around them,
    might be further developed.
    I will give you just one example, very briefly. That is,
    the evolution of what the Iraqis are calling the Executive
    Council. This is the Presidency Council. The Kurdish President
    and the two Vice Presidents, one Shia and one Sunni, are
    meeting now on a regular basis with Iraq's Prime Minister,
    Nouri al-Maliki. Meetings are now scheduled every Sunday
    morning. There is a secretariat to help staff the four
    officials. There is an agenda. There are prepared minutes of
    the meeting. This brings, in particular, the leader of Iraq's
    Sunni community together with the Prime Minister in a venue
    where they can deal with the crises of the moment, but also, we
    hope, over time, chart a way forward on achieving both the
    legislative benchmarks and also the spirit of reconciliation
    that has to underlie them.
    Mr. Chairman, both you and Senator Lugar spoke of the
    region, and I would just make a few remarks in that context,
    and then, if you'll permit me, come back very briefly to
    address other comments you made about levels of government
    below the central authority.
    As you know, Iraq exists in a tough region. It was
    precisely to engage the neighbors in a constructive manner that
    we supported the establishment of the neighbors forum, which,
    as you know, has now met at the ministerial level, one time in
    Sharm el-Sheikh, at the beginning of May, and we look forward
    to further such meetings. This process also established a set
    of working groups, one of which has already met, the energy
    working group in Istanbul, at the end of last month, and two
    others are now scheduled, one on refugees, in Amman next week,
    and another on border security, in Syria at the beginning of
    August. We think this process is important. We think it should
    be intensified, precisely as a way of, again, bringing Iraq's
    neighbors into some constructive, rather than destructive,
    engagement on Iraq's present and its future.
    We would welcome, Mr. Chairman, as I think both you and
    Senator Lugar proposed, a more active role by the United
    Nations. They have done important work here in the past. We
    have been in contact here with the Special Representative of
    the Secretary General, in contact with the United Nations in
    New York and in Washington, to urge them to devote the
    personnel and the resources to Iraq that Iraq needs and
    deserves. There is a lot of good work they have done, and can
    do, on issues such as refugees and elections. And I, for one,
    would like to see them staffed more robustly to carry that
    forward.
    Finally, on the international level, there is another U.N.
    and Iraqi sponsored process, with which, of course, you are
    very familiar: The international compact with Iraq. That, too,
    had a successful ministerial at Sharm el-Sheikh in May. It also
    has developed followup mechanisms that bring the broad
    international community into engagement, primarily on Iraq's
    economic agenda. I think we need to continue to support and
    encourage this effort, as well, because it does benefit the
    whole process in Iraq.
    My final comment, sir, would be on government at different
    levels. As you have commented previously, we have seen some
    encouraging developments in Iraq over the last few months,
    primarily among Sunni communities, starting in the western
    province of Al Anbar, where tribal figures that had been, if
    not supportive of al-Qaeda, at least tolerant toward al-Qaeda,
    shift over so that they are now supporting coalition forces,
    and, by extension, the Iraqi Government. This phenomenon has
    spread to Abu Ghraib, just west of the city, in parts of
    Baghdad itself, and to other provinces, such as Diyala and
    Ninawa. I was in Ninawa yesterday, in Mosul, learning there of
    overtures from Sunni tribes who had once ferociously resisted
    the Iraqi Security Forces, now seeking to have its young men
    join both police and the Iraqi Army. So, I think, incorporating
    this shift, and working to further intensify it at the
    grassroots level, is important to the overall prospects for
    success in Iraq.
    In my view, Mr. Chairman, Iraq needs efforts at both these
    levels. Central authority, itself, is not sufficient, but a
    total decentralization, in the Iraqi context, I think, would
    also be both difficult and potentially dangerous as a prelude
    to nongovernance and potential chaos.
    Iraq is on a course, as you suggested, that is somewhere in
    the middle. The Iraqi Council of Representatives passed
    legislation earlier this year that provides for the
    establishment of regions. And, as you know, there is a Kurdish
    region, the Kurdish regional government already in existence.
    This legislation provides the framework for that. It also
    permits provinces in other areas to similarly constitute
    themselves as regions. That is part of federalism, in the Iraqi
    context, provided for in the constitution model legislated by
    the Council of Representatives. And I think this provides an
    effective way of dealing both with the need for a central
    authority in certain key areas, but also taking into account
    regional aspirations and regional capabilities.
    And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to take your
    questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ambassador Crocker follows:]
    Prepared Statement of Hon. Ryan Crocker, Ambassador to Iraq, Department
    of State, Washington, DC
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is with pleasure that I appear before
    the committee for the first time since my confirmation hearing in
    February. Last week, the President submitted to Congress an interim
    assessment of the Government of Iraq's progress toward achieving a
    number of political, economic, and security benchmarks.
    I believe it is a fair assessment which demonstrates that while the
    Government of Iraq is making some progress, there is still much to do
    and much room for improvement. As we approach September, I and other
    senior-level Embassy officials are--on a daily basis--personally
    engaging with the highest levels of the Government of Iraq to make
    clear that progress on the benchmarks is imperative, to suggest ways
    forward, and to serve as honest brokers to promote compromise. At the
    working level, we also maintain daily contact with members of the Iraqi
    Council of Representatives, from committee heads to rank-and-file
    members, to monitor progress and serve as advocates for agreement on,
    and passage of, key legislation.
    We do much of our work discreetly. Those who would like to see our
    efforts fail in the hopes of stalling forward momentum past September
    15 are quick to recast our efforts as U.S. coercion and infringements
    upon Iraqi sovereignty. Recently, there were public demonstrations in
    Iraq's No. 1 ``oil city,'' Basra, condemning American pressure toward
    passage of a hydrocarbons law. But discreet should not be confused with
    ineffective, and we continue to make progress.
    I would like to add a general note of caution, however, about
    benchmarks. The benchmarks can be a useful metric; but the longer I am
    here, the more I am persuaded that progress in Iraq cannot be analyzed
    solely in terms of these discrete, precisely defined benchmarks
    because, in many cases, these benchmarks do not serve as reliable
    measures of everything that is important--Iraqi attitudes toward each
    other and their willingness to work toward political reconciliation.
    For example, I think if the committee examines the legislative
    benchmarks, it is quite possible that Iraq could achieve few of them
    over the coming months and yet actually be moving in the right
    direction. Conversely, I think it is possible that all the legislative
    benchmarks could be achieved without making any real progress toward
    reconciliation. Merely passing legislation without a broad consensus of
    all major Iraqi communities will not meet the goals of real or lasting
    reconciliation. Moreover, passing laws without the requisite consensus
    will undermine the political will for implementation on the ground
    following enactment. The benchmarks are useful tools if we remain
    focused on the broader context--the fundamental reconciliation issues
    facing Iraq that the benchmark legislation represents.
    Furthermore, I would note that the framework of these benchmarks
    focuses on the central government's capabilities and does not capture
    achievements made at the provincial level. The progress in the
    provinces, if properly nurtured, could be the basis for more
    substantial reconciliation efforts: A grassroots effort that produces
    security and prosperity for the citizens of Iraq.
    Our Provincial Reconstruction Teams report that local governments
    are taking the initiative--meeting the basic security needs of their
    citizens, planning and budgeting for reconstruction projects, and
    taking control of their futures by resisting
    al-Qaeda. It is this kind of activity that provides a level of
    encouragement that potential shortcomings at the national level may be
    offset by the affirming activities of state and local governments.
    Moreover, Iraqis at the local level are seeing the results of an
    improved political and economic process which is critical for a broader
    national reconciliation.
    Realizing that local government, small business, services and
    employment must play a vital part in the stabilization and
    sustainability of a self-governing Iraq, we have sharply increased the
    number of our PRTs, and we are strengthening their staffs. We have
    deployed 10 new PRTs this year and 4 more will be coming in early
    September. I have to be honest and say we have not yet deployed enough
    people in those teams, and we are in the process of expediting staffing
    efforts.
    I know the committee is interested in our New Embassy Compound--a
    project which has benefited from your support. Overseas Buildings
    Operations Director Williams has assured us, as well as the Congress,
    that the NEC is on schedule and on budget for completion in September.
    We seek to move personnel into the safer NEC quarters as quickly as
    possible following installation of the necessary communications,
    logistical and other support services.
    I look forward to your questions and thoughts.

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    Thank you very much.
    We will start this with 10-minute rounds. And if we run--
    begin to run out of time, we will alter it, but we should be
    able to do the 2 hours, here.
    Let me begin by asking you, Mr. Ambassador--the Iraqi
    Constitution--I can't remember now, I think it's section 115 or
    116--talks about the establishment of regions, and it's what
    I've been talking about for some time. Is it not true that,
    under the Iraqi Constitution, any region that decides--of 18
    governorates--any one or more that choose to be a single--one
    governate can become a region, or they can combine with two,
    three, five, like they have in the Kurdish area--to become a
    region. Once you are--declare that, by a majority vote, is it
    not true that that region writes its own constitution?

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    That is correct, Mr. Chairman. That is
    my understanding. That is what the Kurdish region has done.

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    And what is available to the other
    governorates, as well, correct?

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Yes, sir. The region's law, passed by
    the Council of Representatives, implements that.

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    Yes. Now, second, one of the things that, if
    you conclude that you are going to be a region--and I read
    article 115, ``The federal system in the Republic of Iraq is
    made up of a decentralized capital, region, and governates, and
    local administration.'' And section 116 goes and lays out and
    talks about the Kurdish region, and then 117 talks about this
    Council of Representatives can enact a way--a timeframe in
    which people become a region. And then it goes on to point out,
    in article 119 and 120, that if you choose to be a region, you
    can have control over your, quote, own security--your own
    security--like they do in the Kurdish area. There is no Iraqi
    Army, absent the Kurdish permission to move into there; they
    have their own local security. Is that not correct?

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    That is largely correct; yes, Mr.

  • Chairman

    At 00:12:55


  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    Now, next question I have is that you point
    out--which I and the--Chairman Lugar have been talking about
    from slightly different perspectives for 5 years now, or 4
    years now--this is a tribal society. There is no trust. As
    you've pointed out from the outset of your comments, that as a
    consequence of Saddam's tyrannical rule, that, in order to--you
    have gone back--they've gone back to basics, from the family
    unit to the tribal unit, to generate enough security and trust
    among themselves. That's what this tyranny imposed upon Iraq.
    And now we're in a situation where, as I see it--this is
    the question--is it not true that, even in the Sunni areas,
    there is no Sunni--or in the Shia areas, no Shia--overall
    unity? They are broken down into tribal and competing units
    within the Shia area, as we speak. Is that not true?

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Iraq, Mr. Chairman, presents a very
    complex picture. Iraq does have a strong tribal element in its
    society, but, in my experience here, both now and previously, I
    would not characterize all of Iraqi society as tribal. There is
    also a very rich urban society of long standing, certainly in
    Baghdad, but also in other regional centers, such as Mosul,
    Kirkuk, and Al Basrah.
    And, indeed, at a political level, while there are
    political movements that may be largely tribally based, there
    are also others that are very much crosscutting. The Iraqi
    Islamic Party, for example, the largest Sunni party in the
    coalition, is, to a large degree, an urban phenomenon, a
    middle-class urban phenomenon, of long standing. So, yes,
    tribal society is very important in understanding and dealing
    with Iraqi politics, but it's much more than that.

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    I----

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    You are absolutely right, sir----

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    Go ahead, I'm sorry.

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    You're absolutely right, sir, in my
    view, to emphasize the element of fear, because that has
    permeated all echelons of the society in this country, whether
    it's rural or urban, tribal or cosmopolitan. And that has to be
    overcome, in my view, Mr. Chairman. Whatever models the Iraqis
    choose, I would be concerned that none of them are going to
    work in the interest of Iraq's long-term security and
    stability, unless and until Iraqis, at various levels--local,
    provincial, regional, and national--are able to work through
    the fear that has been imposed on them into, and toward, a
    level of trust that at least permits basic compromises to take
    place and a new society to begin to build.

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    In the interest of time, if I could interrupt
    you to get to a couple more questions, if I may--and I don't
    disagree what you've said--with what you've said. But the
    bottom line here is that almost 4 million Iraqis, many of them
    in that middle class from those urban areas, have either fled
    internally within Iraq or left the country. As I understand it,
    it's close to 1.9 million displaced in the country, 2 million
    have left the country. I think we're kidding ourselves if we
    think you can, from the center--from the center--build a system
    that eliminates the fear in the provinces, in the--outside the
    urban areas. And I have been very disturbed that this
    administration's failure to push for the ability of this
    constitution to take form has, in my view, led to this
    continued over-reliance on the idea that Maliki, or anyone
    else, no matter how well intended, representing elements of
    Sunni, Shia, and Kurd, would be able to, from the center,
    eliminate this fear.
    Now, let me get to my next point. I believe there is no
    possibility we will have 160,000 troops in Iraq, a year from
    now. It's just not going to be the case. So, time is running
    out in a big way. And so, unless we do something, in my humble
    opinion, like we did in the Balkans, which you're very familiar
    with, which is set up a loosely federated system--we've had
    20,000, on average, troops there--Western troops there--for 10
    years. Not one has been killed, thank God. It's not a answer to
    everything. But the genocide is stopped, and they're becoming
    part of Europe. To think that we can accomplish reconciliation
    from the center, I find to be well beyond any reasonable
    expectation.
    And let me get to my last question. You say that the
    benchmarks--in your statement--are not a reliable measure.
    Then, what is the measure of whether or not political process
    and reconciliation is taking place? And I would add, the very
    progress you show in Anbar province is the very thing having
    Shia leaders call me here in Washington, saying we're picking
    sides, that we are aiding and abetting the Sunnis in a civil
    war. I'm not suggesting that's right or wrong. I'm relaying the
    fear, the idea that we are making progress in the provinces,
    relative to al-Qaeda, I would respectfully suggest, is making
    it harder for you to deal with the Shia, generally, in
    accommodating a real political reconciliation.
    But what are the benchmarks--not benchmarks--what are the
    objective criteria we should be looking at to determine whether
    or not Iraqi attitudes toward each other, and the willingness
    to work together at reconciliation, is happening?

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Mr. Chairman, if I might start with
    your last point, what's going on in Al Anbar----
    [Video call disconnected.]

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    I don't know what all this means, folks, but
    hang on. Stay tuned. The one thing we don't want to be looking
    at is a picture of me, the one thing I don't want to be looking
    at.
    Bertie, what's the story, do you know? I know--they're
    checking it out. I'm sorry. We're going to have a--thank you.
    We'd--our staff is on the phone with the technology experts
    trying to fix this. We may--we may be getting back up quickly
    here. We'll see.
    Do we still--do we still have--Ambassador Crocker, can you
    hear me? Because even if we don't have visual, we--if we have
    audio--I'm told we may still have audio. Is that--no, we don't
    have audio. Hang on a second, here.
    [Pause.]
    If we'll come to order, we're going to try
    this with just the audio. I don't know whether or not, and, Mr.
    Ambassador, you can hear us. Can you?

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Hello. Go ahead.

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    Mr. Ambassador, we've lost the video, but
    if--Mr. Ambassador, can you hear us?

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Hello, can you hear us on the other
    end, please?

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    Who is that speaking? Which end is up, here?
    Are we being asked if we can hear?
    We can hear you. So, Mr. Ambassador, just proceed with your
    comments. We went blank, and we lost you after I finished my
    questions. Would you proceed from there? The floor is yours,
    Mr. Ambassador, if you can hear me.
    [Pause.]
    Well, my microphone is off. I'm going to
    yield 10 minutes to the Senator, and then, I hate to say this
    to the rest of you, but we're going to cut back the time from
    10 minutes to 5 minutes, to make sure everybody gets in. It's--
    I apologize.
    If we have time--I'm told the Ambassador had, from
    beginning to end, a little over 2 hours--so, if we have time
    after that, we'll come back to--not to the chairman and I, but
    we'll come back to all of you who have gotten cut out, here--
    your time cut out. But, in order to get everybody in, I think
    it's going to--realistically, I'm told, we'll have to go closer
    to 5 minutes, assuming we get this connection at all.
    Baghdad, can you hear the U.S. Senate?

  • Senator Boxer

    At 00:12:55

    That's the problem. [Laughter.]

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    Let me say it another way--Ambassador
    Crocker, can you hear Joe Biden? No; they obviously can't hear.
    [Pause.]
    We're going to recess for somewhere between 3
    and 5 minutes to see if we can set this up, and we'll come back
    and figure out where we go.
    [Recess.]
    The hearing will come to order. We're going
    to the old tried-and-true method of a speakerphone. So, I'm
    going to put my microphone down here. And, Ambassador Crocker,
    if you can pick up where we left off, the floor is yours, Mr.

  • Ambassador

    At 00:12:55


  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Your question is a good one, because I think it brings into
    play several of the issues we've been discussing. You mentioned
    the concerns that had been expressed to you by Shia
    acquaintances over the impact of the Sunni outreach effort on
    their interests. And I think this illustrates why there needs
    to be a linkage between what happens in the provinces and the
    center.
    What we have done here, in close coordination with the
    Iraqi Government, was to establish, first, between General
    Petraeus and myself, a special section in the Multinational
    Force and the Embassy--it's cochaired by a Foreign Service
    officer and a British major general--to deal with engagement
    issues.
    Now, they work very closely with an Engagement Committee
    that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has established through his
    office, and it is through this process that we deal, on the
    federal level--the central level, with the steps we're taking
    at the local level. And this has worked, in the case of Al
    Anbar, quite well, where the tribes that had a desire to get
    into the fight against al-Qaeda have been formed into
    provisional police units that have been vetted through the
    Iraqi Central Government, and who are paid by the Iraqi Central
    Government.
    So, I think this is the direction in which we wish to work.
    If we were to do this at a completely local level, without
    centralized connection, I think the phenomenon that you allude
    to there would very quickly overtake the process, fears and
    concerns that whatever was going on in one area was somehow
    deeply inimical to the interests of another. So, this way to
    connect what happens regionally and provincially to the center,
    I think, is very important as we move forward.

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    Ambassador, thank you very much.
    When are regional elections going to take place? When are
    the governorates able to vote, if they wish to, to become a
    region? What date does that begin to occur? When does the law
    that was passed 8 months ago or so take effect?

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    My recollection, sir, is that the
    effective date for the establishment of the regions is April
    2008. That would be--that would be the time after which new
    regions could be established, according to the law.

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
    I'm now turning it over to Senator Lugar. We've also got a
    picture back.

  • Senator Lugar

    At 00:12:55

    Mr. Ambassador, are you aware of--or are you
    a part of any planning being done with respect to a transition
    in mission or redeployment of United States combat forces,
    something that might called plan B? Now, I ask this, because I
    understand, from widely reported press coverage, that back
    before the invasion in 2003, such integrated interagency
    planning, was being retarded by high-level political pressures
    and, therefore, had been abandoned. And I would simply want to
    know is any planning--and then, more importantly, are you or
    the State Department involved in interagency planning with
    regard to a so-called plan B?

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    In terms of the future planning,
    Senator Lugar--I am fully engaged, as is General Petraeus, in
    trying to implement the President's strategy that was announced
    in January. And from this vantage point, I can't speak to the
    interagency process. If there are advantages to being in
    Baghdad, it's having to deal with things in the Iraqi context
    and letting the interagency take care of itself. But the short
    answer is, I'm not aware of these efforts, and my whole focus
    is involved with the implementation of plan A.

  • Senator Lugar

    At 00:12:55

    Well, apparently you're not involved, at
    least you've testified that you're simply dealing with affairs
    as they are there. So, let me ask you, then, directly: What is
    the most significant concern that you have about a potential
    redeployment of United States Forces in Iraq?

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Senator Lugar, there are several
    aspects of that that are of concern to me. Broadly speaking,
    they involve the potential impact on the people of Iraq and the
    potential opportunity for the adversaries of the United States
    and of what we are attempting to help the Iraqis do.
    On the first point, I've had the opportunity, since I've
    been here, to get out into the neighborhoods of Baghdad,
    including those that have been severely affected by sectarian
    violence. And I've had the chance to talk to the people in
    those neighborhoods. And I hear the same things fairly
    consistently. One is that, by and large, the Iraqi people have
    some confidence in the Iraqi Army forces--not full confidence,
    concerns over their strength and their abilities still untested
    in the views of many Iraqis--but basically a positive attitude
    toward them. But that is accompanied by, again, a fairly
    consistent message: ``You just got here. There is some return
    to normal life because U.S. forces are here. Stay long enough
    to keep these areas secure so they don't spiral immediately
    back down into the violence they've just been pulled out of
    over the last couple of months because of this surge.''
    And I would be concerned, particularly in the very
    demographically complex area that is Baghdad, still--in spite
    of all the separation that has occurred--still a mixed city, in
    communal terms, that nonconditions-based withdrawals could lead
    to a sharp spike in the--precisely the sectarian violence among
    the population that the surge was intended to diminish, and
    which it has diminished.
    The other area, sir, where I would be quite concerned is
    the space that this could give to our adversaries. And I would
    mention just two in this connection. One, obviously, is al-
    Qaeda, where, as you know from statements from the Department
    of Defense and the Multi-National Force, we have had some
    significant successes against al-Qaeda elements. And, clearly,
    the current campaign south of Baghdad and Diyala is affecting
    al-Qaeda in a fairly major way. They continue to direct
    attacks. I believe that the Kirkuk bombing of 3 days ago was--
    has all the hallmarks of an al-Qaeda terrorist attack. Clearly,
    if a nonconditions-based set of withdrawals produces more
    violence among Iraqis, it also creates a climate in which al-
    Qaeda will find a comfortable operating environment. And that
    clearly is not in our interest.
    It could also establish conditions in which Iran would find
    further room to operate. We've already seen, as you're aware,
    sir, the indications of Iranian involvement through the Quds
    Force and through proxies, such as Lebanon's Hezbollah, as well
    as elements of the Jaysh al-Mahdi. In a scenario in which,
    again, central authority was unable to hold and violence
    increases throughout the country, that would provide more
    running room for Iran and its supporters, as something else
    that was not in our strategic national interest.
    So, those two points are the most important to me.

  • Senator Lugar

    At 00:12:55

    Ambassador, you have mentioned al-Qaeda
    activities in Kirkuk; likewise, Iranian activities which are
    sometimes alleged all over the country. General Petraeus has
    about 28,500 forces involved in the surge. His own work, out at
    Fort Leavenworth, would indicate a formula that maybe 250,000
    would be required to cover the country of Iraq. My question, I
    suppose, simply, is: How can the surge be successful with
    28,500? And, specifically, what does happen in all the rest of
    Iraq that is not Baghdad, Diyala, Anbar, or one of those areas
    where we have not increased the forces dedicated to population
    security or combating opposition elements?

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Sir, if--it's a complex question. In
    some areas, we've seen some significant improvements. One of
    them, obviously, is Al Anbar. Another is the northern province
    of Ninawa. I was there, yesterday, talking to both our
    Provincial Reconstruction Team members and members of the
    Multi-National Forces. Because of an improvement of
    conditions--in Mosul, in particular, and Ninawa, generally--
    General Petraeus has been able to redeploy forces from that
    area, elsewhere.
    So, I think this is a process and a situation that's going
    to require a lot of hard analysis and agility on our part, in
    coordination with the Iraqi Government, at both national and
    provincial levels, to determine where their forces are gaining
    the confidence, the experience, and the trust of communities to
    be able to hold, without us present in large force, and where
    conditions have simply moved in a direction that supports these
    kinds of shifts.
    But, clearly, as we look at Iraq now, we're not looking at
    a situation where, even under current circumstances, we need to
    be everywhere at once. We don't. We just have to be smart
    enough to be in the places where it counts.

  • Senator Lugar

    At 00:12:55

    Thank you very much.

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    Senator Kerry. We're going to 5-minute
    rounds, and--in light of the delay. That's what we're doing.
    It's the prerogative of--I gave the Senator 10, but we're--all
    started off at 10, John, but we've run out of time. We're going
    to have votes at 12 o'clock.

  • Senator Kerry

    At 00:12:55

    Mr. Ambassador, thank you. It's good to see
    you for the second time today. I was your next questioner, over
    at the Pentagon a little while ago, and we got interrupted
    there, so I'm glad to be able to pick up here. And I will
    separate, certainly, what was appropriate to that briefing to
    this one.
    When I chaired your--nominated--your confirmation hearing,
    you said, at that time, that you believed, as the President and
    the Vice President and the Secretary of State and all of our
    generals said, that there is no military solution, there is
    only a political solution. Do you still believe that?

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Absolutely, sir, no question.

  • Senator Kerry

    At 00:12:55

    And so, what we've achieved, militarily in
    the last days, would have to be described as tactical
    successes. Is that not correct?

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    I think that is a very accurate
    description.

  • Senator Kerry

    At 00:12:55

    And one of those tactical successes in Al
    Anbar, which has been much referred to, publicly and otherwise,
    is that the tribal chiefs have joined with us in an effort to
    try to deal with al-Qaeda; correct?

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Yes, sir.

  • Senator Kerry

    At 00:12:55

    But they are, essentially, in Al Anbar,
    almost exclusively Sunni who are acting to protect their own
    interests, because al-Qaeda was killing their villagers and
    their sons and daughters, raping them, correct? So, the Al
    Anbar success has to be separated from the fundamental conflict
    of Shia and Sunni, the fundamental civil strife that our troops
    are caught in the middle of in other parts of the country,
    particularly Baghdad and its surrounding area. Is that correct?

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    There, I'd make a slight distinction,
    which is to say that each part of this country has to be
    understood and dealt with in its own terms. Al Anbar, as you
    correctly point out, is almost entirely Sunni and almost
    entirely tribal. A province like Diyala has a mixed population,
    both Sunni and Shia.

  • Senator Kerry

    At 00:12:55

    Correct.

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    And that has to be taken into account.
    But in Diyala we have seen a similar phenomenon, where
    significant elements of a population that has been hostile to
    us are now prepared to work with us. It's more complex, because
    we've got to be very careful that this is managed in a way that
    does create or renew sectarian tensions. But the same desire to
    say, ``We don't want to have these guys anywhere near us,'' is
    at play in Diyala and other provinces.

  • Senator Kerry

    At 00:12:55

    Well, let me follow up on that, because the
    stated purpose, by the President, of the escalation of our
    forces--on a temporary basis, I emphasize, and he did--was to
    provide the breathing space for the leadership of Iraq to make
    fundamental political decisions; i.e., compromise. The Al
    Anbar--separating Al Anbar there, because of its, sort of,
    uniqueness, there's been almost zero political compromise
    whatsoever on any of the major benchmarks and fundamentals. And
    your testimony earlier today was that, essentially, you think
    the benchmarks aren't as important as the process itself. So,
    in a way, the goal posts are now moving a little bit.
    And my question to you is: If there is no military
    solution, and the process is important, but the fundamental
    conflict and killing is taking place because the stakeholders
    are battling between each other for the future of Iraq,
    essentially, and for their status in it. If there is no
    political settlement, how can the process become more
    important? In the absence of that political settlement, our
    troops are going to remain in the same trap they're in today,
    with, as Senator Lugar said, inadequate people to do the job,
    and the ability of al-Qaeda and others to use our presence to
    continue to be the magnet for terrorism and for jihadists and
    for naysayers and opponents and so forth. So, where do we go,
    in looking for that political compromise, if you're moving the
    goal posts, at this point in time? And what are--what is--what
    do Americans have to look forward to, in terms of a real
    resolution, since there can only be a political settlement of
    this conflict?

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Senator Kerry, I'll repeat to you here
    what I believe I said when you chaired my confirmation hearing,
    which is: As long as it's my privilege to serve as the American
    Ambassador to Iraq, I will give you and the American people my
    best assessment as to what ground truth and ground reality
    looks like. So, I'm certainly not moving any goal posts. What
    is the case is I've been here now for about 4 months, I've had
    time to get in on the ground, to spend as much time as I can
    outside the Green Zone, to try to understand the complexity of
    what is going on here. And what that tells me is there are a
    lot of processes at work--some of them positive, some of them
    negative. A positive process is the one that we have seen in Al
    Anbar. We didn't create that. The central government didn't
    create it. It started among Anbaris. I think we have done the
    right thing, in coordination with the central government, to
    try to develop and strengthen that process and ensure that it
    is linked to the central government to avoid the kinds of
    suspicions that Chairman Biden mentioned a little bit ago.
    Now, that is a phenomenon that, when I appeared before you
    in February, we could not have begun to foresee or predict. But
    it has developed, and it's developed in a fairly positive way.
    These are the kinds of things I think we've got to have the
    agility and the imagination and the people on the ground, both
    military and civilian, in the form of our Provincial
    Reconstruction Teams in Al Anbar, to identify and then take
    advantage----

  • Senator Kerry

    At 00:12:55

    Right, but I'm not talking about Al Anbar,

  • Ambassador

    At 00:12:55

    I'm trying to direct your attention to the rest of
    the fundamental conflict that is different from an Al Anbar. I
    mean, Al Anbar is not the model for the resolution of the
    Muqtada al-Sadr problem, who is modeling, now, his
    organizational effort on Hamas and Hezbollah. It's not the
    model for the resolution of the militia conflict between Shia
    and Sunni, et cetera, nor even the jockeying of political
    players between the rejectionists in the Sunni population and
    the Shia, who have different interests. So, I'm really trying
    to focus you on that.

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    I agree, Sir; Al Anbar is Al Anbar.
    But, you know, there are similar phenomena repeated around the
    country. At the national level, the process I referred to was
    the effort that the four senior officials in this country are
    exerting to come together in an established, regularized forum
    to deal with differences among them--the Sunnis, Shia, and
    Kurds. That has, in the--at the national level, those who need
    to come to terms on a national basis. So, that's one process.
    What's going on in Diyala is another process. What's happening
    in the south--and the south, too, is not a monolith. You know,
    very different conditions, as you rightly suggest. What does
    Muqtada al-Sadr intend? And how are parties of a different
    persuasion, and the government itself, dealing with that
    particular challenge? And how can we help? In the south, Jaysh
    al-Mahdi has received several significant setbacks in places
    like An Nasiriyah and Ad Diwaniyah--in part, through coalition
    intervention, but also through Iraqi Security Forces standing
    up and dealing with that particular challenge.
    So, again, I am not trying to gild any lilies here, and I'm
    certainly not trying to oversimplify a highly complex process,
    but there are opportunities in that complexity. We just have to
    be, I think, aware enough and quick enough to see them and turn
    them to the advantage of the Iraqi Government and people.

  • Senator Kerry

    At 00:12:55

    Mr. Ambassador, thank you. My time is up,
    and I need to go vote in Finance. But we're grateful to you--
    and I didn't have a chance to extent that to General Petraeus--
    but we're grateful to you, and all of the people serving over
    there, for what you're doing for your country. And we want you
    to be safe.

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    Thank you, Senator.

  • Senator Hagel

    At 00:12:55


    Ambassador Crocker, I would--like all my
    colleagues here in the Congress, add my thanks to you and your
    colleagues who are serving in Iraq. We are grateful for that
    service. We may have differences of opinion on policy, but we
    acknowledge your service, and all of your colleagues' service,
    and we are grateful for that service.
    I have, as all my colleagues do, limited time, and I wanted
    to begin with acknowledging what the State Department noted
    this week, in that our Government would be engaging Iran once
    again. And if we have time to get to that, I would like a brief
    comment on that, as to--When will that occur? And where will
    that occur? What do we hope to accomplish?
    But let's stay focused, for the present time, on the
    questioning here this morning.
    One of the points that you made, Ambassador, when you
    opened this conference, a statement--and I'm paraphrasing, but
    I believe it's pretty accurate--you said, after a year away
    from Iraq, you were struck by the damage that had been done in
    Iraq mainly by sectarian violence. Now, that is, in some
    conflict with a number of senior administration officials--in
    fact, including the President, who has said, over and over,
    that Iraq is the forefront, the battleground, against al-Qaeda,
    that al-Qaeda is the central element of violence and
    destabilization in Iraq. Now, of course, our National
    Intelligence Estimates of our 16 intelligence agencies have
    said that that's not true, either. But I lay that out as a
    preface to a couple of questions that I have coming your way.
    Senator Lugar made an interesting observation, and he's
    correct in this, as Senator Lugar normally is correct on these
    things, and that is that the counterinsurgency manual, that
    General Petraeus actually wrote, lays out a formula for force
    structure, essentially matching the force structure with the
    mission. And, unfortunately, we have put our troops in a
    situation where they are woefully overmatched with a mission,
    because they do not have even near the numbers of troops that
    General Petraeus actually, himself, wrote in his
    counterinsurgency manual, in order to do the job. So, we're
    putting our troops in a terrible position, overburdening them
    with an almost impossible task.
    And I noted--and I would like you to respond to this
    question and a second question--that the Prime Minister of Iraq
    said, this week, that--I'm paraphrasing again--that Iraq was
    capable and ready to take over the security responsibilities of
    Iraq at any time, I believe he said. In light of what you have
    just told us, the last hour, that it seems to me, at least your
    interpretation, is in some conflict with what the Prime
    Minister's analysis of his own forces are--and that's one
    question, Ambassador, I'd like you--to have you respond to.
    The second is, we hear an awful lot about--and you have
    said it--we have to buy time. We have to buy time. We need more
    time. We understand that. But here are the set of questions. We
    buy time for what? For a political reconciliation process that
    is not occurring, that is not working. There's not even a
    political accommodation as the prelude to political
    reconciliation that we're making progress on. We talked about
    some of the successes in Iraq, and we have had some. I was
    there, as you know--appreciated your time--6 weeks ago. You
    just mentioned the south. I had two very informed individuals,
    who you met with, who were over there for a few days last week,
    tell me that those four southern provinces are gone, that the
    Shia militia are in charge. Now, I don't know that's an
    overstatement or not, but you might want to comment on that.
    So, I'm a bit puzzled, because if, in fact, we're buying
    time, I think the question needs to be addressed, We're buying
    time for what? How long is enough time? We're in our fifth
    year, and we still see no political reconciliation occurring.
    Actually, I think we're going backward. So, if you could focus
    on those two questions that I've noted--one, buying time, for
    how long, and for what; and, second, your comment on the Prime
    Minister's statement this week that the Iraqi forces are ready
    and prepared to take responsibility for security in Iraq at any
    time.
    And, thank you.

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Thank you, Senator Hagel.
    Buying time for what, and how much time do we have to buy,
    is a critical question. And, again, not to key up--not to steal
    your time, but the answer is complex, because this is a complex
    situation.
    You mentioned the south. Al Basrah, Iraq's second-largest
    city, and the provincial center for most of Iraq's oil
    resources, has been very, very unstable, with a high level of
    militia activity. What the Iraqi Government has done over the
    last few weeks is to take a couple of tested commanders--one
    army, one police--and send them down to Al Basrah with the
    instruction to get the city under control. It is a tall order,
    but these are officers who, by all accounts, have the
    background and capability to do this sort of thing.
    Now, I've talked to them both, and they're looking for
    resources. They both need more forces than they've got--forces
    that would normally be assigned down to Al Basrah are up--Iraqi
    forces--are up as part of the Baghdad security plan. So,
    they're working out their own plan for Al Basrah. They've got
    to resource it, and then they've got to implement it.
    It's going to be hard. It'll take time. I can't predict to
    you what the outcome will be. But here we have a case of a
    government recognizing it's got a militia problem in its
    second-largest city, and taking some steps to deal with it, and
    I find that encouraging, as far as it goes.
    Elsewhere, again, the situation is intensely complicated in
    some of Baghdad's neighborhoods, where the introduction of our
    forces has made a huge difference. And I've seen it for myself,
    in places like West Rashid, which, just at the time you were
    here, sir, was a place where neither one of us would have
    wanted to set foot in--well, you can do that now. I did it on
    Saturday. And you can do it, because our forces are there. They
    can't stay there forever. I mean, that much is clear. But I
    certainly hope that they can stay there long enough for Iraqi
    Security Forces to be available in the numbers and with the
    training and the equipment and the reliability to do that job
    of protecting the Iraqi people themselves. So, that would be
    another instance of buying time.
    The third point, sir, is, I think, the national point. How
    much time is necessary for an Iraqi Central Government to
    effectively function as one? As you know--you were just out
    here--they are having, you know, significant difficulties. I--
    as I said, I've been encouraged that they are able at least to
    come together and thrash out these difficulties, face to face.
    They are going to need more time, because, again, in the
    climate that has been created, Saddam plus the sectarian
    violence, it's pretty hard to make sweeping compromises, even
    if you, as a leader, are so inclined, because you have got a
    constituency out there that is very badly scarred and very
    badly afraid of what the consequences of those kinds of
    compromises can be.
    So, there's got to be time to build, again, that minimum
    level of trust that will let this country move forward.

  • Senator Hagel

    At 00:12:55

    Thank you.

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    Thank you very much.

  • Senator Feingold

    At 00:12:55


    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First, I just want to raise a note of caution about this
    discussion about Anbar province. The first, of course, is the
    one that Senator Kerry so effectively raised, is the
    applicability of the lessons, Ambassador, of Anbar to other
    parts of Iraq. That's a very serious question which we have to
    address. The second is, I'm not so sure about Anbar itself. We
    have been subjected to so much hype in the course of this war
    that I would just urge you and the administration and my
    colleagues to not be so sure that everything will continue to
    be rosy in that region. The fact is that when I was in
    Fallujah--Camp Fallujah in 2005, there was a very rosy scenario
    presented after the battle of Fallujah. A year later, when I
    was in the same place, it didn't sound so good. Now, in 2007,
    it sounds better.
    But for people to start suggesting that this is somehow a
    result the surge or somehow, simply because they're now on our
    side, they're our buddies now, I think we've heard enough
    things in this war, I would caution my colleagues.
    I hope it is true. I hope those are the long-term
    consequences for that region. But I think once al-Qaeda is, in
    some way, minimized, our presence there may become the greatest
    focus of the Sunnis, who do not like it that we are there. So,
    I would urge everyone to not be so sure that Al Anbar is taken
    care of, any more than Basrah was taken care of when everybody
    thought that was done, or Hillah province, where I was taken,
    because that's a safe place. The fact is, these places come and
    go. And if we are so naive as to think that, sort of, we're
    done with a place, we haven't learned the lessons that caused
    us to make the mistake in the first place, of invading a
    civilization that, frankly, is extremely complex. That applies
    to Anbar, as well.
    On a different matter, Ambassador, the interim assessment
    report, released last week, states, ``Left on their own, many
    ISF units still tend to gravitate to old habits of sectarianism
    when applying the law.'' Indeed, there have been reports in a
    number of media outlets, of ISF complicity in attacks on U.S.
    forces. Can you discuss with us the extent to which members of
    the ISF are participating in sectarian violence?

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    As the report notes, there are problems
    of sectarianism within the Iraqi Security Forces, primarily in
    the Iraqi police, and especially the Iraqi national police,
    less so, as far as I can determine, in the Iraqi Army, although
    it does exist there, too.
    This is a major problem, Senator. And, again, one sees it
    in different parts of Baghdad. I have discussed, before, the
    sense I get from people out there, that they're really counting
    on U.S. forces. They're the ones who secure a particular
    neighborhood. They feel that their army is--has got the right
    orientation and intention, they're less sure of the
    capabilities.
    When one asks about the police, a lot of people I've talked
    to, and our colleagues have talked to, have very serious
    concerns, because they have been involved in sectarian violence
    themselves. This is something that the Iraqi Government is
    aware of. It has taken some actions. Clearly, it's going to
    have to take more actions if there is to be an Iraqi police
    that truly is involved in the protection of its--of the Iraqi
    people, and is perceived as such by those people.

  • Senator Feingold

    At 00:12:55

    Well, what sort of action----

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Sir, I'd just make one comment on Al
    Anbar. Sorry.

  • Senator Feingold

    At 00:12:55

    Go ahead. Well, I was just going to ask,
    what actions have been taken----

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    I wanted to make one----

  • Senator Feingold

    At 00:12:55

    I'm sorry.

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    There have been arrests of police
    officers--some senior, some junior. Whole units have gone back
    in for retraining. There are efforts now to monitor the
    performance and the orientation, the actions, of police units.
    But, again, I would not want to suggest that this is a problem
    that, by any means, has been fixed. It is a problem, and it's
    going to need a lot more applied attention.

  • Senator Feingold

    At 00:12:55

    And, please, your comment on Anbar.

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Yes, sir. I certainly wouldn't want
    you, or any of the other members, to think that I was going
    beyond the current situation in Al Anbar to predict a rosy
    future for Al Anbar or anywhere else. I, too, have seen these
    evolutions. Al Anbar is in a pretty good place right now. And I
    think the challenge that the Iraqi Government has, and we, by
    extension, have in support of the Iraqi Government, is to try
    to solidify that. And I think the best way that can be done is
    to try to establish linkages between the Anbaris who have
    signed up for duty and the central government, so they feel
    that they are a part of the system, they're getting a regular
    wage, they've got a better future for themselves, and prospects
    of a better future for their kids.
    Does that mean it's all going to come right from Al Anbar?
    Sir, I have no idea. But I think what we have to do is try to
    work a pretty positive development now, which, as you point
    out, we didn't create--that happened. We need to try to develop
    it in a way that is sustainable.

  • Senator Feingold

    At 00:12:55

    Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    Senator Coleman.

  • Senator Coleman

    At 00:12:55

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Ambassador, thank you. Thank you for your service. And
    I appreciate your reflections of the complexity of what we're
    dealing with in Iraq in various regions.
    I just have to make one note of--about Anbar, because I
    would hope that the public would understand that, you know,
    this is not about hype, and this is not something coming from
    the administration sending a message. I think you're right
    about the complexity, about trying to establish linkages so
    that there's long-term success. But, when I was in Anbar, in
    late April of this year, we had troops there from Minnesota
    National Guard. They're--two of the 136th Combined Arms
    Battalion. And they told me the story of a bombing in
    Habiniyah, in which 80 Iraqis were either killed or wounded,
    and it was our troops that were then giving blood. There were
    no American casualties. And they told me the story of, the next
    day, the local sheikh and the mayor coming in and identifying
    al-Qaeda operatives and saying, ``We want to work with you,''
    and--you know, so they were telling me that, for them, it was a
    turnaround. It had been the Wild West 6 months ago. And I think
    the challenge is long term. And I think it's fair commentary of
    my colleague from Wisconsin. But, clearly, the success is real.
    And if that can become a model to beyond Anbar, I think we'd
    all be well served. But I appreciate your understanding that we
    have to have linkages, long term.
    And, if I can, just one other comment for my colleague from
    Nebraska. And I'm sure he wasn't intending this, but I almost
    got a sense from his--the preface to his question, that somehow
    discounting the al-Qaeda threat and that sectarian violence is
    the key to, you know, all the fear and everything we're dealing
    with in Iraq. And I'm sure that's not the case. If anything,
    from what I heard from you this morning and today, what al-
    Qaeda does is, as you said, operates on the fault line, and
    that their attacks are intended to--is it correct that their
    attacks are intended to exacerbate the sectarian violence? Is
    that part of their plan? Is that part of what you're seeing?

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Yes, sir; that is certainly my
    assessment. In the 4 months I've been here, I have seen attacks
    from al-Qaeda that have been aimed at virtually every community
    in Iraq. They have targeted Sunnis, they have targeted Shia,
    they have targeted Arabs, Turkmen, Kurds, and they have
    targeted coalition forces, as well as the symbols of the Muslim
    faith. Al-Qaeda was the entity that attacked the Baghdad
    bridges, bringing one main bridge down, and damaging others.
    And it was an al-Qaeda operative who got into the Council of
    Representatives and detonated his suicide vest there as a
    symbolic strike at an institution of the new state.
    So, they are working, I think, every avenue of attack they
    possibly can, in a very bloody fashion. And, again, I certainly
    don't intend to paint a rosy picture out of something that
    brutal. I think it is worth noting that, thus far, they have
    had fairly limited success, as far as I can see, in actually
    reigniting that sectarian violence.

  • Senator Coleman

    At 00:12:55

    Let me talk about, if I can--again, in the
    time that I have, Ambassador--just about shutting down Anbar
    and moving to the diplomatic side.
    One thing that frustrates me is that, for the neighbors in
    the region, for--you know, for Mubarak, in Egypt, al-Qaeda is a
    threat to him; Iran and the extremists that they support are a
    threat to him; the same thing with Abdullah, in Jordan; the
    same thing with the House of Saud. The threats to their
    existence are al-Qaeda and the forces they support, as well as
    the extremists that the Iranians support.
    What is it that--and you've--we also know, and as you
    indicated earlier, a lot of the flow of foreign fighters come
    from these countries, and they come through Syria into Iraq.
    So, it's a two-part question, because I know Secretary Gates
    and Secretary Rice will be going into the region--what is it
    that our allies, our friends, who are equally endangered by the
    strength of an al-Qaeda and the strengths of Iran--what is it
    that they're not doing that they can do? What is it that we
    have to do to get them to be more involved? And then, the third
    part of that is, can they be helpful in shutting off the flow
    of al-Qaeda and these, you know, terrorists, coming in through
    Syria? Is there something that they can be doing, they're not
    doing? And what is it that we have to get their--how do we make
    that happen?

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Senator, sitting, as I am, in Baghdad,
    my perspective on that broad regional question is a little bit
    limited, but it is clearly something that is very important to
    us here. I may not have full visibility on everything that's
    being done, but I would point to a couple of things.
    One is the neighbors conference mechanism that I mentioned.
    This is an opportunity to get all of Iraq's neighbors engaged
    on issues like border security. And a working group on border
    security will be convening at the beginning of August in
    Damascus, which is a pretty good place to do it, given the
    involvement of Syria in the flow-through of foreign fighters.
    It's an opportunity to impress again, just the points you
    made, that the enemy we're fighting in Iraq--al-Qaeda--aims at
    the overthrow of each one of those regimes, and they have all
    suffered losses among their citizens from al-Qaeda attacks. So,
    they have got common cause here, and they need to move forward
    in that way.
    I know we've had discussions in regional capitals about the
    importance of these governments, given this is a common enemy,
    of taking every step they can to ensure that their young men
    don't make this particular trip up to Damascus and then across
    into Iraq. I think we're just going to have to keep at them,
    both collectively, in a regional context, through regional
    diplomacy, and bilaterally.

  • Senator Coleman

    At 00:12:55

    Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    Thank you very much.

  • Senator Coleman

    At 00:12:55

    Mr. Chairman.

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    Senator Boxer.

  • Senator Boxer

    At 00:12:55

    Thanks so much, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for
    your leadership on continuing to push for a political solution,
    which I think makes eminent sense.
    And, before Senator Hagel leaves, I really have a
    rhetorical question I'm going to ask, which doesn't require an
    answer. It's really a way of expressing my own frustration.
    As Senator Hagel has pointed out--and, I think, very
    straightforwardly--here you have an Iraqi leader who says to
    the Americans, ``You can go home now. We're fine. Don't stay
    here on our account.'' So, I guess the question--the rhetorical
    question I have is: How many Americans have to die while we're
    buying time for an Iraqi Government whose leader says we don't
    need to be there?
    And so, to answer my own question--it's not a single one
    should have to die for that.
    And, no--and I hope the people in the audience will not
    respond to this, one way or the other. The point is, there's a
    deep feeling of frustration and outrage in this country as we
    keep on pouring dollar after dollar, and life after life, into
    a place where the people say they don't really want us there.
    Now, al-Qaeda is a serious problem, sir. And, by the way,
    thank you so much for your sacrifice and what you're doing for
    your country. I can't thank you enough for it. But the bottom
    line is, 53 Senators, a majority of the Senate, voted to change
    this mission, because we know al-Qaeda's there. They're 15
    percent of the problem, according to the Bush administration.
    And we're saying, ``Get our troops out of the middle of a civil
    war, where 85 percent of the problem is coming from. And, yes,
    redeploy them out, so they can be a force to act quickly to go
    after al-Qaeda.''
    And I just have another question, a real question for you,
    that deals with one of the comments that you made, and that is
    that you, kind of, put aside the benchmarks, really, basically
    didn't think they were important. As a matter of fact, this
    past Saturday, sir, you said, ``I think electricity is more
    important to the average Iraqi than all 18 benchmarks rolled
    into one.''
    So, I decided to look at what's happening on the
    electricity front. May 16, for the week of May 9-15--and this
    is State Department report--national electricity supply was 2
    percent below the period in 2006. May 23, national electricity
    supply was 11 percent below the same period in 2006. May 30,
    national electricity supply was 7 percent below the same period
    in 2006. June 6, below the same period in 2006 by 3 percent.
    June 13, 8 percent below the same period in 2006. June 20, it
    was unchanged from the same period. June 27, 7 percent below.
    June--July 4, 6 percent below. July 11, 4 percent below.
    So, I don't understand, if you're trying to tell us how
    much progress is being made here, and you dismiss the
    benchmarks, and then you tell us electricity--aren't we failing
    there, as well?

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Senator, I made that comment after
    talking to a number of Iraqis in a store in West Rashid,
    Baghdad, that didn't have any electricity. And I certainly, in
    that comment, was not painting a rosy picture about the
    availability of electricity in West Rashid or anywhere else in
    Baghdad. The point I was making is that, for those Iraqis,
    getting a reliable source of power was a whole lot more
    important than passage of a revenue-sharing bill by the Council
    of Representatives.
    The hard fact is that the availability of electricity to
    the average citizen in Baghdad is still at a very low level, an
    hour or two a day. It's better in much of the rest of the
    country, but that is small comfort if you're sitting in Baghdad
    in the middle of summer.
    There are a lot of reasons for it, and the main reasons
    have to do with continued attacks by insurgents against
    electrical transmission lines and against fuel pipelines that
    provide the energy source that you need to generate
    electricity. It's one more in a long series of hard problems,
    but it's a very real problem for many, many Iraqis.

  • Senator Boxer

    At 00:12:55

    Sir, I hear you.

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    And, if I could----

  • Senator Boxer

    At 00:12:55

    I hear you. My point--you're, sort of,
    missing my point, if I might. And my--because I'm running out
    of time here--the point that I'm trying to make is, you said--
    you kind of pushed aside the benchmarks. Now, a lot of people
    have worked on these benchmarks--Republicans, Democrats, the
    White House, everybody--you set them aside, and you were making
    a good, I think, point that the daily lives of the Iraqis are
    not going well. I'm echoing that point. And the fact is, the
    estimates that I read to you come from all over the country--
    all over the country. So, my point is, not meeting the
    benchmarks--the Iraqi Government's not meeting the benchmarks.
    The electricity that you say is so important is worse, not
    better. The Iraqi leader says, ``We can handle this.'' And, in
    my last trip to Iraq, I have to say, General Petraeus, at that
    time, was in charge of training the troops, he said he thought
    the troops were very well trained, he was very optimistic about
    them. What happened to, ``If we stand up--if they stand up, we
    stand down,'' all this changes, there's a moving target--the
    bottom line here, sir, is, I know you have a very difficult
    assignment. I want to be helpful to you.
    I guess, in closing, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to express the
    deepest sense of frustration from my State that people feel we
    have given blood, we have given dollars, we have given
    patience, we have given everything, and people are at the end
    of their patience.
    And, sir, I hope you will continue your work. I hope you
    will tell us the reality on the ground, and not paint rosy
    scenarios in September and say, ``Well, none of the benchmarks
    are met, we can't deliver electricity, but we're making
    progress,'' because that's only going to prolong the killing.
    Thank you.

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    Senator Voinovich.

  • Senator Voinovich

    At 00:12:55

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First of all, I'd like to submit, for the record, the
    letter that I sent to the President, along with ``The Way
    Forward,'' that outlines a program to urge him to develop a
    comprehensive plan for our country's gradual military
    disengagement from Iraq in a way that will protect our national
    security interests and prevent chaos in the region.

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    Without objection, it will be placed in the
    record.

  • Senator Voinovich

    At 00:12:55

    It may seem contradictory to some, Mr.
    Chairman, but I believe we can accomplish more in Iraq by
    gradually and responsibly reducing our forces and focusing on a
    robust strategy of international cooperation and coordinated
    foreign aid.
    And I agree with our Ambassador, and I thank him very much
    for his service to our country, that we cannot abandon Iraq in
    chaos, but we must start to face reality and begin a
    transition, where the Iraq Government and its neighbors play a
    larger role in stabilizing the country. And I think that you've
    got to make sure that they know it's inevitable that the United
    States is going to disengage and that our commitment is not
    open-ended. And what he does now, and in the next several
    months, is going to have a great deal to do with the kind of a
    reaction that we're going to have to the recommendations that
    you and General Petraeus are going to be making to the
    Congress. It doesn't seem that he understands the urgency of
    the situation, that he's not taking advantage of our presence,
    and he should be. He ought to get on with the constitution, he
    ought to get on with the oil. And I read, in The Economist,
    where the they met at Sharm el-Sheikh. You made reference to
    it. The country's talking about oil and security and the
    refugee problem. And what I understand is, he wasn't
    enthusiastic about it. And he ought to understand, again, that
    he ought to be reaching out to these people in his executive
    committee to get them to help him deal with the situation that
    he has in his country.
    In addition to that, we met earlier this week, several of
    us, with Secretary Moon, Secretary General Moon, of the United
    Nations, and I urged him, ``It's urgent for them to get
    involved. Is there a sense of urgency? What are you doing to
    let them know that this time is running out? Time is running
    out. What are you doing?''

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Senator, that is a point we have made
    to the Prime Minister, to the rest of the Iraqi leadership,
    that we are buying time. We're buying time, at the cost of the
    lives of our soldiers and of Iraqi soldiers, and they need to
    honor that sacrifice by moving the country forward.
    I don't think the Prime Minister fails to understand the
    challenge he has. This is hard work. We've put a lot of time
    here, me and all of my colleagues, in working with him to
    achieve these benchmarks. It is frustrating to us when the
    progress is as slow as it has been in many areas. It's
    frustrating to them. They've got to keep at it, and we've got
    to keep pushing. And we will do that.
    And with respect to the United Nations, Senator, I think
    their engagement is very important. And I applaud your
    encouragement of further efforts on their part to make a
    difference out here.

  • Senator Voinovich

    At 00:12:55

    Well, I want to thank you. I've been
    informed that if I don't----

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    Well, actually, I was mistaken. They're going
    to leave the--they're going to have the 5-minute grace period,
    so you still have a minute and a half to go.

  • Senator Voinovich

    At 00:12:55

    Well, there's got to be some real
    evidence that action's taking place there. And everything you
    can do to convey to Mr. Malaki and his executive committee, to
    the other players in the region, that the American people's
    patience is running out. And you may assume that some of the
    things you talked about are going to continue, but the fact of
    the matter is, I don't think that's what the case is going to
    be. And if I were, you know, in the position of the President
    or Secretary Bond, I'd put them all in a room and say, ``You
    know what? We're on our way out of here. Take advantage of the
    opportunity that you have. You all have a symbiotic
    relationship to work together so this thing doesn't blow. And,
    if it does, then you are going to have some very, very serious
    problems. So, help us. Help us, so we can stabilize the area,
    and we'll be willing to provide humanitarian help, we'll be--
    we're going to stay in the region, but we have to disengage.
    It's inevitable. Take advantage of this wonderful opportunity
    that you have.''

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55

    Thank you very much, Senator.
    Mr. Ambassador, I want to thank you. I'll make a closing
    comment here, in the next minute or so.
    No. 1, having the United Nations involved on the ground is
    not the same as having the Permanent Five of the Security
    Council take ownership of this problem. I met with them--and
    you may find it of interest--3 weeks, the permanent members. I
    asked what would happen if the President came to them and
    said--called an international conference--not Sharm el-Sheikh--
    where they had equal ownership with the United States--equal
    ownership of the problem. They said they would all participate.
    They would call an international conference. If you don't raise
    this up, Mr. Ambassador, you're going to be left there adrift.
    Second point is, with all due respect to everyone who has
    talked about this, you heard from my colleague--we're not
    staying, Mr. Ambassador. We're not staying. You don't have much
    time. And there's not much you can do about it, I know, if
    we're to make--begin to make this the world's problems.
    And the last thing I'd like to say to you, Mr. Ambassador--
    I have overwhelmingly high regard for you--you said one thing
    that demonstrates that we have a fundamental disagreement,
    though. You pointed out that you were talking to a group of
    Iraqis and saying that--where there is no electricity--saying
    electricity is more important than an agreement on revenue-
    sharing. I would respectfully suggest, if you got an agreement
    on revenue-sharing, that would mean there was genuine political
    progress being made, and accommodations being--going forward
    among the warring factions, and that would mean there would be
    more cooperation in seeing to it that those who are blowing up
    the transmissions lines didn't blow them up.
    So, I really think you guys have it wrong when you put, on
    the back end, the political settlement relating to regionalism,
    you put, on the back end, the constitutional changes, you put,
    on the back end, the importance of the oil agreement. I don't
    know how you get the Sunnis to buy in without them knowing
    they, in fact, have a piece of the oil. I don't know how you
    get the Shia to buy in, unless they're able to have a regional
    government. I don't know how you do that. You may know. I'm
    anxious to hear it later.
    But, bottom line, Mr. Ambassador, you're a very skilled
    diplomat, you're professional, you've been around a long time.
    I promise you, old buddy, forget what Joe Biden said, listen to
    the Republican. We ain't staying. We're not staying. We're not
    staying. Not much time. Political benchmarks better be met, or
    we're in real trouble, because we will have traded a dictator
    for chaos, notwithstanding all your incredible efforts.
    And, with that, Mr. Ambassador, if you'd like to make a
    quick closing comment, the floor is yours, and I'm going to
    have to go leave and vote, and I'll be in touch with you, by
    plain-old telephone, personally, if I can.

  • Ambassador Crocker

    At 00:12:55

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for
    the opportunity to meet with the committee at this important
    time on this important issue.
    The benchmarks are important. We put an extraordinary
    amount of time and effort--and I do, personally--in pushing,
    pulling, prodding, looking for the deals, trying to drive this
    forward so that benchmarks are met, because they mean
    something, in and of themselves, and they clearly mean
    something, in terms of American support.

  • The Chairman

    At 00:12:55
    1 hour

    Mr. Ambassador, I'm sorry, I'm going to have
    to go vote. I truly apologize. The time has run out.
    I'd respectfully suggest they would be more inclined to
    meet the benchmarks if the whole world community were pushing
    them. We have so little credibility, I think it's important you
    get the rest of the Permanent Five, equally as hard pushing.
    That may be the way.
    But, at any rate, I'm going to have to end this, Mr.
    Ambassador, and I--with your permission, I'd like to give you a
    personal call, if I may, to follow up what we're talking about.
    Thank you very much. I apologize to everyone for this
    truncated hearing.
    And we are now adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
    Additional Material Submitted for the Record
    Prepared Statement of Hon. Lisa Murkowski, U.S. Senator From Alaska
    Mr. Ambassador, thank you for taking the time out of your schedule
    to make yourself available to the committee for this hearing. The
    Senate has spent a great number of hours this week discussing where we
    as a nation are in terms of our strategy for Iraq and what kind of
    progress is being achieved. I'm not sure that we resolved anything
    other than that there remains many divergent views on our continued
    military presence in Iraq.
    The interim report issued by the President on July 12 underlines
    what has become a recurring source of frustration for many of us; our
    military is achieving some success on the ground, particularly in Anbar
    province, but political achievements on the part of the Iraqi
    Government have been much slower, if not nonexistent. Iraq's political
    leaders must be able to demonstrate to the Iraqi and American people
    their willingness and ability to set aside sectarian differences to
    make difficult decisions and reach compromises for Iraq as a whole.
    Mr. Ambassador, Senator Sununu and I unfortunately missed you when
    we visited Iraq this past March--our visit occurring just before you
    took up your current post. One of the things that was impressed on me
    during my time there was the need to have a civilian surge to go along
    with the military surge. To make sure that the progress that is
    achieved on the military side in terms of training Iraqi troops and
    policemen, and securing more areas of Baghdad and the rest of Iraq, is
    not undercut by a lack of technocrats to perform activities such as the
    detention and prosecution of those who break the law, or develop the
    financial capability to distribute federal revenues--or even to deliver
    paychecks to the Iraqi troops. These are capabilities that need to be
    in place if the Iraqi Government does enact key pieces of legislation
    such as hydrocarbon revenue distribution, or de-Baathification laws.
    The passage of these laws means nothing if there is no ability to
    implement them. So I urge this administration to ensure we are doing
    our part in those areas that don't get quite as much media attention,
    so that these next steps are in place.
    I want to compliment the ranking member for his work with Senator
    Warner on their amendment to the Department of Defense authorization
    bill. The legislation passed by Congress and signed into law by the
    President in May says that if it is determined in September that the
    benchmarks have not been met, or significant progress has not been made
    in attaining them, the President shall include in his report a
    description of how the United States strategy for Iraq will be revised.
    There are, of course, differing views on how, when, and whether our
    policy toward Iraq should change. While the Senate has not come to any
    agreement on that, the Lugar-Warner amendment rightly suggests that
    consideration for what happens after the September report and testimony
    from yourself and General Patreaus must be taking place now. In my view
    this is not a prejudgment of the September report, but rather ensures
    that the administration is at least putting together a plan B. I whole
    heartedly agree.
    Mr. Ambassador, I have committed to waiting for the September
    report before making a decision on my continued support for the current
    policy. But there are only so many times that the argument, ``give it
    more time'' can be taken seriously when our partner has not
    demonstrated that they are committed to the process as well. Verbal
    commitments are nice; visible action is better.
    It is a frustrating position, as no matter how much we in Congress
    may want the Iraqi Government to succeed, it is basically out of our
    hands. They are the ones that need to make the decisions--to take the
    action. You commented in your testimony that the benchmarks may not be
    the best way to judge whether progress is being made--particularly at
    the provincial level. I agree that if we were to solely look at
    provinces like Anbar, the reports would be more positive, but that
    would leave out the largest population center in Iraq where the
    sectarian strife is most visible. I believe the line goes, as Baghdad
    goes, so goes Iraq.
    We cannot cast their votes for them. It is not our place to
    determine what the best course of action for Iraq is. That is up to the
    Iraqi people and their elected government. But they must know, as the
    President has said on a number of occasions, America's commitment in
    Iraq is not open-ended. The Iraqi Government has between now and
    September to demonstrate that they want the United States as their
    partner.
    Prepared Statement of Hon. Barack Obama, U.S. Senator From Illinois
    Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing and for giving us
    an opportunity to gather more information on the situation in Iraq. I
    also appreciate Ambassador Crocker's willingness to provide an update
    on the situation from his perspective.
    We've heard from the administration and from many of our Senate
    colleagues this week that we need to give the President's surge more
    time and that we need to wait to hear the report in September before we
    make a binding decision to redeploy our troops. However, we learned
    last week that the Iraqi political leaders have not met a single
    benchmark that they agreed to in January.
    We don't need to wait for another report. We have seen the results
    of a failed policy in the form of multiple deployments, more sacrifice
    from our military families, and a deepening civil war in Iraq that has
    caught our troops in the middle.
    It is long past time to turn the page in Iraq, where each day we
    see the consequences of fighting a war that should never have been
    authorized and should never have been waged. The single most important
    decision a President or Member of Congress can make is the decision to
    send our troops into harm's way. It is that decision that determines
    the fate of our men and women in uniform, the course of nations, and
    the security of the American people. It is that decision that sets in
    motion consequences that cannot be undone.
    Since this war began, 3,618 Americans have been killed--532 since
    the President ignored the will of the American people and launched his
    surge. Tens of thousands more have been wounded, suffering terrible
    injuries seen and unseen.
    Here is what else we know. We know that the surge is not working,
    that our mission in Iraq must be changed, and that this war must be
    brought to a responsible conclusion.
    We know Iraq's leaders are not resolving their grievances. They are
    not stepping up to their security responsibilities. They are not
    improving the daily lives of Iraqis.
    We know that the war in Iraq costs us $370 million a day and $10
    billion each month. These are resources that could be spent to secure
    our ports and our borders, to invest in jobs and health care, and to
    focus on a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan and the wider war on
    terrorism.
    We know that because of the war in Iraq, America is no safer than
    it was on
    9/11. Al-Qaeda has gained the best recruiting tool it could ask for.
    Tens of thousands of terrorists have been trained and radicalized in
    Iraq. Terrorism is up worldwide. America has fewer friends, and more
    enemies, in the world.
    We know--because of the release of a declassified NIE earlier this
    week--that we continue to face a ``persistent and evolving'' threat
    from al-Qaeda. And last week, a threat assessment concluded that al-
    Qaeda is as strong today as it was before
    As I said nearly 5 years ago, during the runup to this war, we are
    fighting on the wrong battlefield. The terrorists who attacked us and
    who continue to plot against us are resurgent in the hills between
    Afghanistan and Pakistan. They should have been our focus then. They
    must be our focus now.
    In January, I introduced a plan that would have already started
    bringing our troops home and ending this war, with a goal of removing
    all combat brigades by March 31, 2008. Seventy-nine days ago, President
    Bush vetoed a bipartisan plan that passed both Houses of Congress that
    shared my goal of changing course and ending this war.
    During those 79 days, 266 Americans have died and the situation in
    Iraq has continued to deteriorate.
    We in Congress must take action to change the President's failed
    policy. I was deeply disappointed that some of our colleagues blocked
    an amendment yesterday that would have required a drawdown of our
    forces by the end of April 2008--a date that is consistent with the
    date in the plan I proposed back in January, and a goal shared by the
    bipartisan Iraq Study Group.
    I will continue to push for a new course that gets our troops out
    of harm's way, that changes our military mission to focus on training
    and counterterrorism, that puts real pressure on the Iraqis to resolve
    their grievances, and that urges the robust diplomacy that is so badly
    needed.
    Thank you.
    Responses of Ambassador Ryan Crocker to Questions Submitted by Senator
    Russell Feingold
    Question. I would like you to address the displacement of millions
    of Iraqis. I am interested to hear from you about the process in
    assisting Iraqis who are working, or have worked with the U.S.
    Government and are seeking assistance in resettlement to the United
    States. The progress on processing these cases appears to be
    painstakingly slow--would you explain why it is taking so long to
    process these cases? What mechanisms are you putting in place in order
    to process cases more quickly? How are you handling this calamitous
    situation in-country?
    Answer. We have many mechanisms in place to facilitate and expedite
    access to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) for those Iraqis
    who have been targeted due to their association with the USG and are
    interested in seeking resettlement to the United States, including the
    use of Embassy referrals for Iraqis still in Iraq who have worked
    closely with the USG. To date, Embassy Baghdad has referred over 20
    Iraqi employees and their family members to the USRAP.
    Embassy Baghdad has established a refugee committee to evaluate
    cases brought to their attention by USG personnel. Once the Department
    concurs in accepting the referral, the Embassy works closely with the
    individual to determine where they wish to be processed and passes on
    the information to the appropriate Overseas Processing Entity (OPE). In
    some cases, the USG facilitates entry into a country of first asylum.
    The OPE prioritizes Embassy referrals and works to quickly prepare the
    case for presentation to DHS/USCIS. The Embassy and OPE also keep the
    applicant informed of the timing of DHS/USCIS circuit rides so that
    they can minimize the time spent in the country of first asylum.
    Refugee processing generally takes 4 to 6 months from referral to
    admission in the United States due to the required security checks, a
    face-to-face interview with DHS/USCIS, and medical exams. However, the
    State Department acts expeditiously to refer cases of Iraqi locally
    engaged staff (LES) to the USRAP, to provide emergency shelter in the
    IZ, and facilitate entry to the country of first asylum when needed.
    Assisting the LES and his/her family in arriving to a safe location can
    be completed in only a few days if needed, so that the vast majority of
    the processing time can be spent in a secure location.
    In addition to the processing of Embassy referrals, the USRAP is
    processing thousands of Iraqi asylum seekers in neighboring countries
    referred by UNHCR. Prior to March, the USRAP had two OPE's in the
    region located in Cairo and Istanbul. We now have established two
    additional OPE offices in Damascus and Amman. Additionally, on a
    circuit-ride basis OPE personnel and DHS/USCIS officers travel to
    Lebanon periodically to process UNHCR referrals of Iraqi and other
    refugees.
    Question. The Washington Post reported that you sent a cable to
    Under Secretary Fore making a strong case that we need to do more to
    make it possible for Iraqis employed by our government to come to the
    United States. The cable stated that Iraqis who work with the United
    States ``work under extremely difficult conditions, and are targets for
    violence including murder and kidnapping.'' Senators Smith, Biden,
    Hagel, Lieberman, Leahy, Levin, and Kennedy have introduced
    legislation, which establishes a program to do precisely what you
    called for in the cable. What was Under Secretary Fore's reaction to
    this cable? Will you work with the Congress to establish such a system
    of aiding those who have helped our government?
    Answer. In February of this year, the State Department identified
    the issue of assisting Iraqis who work for the Embassy as a matter of
    urgency. The Department took immediate steps to address the needs of
    those at risk in Iraq because of their association with the U.S.
    Government. The Department asked Congress to expand access for these
    Iraqis to the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program, so that more brave
    Iraqis who are making their own contribution to their country are
    eligible for inclusion in this program.
    Secretary Rice set up the interagency task force on Iraqi Refugees
    and Internally Displaced Persons led by Under Secretary Paula
    Dobriansky, which continues to meet regularly. The interagency task
    force has a specific focus to address the humanitarian situation,
    including the needs of those at risk in Iraq because of their
    association with the U.S. Government.
    The interagency task force drafted and cleared the administration's
    legislative proposal to provide a mechanism to lower, in
    ``extraordinary circumstances,'' the years of service required for SIV
    eligibility under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Embassy Baghdad
    was consulted often during the drafting process and its
    recommendations, which included the number of years of service required
    for SIV eligibility, were integrated into the administration's SIV
    proposal.
    In April, the Department sent to Capitol Hill the legislative
    proposal as an administration position which allows SIVs for Locally-
    Engaged (LE) Staff who have served in ``extraordinary conditions'' as
    determined by the Secretary and have fewer than the minimum years of
    service otherwise required. The Department is now working actively to
    gain support in both the Senate and House to secure the introduction,
    consideration, and passage of the proposal.
    While the Department appreciates the intention of the Refugee
    Crisis in Iraq Act introduced by Senators Kennedy and Smith, we believe
    the administration's SIV proposal is a more comprehensive and practical
    vehicle for addressing the dangers that local employees of the USG
    confront in a manner that will ensure continued effective operation of
    our diplomatic operations in Iraq and of our worldwide administration
    of the SIV program.
    The Department and Embassy Baghdad have communicated to LE Staff
    the processes by which locally employed interpreters and translators
    under Chief of Mission authority can take immediate advantage of the
    Special Immigrant Visa opportunities offered by Public Law 110-36.
    Embassy Baghdad has also acted to accelerate the access of LE Staff to
    the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program.
    The Department and the administration recognize that a solution
    must be secured to assist those LE Staff in extraordinary conditions
    who are serving the American people. We very much appreciate your
    support and interest in this matter as we seek to partner with the Hill
    to implement the legislative changes that are required.
    Question. There is currently a special immigrant visa program for
    Iraqi and Afghan translators. DHS has approved more than 600 petitions
    under this program but less than 40 have been issued. Five hundred
    visas are available under this program over the next 2 years. There are
    reports that Iraqi translators with approved petitions who have
    attempted to travel to Jordan to obtain their visas have been turned
    back to Iraq by Jordanian immigration officials. How many special
    immigrant visas have been issued for Iraqi and Afghan translators this
    year? Why have so few been issued when more than 600 petitions have
    been approved?
    What steps is the State Department taking to ensure all the
    500 visas available this year are utilized?
    Answer. Under previous legislation, only 50 visas were available
    per fiscal year. New legislation was passed in June raising the total
    number of visas available in FY07 to 500 and the total number available
    in FY08 to 500.
    The National Visa Center has received 629 approved Special
    Immigrant Visa petitions (1,442 applicants total, including
    derivatives) for Iraqi or Afghani translators from DHS/CIS. The
    National Visa Center has been able to contact over 500 of these 629 SIV
    applicants in order to begin the document collection process.
    Through the end of June 2007, the Department issued 37 SIVs (along
    with 32 derivative visas issued to dependents) under the previous
    legislation that allocated 50 such visas for FY 2006. These cases pose
    unique challenges because it is difficult to contact the applicants,
    many of whom are deployed with U.S. troops in Iraq. In addition to the
    difficulties contacting the applicants, there are challenges in firmly
    establishing the true identities of some applicants given the various
    naming conventions used in Iraq and the unreliability of civil
    identification documents.
    Over 80 cases are scheduled for August and cases will continue to
    be added as they are ready.
    The Department has sent an additional consular officer to Embassy
    Amman, where most SIV applicants have their visa interview, to assist
    in processing. We have expedited security clearance requests for SIVs
    and our interagency partners have been very responsive. We are also
    working closely with CBP to facilitate the entry of translators and
    their families who do not have an Iraqi ``G'' series passport valid for
    travel.
    How many Iraqi translators with approved SIV petitions have
    been turned back by Jordanian officials? What steps are you
    taking to ensure this does not happen again?
    Answer. Amman has had two cases of SIV applicants who were turned
    around at the Jordanian border, apparently after trying to enter
    without evidence of an interview, but who were later rescheduled for
    other appointments. At the translators' request, four cases were
    transferred to Damascus for appointments. We are working with the
    appropriate authorities to facilitate entry for SIV applicants into
    Jordan and neighboring countries. The U.S. Embassy in Jordan works
    closely with the GOJ officials to ensure translators can enter Jordan
    for their SIV interviews. The Ambassador recently briefed the GOJ on
    this program and its importance to the USG and access to Jordan for
    these applicants appears to be resolved at this time.
    Responses of Ambassador Ryan Crocker to Questions Submitted by Senator
    Lisa Murkowski
    Question. What kind of civilian surge is taking place to match the
    military surge--particularly in the financial and judicial sectors--in
    order to provide a functioning bureaucracy for when the Iraqi
    Government passes legislation such as the hydrocarbon revenue sharing
    bill?
    Answer. The civilian surge is a robust, three-phased plan to
    increase staff at existing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), as
    well as create new ones. There will be more than 20 teams in total.
    Many of them will be embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ePRTs),
    which operate side by side with brigade headquarters. They live with
    the soldiers and go everywhere the soldiers go. The mission of PRTs is
    to work with local leaders--whether they be tribal shaykhs, provincial
    governors, mayors, or neighborhood leaders--to build local networks of
    moderates. They also facilitate civilian technical assistance efforts
    among Iraqi provincial and local government officials and the citizens
    they represent to deliver essential services and programs to rebuild
    communities. This surge has consisted of approximately 500 personnel
    across a dozen specializations. PRTs and ePRTS are typically staffed
    with 10-12 experts, led by a senior Department of State Foreign Service
    Officer, that gear their assistance to the needs of their individual
    communities. Three hundred twenty-five positions are filled, with
    another 96 in process. As a result of the civilian surge's success,
    military commanders recently requested four new ePRTs, which we have
    planned with 84 positions.
    One of the primary goals of the PRT initiative is to improve the
    capacity of local and regional Iraqi governments. This complements an
    ongoing effort to develop the capacity of key Iraqi ministries. The
    U.S. Agency for International Development's National Capacity
    Development (NCD) Program has full-time public management advisors in
    nine key institutions, including the Prime Minister's office and the
    Council of Representatives Secretariat. These advisors are helping
    these entities improve their capacity to develop and execute their
    budgets, design personnel policies, and implement procurement
    regulations.
    Oil and electricity are key priority ministries, within which USAID
    focuses on capacity development in public management. Each ministry is
    well advanced in formulating a capacity development plan addressing the
    ministry's needs; a key focus of these plans is improved financial and
    project management. Additionally, over 80 staff from the ministries
    have enrolled in the program's training sessions, receiving training in
    topics such as procurement, budget management, project management,
    strategic planning, and communications and leadership. We have recently
    expanded our efforts to improve Iraqi ministerial capacity by adding 26
    more contractors, 11 of whom are already on the ground and the rest
    will be in place by the end of August.
    Question. I traveled with Senators Sununu, Klobuchar, and
    Whitehouse to Baghdad and Fallujah in mid-March. When we met with now
    former Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, he mentioned that when
    considering the hydrocarbon revenue distribution law, beyond the
    differences of opinion of the Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites, the Iraqi
    National Assembly needed time to convince the average Iraqi on the
    street that the plan was truly an Iraqi plan, and not a United States
    plan--and that was part of the delay in considering the bill. Is the
    pressure being put on the Iraqi Government by Congress and the
    administration having a detrimental effect with the Iraqi people on the
    believability of any future legislation enacted by the National
    Assembly?
    Answer. Ever since Iraq nationalized its oil industry in 1960, the
    structure and operation of the Iraqi oil sector has generated strong
    nationalist feelings among the Iraqi public. As a number of articles,
    seminars, and public comments by Iraqi commentators have indicated,
    many Iraqis are very concerned about issues such as the role of foreign
    companies in the oil sector, corruption, and the power of regions to
    direct their own development.
    The Government of Iraq (GOI) and the Kurdistan Regional Government
    (KRG) have been in intensive discussions since last July, and have
    completed drafts of a framework hydrocarbon law and a revenue
    management law, both of which are wholly Iraqi products. Over the last
    3 months, central government representatives have met with a wide range
    of parliamentarians to brief them on the main concepts in the law. The
    GOI and KRG also held a seminar in Dubai in April to broaden the
    discussion of the main points of these laws.
    While these actions are useful initial steps, the Iraqi public
    still does not have a good understanding of what the framework
    hydrocarbon law does and does not do, including provisions on foreign
    investment in the oil and gas sectors. We expect that both the GOI and
    KRG will mount a broader public information campaign to address issues
    of concern once work on the remaining portions of the oil law package
    is complete and approved by the Iraqi Cabinet.
    The United States has made clear publicly and privately the high
    priority we attach to Iraq's passing this legislation. These
    expressions of interest, including encouragement to pass these laws
    this summer, have created the impression within some Iraqi circles that
    the USG is attempting to exert undue influence on the entire process.
    We are sensitive to this perception as we calibrate our efforts to
    encourage the GOI and the KRG to proceed with all due dispatch on
    crafting a durable set of laws recognized as legitimate by the Iraqi
    people to govern the most important sector of Iraq's economy.
    Question. Has the Prime Minister undertaken additional good-will
    generating activities with local sheiks and other Iraqi political
    leaders since his March 13 visit to Anbar province?
    Answer. Prime Minister al-Maliki meets regularly with leaders from
    across Iraq's political spectrum, as well as with local sheiks and
    tribal leaders. For example, during a July visit to Diyala province,
    the Prime Minister met with local leaders to discuss joint efforts to
    expel al-Qaeda from Baquba. He praised local citizens, victims of
    terrorism, and the tribally based Diyala Support Council for their
    efforts in working with Iraqi and coalition forces. In June, the Prime
    Minister received a delegation of tribal and local government leaders
    from Al-Qaim, in Anbar province.
    Recently the Prime Minister formed a committee of senior advisers
    and technical experts to work directly with coalition and Embassy
    representatives on issues relating to Sunni tribal and insurgent group
    outreach. The committee has a mandate to integrate anti-al-Qaeda
    fighters into the Iraqi Security Forces.
    We continue to emphasize the need for outreach by Iraq's leaders,
    including the Prime Minister, to all of Iraq's communities as a
    critical element in building political stability through broad
    participation in a national political process.
    Responses of Ambassador Ryan Crocker to Questions Submitted by Senator
    Barack Obama
    Question. The interim report released last week indicates progress
    on all of the first order political priorities has been unsatisfactory.
    Given that the Iraqi Parliament is planning to be in recess
    during the month of August, what expectation do you have that
    the Parliament will convert the unsatisfactory progress on
    these priorities into satisfactory progress by the time you
    submit your report in September?
    Answer. Political progress is a shared responsibility between the
    executive and legislative branches of the Iraqi Government, and is not
    solely the responsibility of the Council of Representatives (COR). The
    Presidency Council and the Prime Minister are all part of the process
    and the weight of progress falls on all of their shoulders. We have
    made clear to the Iraqi political leadership that we attach great
    importance to the resolution of a number of political issues, including
    those laid out as priorities in the July 15 interim report.
    Recent action in the COR indicates there may be forward movement in
    some areas, for example, in legislation connected with defining
    provincial powers, while other legislation remains the subject of
    intense discussion. It is probable that the COR will not complete
    action on all political priorities by the time we submit the September
    report; however, the challenge of enacting legislation involves more
    than securing approval from the COR.
    While progress has not moved as rapidly as we would like, we must
    not diminish the importance of what the COR has accomplished as a
    functioning democratic institution. In a little over a year, the COR
    has passed more than 60 pieces of significant legislation, despite a
    climate of continuing sectarian violence, including an attack on the
    COR parliamentary building that left one parliamentarian dead.
    Finally, while the COR is currently taking a constitutionally
    mandated recess, that does not preclude members of the political blocs
    or committees from meeting to negotiate the specifics of pending
    legislation in anticipation of the COR returning to session on
    September 4.
    Question. Press reports indicate you may be meeting with your
    Iranian interlocutors again sometime in the next 10 days.
    What is on the agenda for these discussions?
    What do you want to accomplish during the discussions?
    Answer. On July 24, the Iraqi Government hosted the second round of
    U.S.-Iranian-Iraqi discussions focused on security and stability in
    Iraq. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki welcomed us and the session was
    chaired by Foreign Minister Hoshyar al-Zebari and National Security
    Advisor Mowaffak al-Rubaie. As was the case in the May meeting, I
    headed the American team and my Iranian counterpart, Ambassador Kazemi
    Qomi, headed the Iranian team.
    As was also the case in May, the sole subject on the agenda for
    this meeting was security in Iraq. There was no broader agenda.
    All parties agreed in principal that it is in the best interests of
    all parties to see a democratic and stable Iraq, but the challenge
    remains applying those principles on the ground.
    We expressed concerns, as we have in the past, over the Iranians
    arming and training violent militia elements. We made clear in our
    talks that in the 2 months since our last meeting we have not seen a
    reduction in militia-related activities attributed to Iranian support,
    but rather an increase. The presence and lethal activities of Islamic
    Revolutionary Guard Corps--Quds Force (IRGC-QF) personnel in Iraq and
    their provision of lethal support--in the form of weapons, training,
    funding, and guidance--to illegal militias who target and kill
    coalition and Iraqi Forces, as well as innocent Iraqi civilians,
    contradicts the Iranian Government's stated policy of supporting the
    Iraqi Government.
    We made clear to the Iranians that their efforts will be measured
    by the security conditions on the ground, not by stated principles or
    by promises. The goal of these discussions is not to schedule more
    discussions but rather to find a solution to the issue of Iraqi
    security. To that end we discussed the formation of a security
    subcommittee that would address at the expert or technical level issues
    relating to security, including support of militias, al-Qaeda, and
    border security. We are working on the composition, level of
    representation, and function of such a committee.
    Question. Recent reports from Basra, Iraq's second largest city,
    indicate extremist groups may be taking control of this key city.
    How would you characterize the situation in Basra?
    What is the plan to address the growing challenges in this
    strategically important city?
    Answer. There is considerable instability in Basra. Intra-Shia
    violence in Basra has contributed to a significant increase in attacks
    against coalition forces in Basra and greater hostility toward the
    coalition presence. The ongoing violence has highlighted the failure of
    the Iraqi police to challenge Iranian-backed Shia militants in southern
    Iraq.
    The security situation in Basra is a concern to us and our
    coalition partners, particularly the British, who have responsibility
    for Basra province. In June, the Chief of Police in Basra was replaced,
    as was the Basra Operations Commander. While the full impact of these
    new leaders remains to be seen, both have already improved the
    situation on the ground, with the new Chief of Police addressing issues
    of concern regarding the Basra police force and the new Operations
    Commander focusing on militia activity. There is currently a proposal
    to create a new 14th Army Division in the south which will assist the
    Iraqi Army 10th Division already stationed in the region. Coalition
    Forces are also working with the Iraqi Government to create a new
    Presidential Palace Protection force which will ultimately take over
    responsibility for the protection of the Basra Palace Complex once it
    is handed over to Iraqi control. The ultimate goal is to see Basra
    under Provincial Iraqi Control, but implementing this transition will
    be a conditions-based decision made jointly by MNF-I and the Iraqi
    Government. Until that time, coalition forces will continue to conduct
    operations against militia elements in cooperation with Iraqi Security
    Forces.
    Submitted by Senator George V. Voinovich: Letter to President George W.
    Bush and Senator Voinovich's Proposed Plan ``The Way Forward in Iraq''
    June 26, 2007.
    President George W. Bush,
    The White House,
    Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. President: The United States has been faced with
    tremendous challenges during your administration. As the United States
    engages in its fifth year in Iraq, I submit to you respectfully that we
    must begin to develop a comprehensive plan for our country's gradual
    military disengagement from Iraq and a corresponding increase in
    responsibility to the Iraqi government and its regional neighbors.
    Though it may seem contradictory, I believe we can accomplish more in
    Iraq by gradually and responsibly reducing our forces and focusing on a
    robust strategy of international cooperation and coordinated foreign
    aid. We must not abandon our mission, but we must begin a transition
    where the Iraqi government and its neighbors play a larger role in
    stabilizing Iraq.
    As you know, I have been concerned about the situation in Iraq for
    some time. Nonetheless, I was steadfast in voting against any
    legislation that would limit or cut off spending for the war. I have
    consistently opposed attempts to limit your powers as our Commander-in-
    Chief, and I have openly opposed any form of precipitous withdrawal
    that would threaten our men and women in uniform, endanger American
    interests, or abandon the commitment we have made to the people of Iraq
    who do want our help.
    A policy of responsible military disengagement with a corresponding
    increase in non-military support is the best way to advance our
    nation's interests in Iraq and achieve our primary goals: to help
    Iraqis stabilize their country and improve the security of the United
    States. However, I am also concerned that we are running out of time.
    The commitment of the United States to the principles of democracy
    and freedom will not falter. Our military has fought courageously and
    admirably, and it is time to pursue a strategy that combines the
    resources of our military with the resources of our diplomatic corps
    and international partners. I have enclosed a brief position paper that
    outlines my thoughts for a way forward in Iraq .
    I hope that you will review this paper, and the many other
    recommendations that have been proposed, as you fulfill the
    responsibilities of being our Commander-in-Chief. My prayers are with
    you and our nation.
    Sincerely,
    George V. Voinovich,
    United States Senator.
    Enclosure.
    the way forward in iraq
    It is in our Nation's security and economic interests to begin to
    change our strategy in Iraq and initiate a plan for a responsible
    military disengagement. We have lost 3,530 lives to military operations
    in Iraq. We have spent over $378 billion plus the funds that were
    appropriated in the most recent supplemental bill. Our national debt is
    rising and our government is being forced to abandon critical domestic
    priorities. Our public image to the world has deteriorated drastically
    and continues to suffer. If we proceed on the current path, we will
    endanger our Nation's long-term competitiveness and well-being.
    Moreover, political realities in Washington will force change. As we
    approach the 2008 Presidential election campaign, the people of the
    United States may choose to elect a President that promises an
    immediate withdrawal. This could be very dangerous for the region and
    American national security interests. Therefore, it is time to deal
    with the realities--the inevitability of our eventual disengagement--
    and begin the planning for a new way forward in Iraq.
    Military Disengagement Does Not Equal Abandonment
    It is absolutely critical that we avoid being forced into a
    precipitous withdrawal, whether it is because of world events or our
    own political atmosphere at home. The dangers of a precipitous
    withdrawal include the potential destabilization of the region; the
    disintegration of United States relations with various allies in the
    region; the endangerment of vital energy supplies in the Middle East;
    and irreparable damage to the credibility of the United States
    throughout the world (especially if we leave and a humanitarian crisis
    ensues). If we lose the opportunity to implement a responsible military
    disengagement on our own terms, we may find ourselves unable to prevent
    the aforementioned dangers. Therefore, we must formulate a strategy for
    disengagement that seeks to prevent these outcomes and protect our
    long-term, strategic interests in the region.
    While our men and women in the field courageously fight day in and
    day out, complex power struggles in the region and among Iraq's
    religious sects and political factions continue to undermine American
    troops. Iraq's elected government has not yet proved capable of forging
    a political reconciliation and winning the support of these groups.
    Following the second attack on a Shiite shrine in Samarra, Iraq's
    Government has grown increasingly nervous as political factions split
    even further. Shiites are now fighting with Shiites in neighborhoods
    that were previously calm. According to the testimony of numerous
    experts and officials who have testified to the Senate Foreign
    Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, Iraq's
    problems cannot be solved with a military solution alone. Rather,
    Iraq's future rests largely on political solutions within the Iraqi
    Government, its perceived leaders and Iraq's neighboring countries
    where American influence is limited. Currently, the only leverage we
    have to influence these actors and trigger political cooperation is
    through the presence and/or removal of our military forces from Iraq.
    Unfortunately, the presence of American forces in Iraq is being
    exploited by Iraq's political actors, religious sects, and militias, as
    well as al-Qaeda, other foreign fighters, and Iraq's neighboring
    countries. Their leaders are not moving quickly to make responsible
    decisions and change the situation, because the continued presence of
    American forces fuel their arguments and make compromise unnecessary.
    Therefore, our best chance of stabilizing Iraq is to develop and
    implement a strategy for United States military disengagement that is
    coupled with a robust diplomatic effort to contain instability and
    protect our interests in the region. It is time the Iraqi Government
    and its regional neighbors take a greater responsibility in stabilizing
    this situation. Military disengagement is the only way to force Iraq's
    leaders and neighboring countries to make the difficult decisions
    needed to create stability and prevent a catastrophe in the region.
    Only by initiating such a strategy can we hope to achieve all of the
    following goals:
    Compel Iraq's leaders and neighbors to take actions that will
    support stability in Iraq and prevent chaos in the region;
    Make al-Qaeda's mission to drive out U.S. forces obsolete, so
    Iraqi tolerance for al-Qaeda decreases;
    Stop terrorist networks from using Iraq's perceived occupation
    as a recruitment tool;
    Develop a plan for Iraq that can be endorsed by all of Iraq's
    neighbors and key international organizations;
    Agree on a timeline for disengagement that is acceptable to the
    people of Iraq, blessed by the international community, and
    easier to implement because it has their support;
    Protect key American alliances in the region by working with
    them to develop our exit strategy and working to address their
    fears and concerns;
    Preserve American credibility by staying involved in Iraq and
    focusing more energy on refugee assistance, humanitarian aid,
    and reconstruction aid;
    Focus our resources on other fronts in the war on terrorism;
    and
    Rest and repair our military forces for potential future
    conflicts.
    Military disengagement cannot be viewed as an abandonment of Iraq
    or our long-term strategic interests in the region. If we pursue a
    well-developed and comprehensive plan for withdrawing U.S. forces, we
    will have a better chance of achieving our goals and sustaining
    domestic support for a continued commitment in the future. Drawing out
    our current efforts indefinitely will deplete our resources and limit
    our options when we eventually decide to draw down our forces. By
    forming the strategy now, we have time on our side and can mitigate the
    possible negative consequences of our departure.
    what is the way forward?
    A Clear Announcement and a Clear Commitment
    The United States should begin by issuing a clear announcement
    about the intention to responsibly withdraw our military forces from
    Iraq, while stressing our commitment to remain engaged in Iraq's future
    and the future stability of the Middle East. The statement should and
    must go hand in hand with a demonstration of our decision, to ensure
    that it is taken seriously. The demonstration could be to draw back a
    significant number of our forces to major military garrisons or to
    redeploy them to forward operating bases in neighboring countries. The
    goal would be to reduce our visible presence, while sustaining our
    ability to respond immediately to any serious crisis or attack on U.S.
    soldiers or installations.
    The announcement should also be coupled with an expression of our
    commitment to Iraq's future and our determination to stay involved in
    the region and prevent its destabilization. We must make clear that our
    decision to leave is based on a desire to bring an end to the violence,
    to force out foreign fighters, and to allow Iraqis to reclaim their
    country from terrorists and militants. We must also emphasize that we
    will come to Iraq's assistance if asked, and that we will remain in the
    region to assist our other allies as well.
    Lastly, we should make clear our pledge to provide Iraq with our
    financial and humanitarian assistance for the next several years,
    including a special program for assisting refugees who have left Iraq
    and refugees who want to return to Iraq when the violence stops. Prior
    to the announcement, we should have a plan in place to resettle a
    portion of Iraqi refugees in the United Sates, especially those who
    helped U.S. forces as linguists, informants, or in other ways.
    An International Conference and Shuttle Diplomacy
    Military disengagement must go hand in hand with a plan for robust
    diplomatic engagement aimed at preventing instability and leveraging
    Iraq's neighbors to help us prevent chaos in the region. On the
    multilateral front, the United States should organize an international
    conference to bring together Iraq's neighbors, the five permanent
    members of the U.N. Security Council, and the U.N. Secretary General.
    The purpose of the conference would be to discuss how to maintain
    stability in the Middle East, manage the refugee crisis, and forge a
    new political compact in Iraq that will address key political issues in
    Iraq, including resource allocation, de-Baathification, and
    reconciliation. The conference should aim to produce an agreement among
    its participants and a subsequent U.N. Security Council Resolution. The
    agreement should establish agreement on a number of important issues,
    including respect for Iraq's sovereignty and its current borders, and
    any arrangement to provide an international peacekeeping force if
    sectarian conflict leads to a humanitarian crisis.
    On the margins of the international conference, the United States
    should conduct a series of focused bilateral meetings with Iraq's
    leadership, our allies, and Iraq's neighbors. The meetings should
    address specific concerns, including cooperation to control Iraq's
    borders and cooperation to prevent retaliatory attacks on U.S. soldiers
    upon withdrawal. We should make clear that any coordinated attack on
    U.S. soldiers would be responded to with speed and severity.
    A Substantial Package of Foreign Aid
    The way forward and out of Iraq will require a substantial aid
    package for Iraq. This is an important step and will send a clear
    message that we intend to keep our promise to the Iraqis and help
    stabilize their country. We will also need to provide foreign aid to
    key partners in the region, such as Jordan and Kuwait, who will be
    impacted strategically and economically by military disengagement. This
    must include refugee assistance and increased economic and security
    assistance to help them deal with the thousands of Iraqi refugees and
    manage security at their borders. It is a sign of goodwill that
    advances U.S. interests by helping to protect our partnerships and
    prevent the spread of instability through the region. Though some may
    balk at the expense of foreign aid to Iraq or other partners, it is
    only a fraction of the costs of sustaining war operations.
    Sustain U.S. Credibility and Bolster Public Diplomacy
    As a final and critical component of any plan for military
    disengagement, we must find ways to restore our credibility and
    standing in the world. The war in Iraq was a major blow to our soft
    power and public diplomacy. It cannot be rebuilt overnight, but steps
    should be taken to prevent the further deterioration of our image in
    the aftermath of a withdrawal. First, we should follow up our
    disengagement from Iraq with an announcement of our commitment to
    remain involved in the greater fight against terrorism and to engage
    more heavily in Afghanistan and the Global War on Terrorism. We should
    devote more resources to strangling terrorist financial networks,
    promoting international law enforcement cooperation, and ridding
    countries of dangerous madrassas that train terrorists. Second, we
    should give a visible priority to the Middle East Peace Process and our
    relations with all countries in the Middle East. We must show that our
    disengagement from Iraq does not represent an abandonment of our
    commitment to stabilize the Greater Middle East. Third, we should
    pursue a significant foreign aid program that will draw attention to
    the United States good works and involvement in the world. This could
    begin with our commitment to pay the full amount of our current
    outstanding dues to the U.N. for international peacekeeping and other
    arrears, which would send a powerful message to the world and bolster
    the American image tremendously.
    Conclusion
    I believe that we can set our Nation on a new course in Iraq that
    has bipartisan support in Congress and sustains our commitment to the
    people of Iraq. We can share more of the responsibility with Iraqis and
    their neighbors, while protecting our vital interests. We must begin
    the process now. The United States is a powerful and principled nation,
    and we are entering just one more phase of our Nation's history. Our
    courage and resolve can carry us through this experience and into a new
    phase of global leadership.