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LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS ON THE REPUBLICAN LINE. |
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PART OF THIS MORNING'S "WASHINGTON JOURNAL." THE PROGRAM IS LIVE AT 7:00 A.M. EASTERN. NOW LIVE TO... |
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-- SIR MARTIN GILBERT HAVE |
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WE'VE HEARD FROM A NUMBER OF OUR MILITARY WITNESSES OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR TROOPS TO BE DEPLOYED... |
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I WAS ADVISED WE COULD SUSTAIN IT BUT IT WAS GOING TO BE DIFFICULT FOR SURE. WE OBVIOUSLY HAVE THE... |
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WERE YOU CONCERNED AT ANY POINT WE HAD ACTUALLY |
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I WAS CONCERNED TO MAKE SURE WE DIDN'T AND OBVIOUSLY TOOK ACTION BETWEEN MYSELF AND THE MILITARY... |
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IN HIS EVIDENCE TO US, THE GENERAL DESCRIBED THE IMPACT OF OF BRITISH FORCES IN IRAQ IN THE SUMMER... |
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WELL I THINK THE IDEA OBVIOUSLY WAS THAT WE WOULD NOT REQUIRE THE SAME NUMBER OF TROOPS FOR THE CONFLICT,... |
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GIVEN THE CONSTRAINTS, WHAT DID YOU SEE AS THE BALANCE OF THE TASK OF OUR TROOPS? ON THE ONE HAND,... |
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THESE VERY MUCH WERE DECISION OF THE COMMANDERS ON THE GROUND BUT I THINK THEY WERE CONSCIENCE AT A... |
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YOU MENTIONED IT WAS THE MILITARY ADVISING IN TERMS OF PRIORITIES, BUT WHAT WAS YOUR INPUT AT THIS... |
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I THINK WE GETTING FEEDBACK AS QUICKLY AS WE COULD HOW WE COULD CHANGE THE SITUATION AROUND AND WERE... |
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IF I COULD GO BACK TO THE MILITARY FUNDING ISSUE, LOOK AT ITS WIDER ASPECTS. WE'VE HEARD FROM SEVERAL... |
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I DON'T THINK THIS WAS SOMETHING I WAS PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN NO. I WAS MORE INVOLVED AT THE LEVEL,... |
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THE URGENT OPERATION REQUIREMENTS CAN DIVERTING AWAY |
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IF ANYBODY HAD COME TO ME AND SAID, LOOK, THERE'S AN ISSUE AND PROBLEM AND I WOULD HAVE BEEN STRAIGHT... |
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IT DID AND ONE OF THE REASONS WHY THEY AGREED TO A DIVISION AND 127 MILLION POUNDS OR ROUND ABOUT... |
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THAT ARE BRINGS ME TO MY FINAL QUESTION THAT YOU TOUCHED ON BEFORE THE BREAK. THAT IS THE QUESTION... |
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CORRECT AND WE FOCUSED AND ALSO THERE WAS A COURSE. I RAISED THE ISSUE MYSELF SEVERAL TIMES. SHIA... |
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THEY WANTED DISCUSSION AND THEY WERE VERY, VERY WELL AWARE OF THAT. THIS AGAIN IS OF VITAL EXPERIENCE... |
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THIS WAS NOT SOMETHING YOU MENTIONED I THINK TWICE IN YOUR SPEECHES BEFORE THE WAR AND YOUR MEETING... |
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THEY WEREN'T. IT WAS A STATEMENT OF THE OBVIOUS. BRITAIN IN A SENSE AND IRAQIS REMEMBER IN THE 1920s... |
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BRIEFLY FOLLOW-THROUGH ON THAT POINT. HINDSIGHT IS A WONDERFUL THING. WITH ALL THE WISDOM, IT SEEMS... |
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THIS IS A VERY, VERY GOOD QUESTION. FOR ASSESSMENT AND YOU CAN SEE THROUGH 2002, THEY ARE GOING BACK... |
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DESPITE THE FACT THAT IRAN HAD FOUGHT A LONG WAR AND |
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THAT WAS THE POINT. THE CAUSE AS IT WERE, SADDAM HAD BEEN THE ENEMY AND THERE WERE A MILLION CASUALTIES... |
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IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF WE END. YOU RAISED IT AS A BINARY QUESTION. THERE ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS... |
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I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THERE WAS OFFICIAL CONTACT AND I KNOW I HADN'T HAD THE DISCUSSION WITH THE WHITE... |
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I'M NOT SURE IN MY OWN MIND ABOUT THIS NOW. I THINK IN HELP FOR THIS, IT WAS GOING TO BE REALLY DIFFICULT... |
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IT WAS KIND OF TOO LATE. EFFECTIVELY WE HADN'T BEEN CONSULTED. AS SOON AS WE HEARD ABOUT IT, |
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IT'S A DECISION AT THE MOMENT. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN SENSIBLE IF THERE HAD BEEN A MAJOR |
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TO BE FAIR TO THE AMERICANS, THE MOMENT THAT IT HAPPENED, WE RAISED THE ISSUES WITH THEM AND |
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THEY DIDN'T WITHDRAW THE |
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THEY AMENDED SUBSTANTIALLY. I THINK AGAIN I WOULD CONSULT CAREFULLY WITH THE PEOPLE WHO TOOK THEM.... |
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THEY ARE OBVIOUSLY INTO THE POSTWAR PRESIDENT. WE HAVE DISCUSSED BEFORE THE ISG REPORT. # I THINK WE... |
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AS TIME WENT ON THROUGH THE COURSE OF 2003, IN THE BEGINNING WE HAVE TAKEN EVIDENCE OF A GENUINE BELIEF... |
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GENERAL FREY COLD US EVEN AS THE TROOPS WERE ON THE MISSION, IT BECAME DISILLUSIONED. IT WAS SUPPOSED... |
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I WAS AWARE THERE WAS A DEBATE WITH THE AMERICAN SYSTEM. DID YOU USE THE DOCTRINE OF OVERWHELMING... |
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PART OF THE DEBATE WAS IN THE UNITED STATES IT WAS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO WHERE EACH... |
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THIS IS A MAJOR, MAJOR PART OF HOW ANY SUCH OPERATION WOULD BE DONE IN THE FUTURE. THE FORCE TO REMOVE... |
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THEY HAD MORE IN BEING ABLE TO MOVE QUICKLY TO THIS NATION-BUILDING ROAD. WITH THAT SAID, I DON'T... |
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AND THE DISBANDING OF THE |
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IT WAS THE PENSIONS POINT YOU MENTIONED. IT DIDN'T EXIST AS AN ORGANIZED FORCE, BUT A BASIS OF GETTING... |
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IT PARTLY DEPENDS UPON YOUR ABILITY TO ASSERT ORDER AND AUTHORITY EARLY ON. AND WE CAN REMEMBER.... |
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IT CERTAINLY WAS, YES. I WAS INVOLVED WHY DISCUSSIONS THE PRESIDENT AND ALSO WITH -- TAKING ON THE... |
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IT WAS GOING TO BE TOUGH AND ONE OF THE CENTRAL QUESTIONS, MY VIEW IS THE WAY THAT IS RIGHT. WE SHOULD... |
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IT'S TRUE THAT THE NATURE OF THE RESPONSE MAKES A DIFFERENCE TO IT AND WE TALK ABOUT THESE OTHER... |
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THIS WASN'T THE ISSUE DOWN |
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THAT'S THE OTHER ISSUE FOR |
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I THINK YOU HAVE TO LOOK AT QUESTION VERY CAREFULLY BECAUSE I THINK I WOULD PUT IT IN A DIFFERENT... |
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THE SURGE WORKED IN VERY DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES THAN |
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THAT'S NOT MY POINT. IT WORKED, THEN 2007 AND IN 2004 IT WASN'T |
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IT WORKED BECAUSE YOU HAD FORCES THAT WERE TRAINED FOR THE JOB. HUH A DOCTRINE THAT WAS APPROPRIATE... |
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ABSOLUTELY. WHAT WAS CLEAR IS THAT AS I SAY, THIS INFLUENCE WAS GROWING AND WE DEBATED A LOT WHAT TO... |
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YOU HAVE TAKEN US AGAIN THREE OR FOUR YEARS FURTHER ON. THESE ARE THE FINAL ASPECTS OF 2004 WHICH WAS... |
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I WAS SHOCK AND ANGRY AS ANYONE WOULD BE. WRONG AND ANGRY BECAUSE OF THE DAMAGE I KNEW IT WOULD DO.... |
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HAVE YOU BEEN GIVEN ADVANCED |
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I THINK EVERYONE WAS TAKEN BY SURPRISE, INCLUDING THE WHITE |
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I APPOINTED AND INCLUDED AS HUMAN RIGHTS ADVISER, WE MADE AN EFFORT TO TRY TO SAY THINGS ARE GOING... |
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AT THE MOMENT THE COALITION IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE IRAQI PEOPLE AND YOU INDICATED... |
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LET US HOPE SO. THAT WAS THE EVIDENCE. CERTAINLY BETTER THAN OFF THAN |
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I HAVE CONVERSATIONS WITH IRAQIS. THAT'S SOMETHING THAT HAS TO BE AND THAT ONLY IMPROVED. CAN I GO... |
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THAT WAS A DIFFERENT SITUATION AND WHY? WE BUILT UP THE CAPACITY OF THE IRAQI FORCES THEMSELVES AND... |
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SUPPOSEDLY THE FINAL QUESTION IS THIS IS A VERY HEAVY PRICE TO IT NOT, FOR THE LACK OF PREPARATION.... |
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WE WILL PASS IT OVER TO THE |
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WE WANT TO TALK ABOUT THE AFGHANISTAN AS IT WERE. NOT TO LOOK AT THEM IN THEIR OWN |
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JUST ONE, REALLY. HE WAS AGAINST THE IDEA OF DEPLOYING INTO MORE TROOPS UNTIL WE PRODUCED OUR COMMITMENTS... |
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WE WERE THEN FIGHTING IN TWO THEATERS OF OPERATION. AGAIN I THINK THE DECISION TO GO DOWN WAS TAKEN... |
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THE SUGGESTION CAME FROM THE MOD. IT WILL BE TOUGH, BUT WE CAN DO IT AND SHOULD DO IT. RIGHT AT THE... |
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WE WERE DISCUSSING IN RELATION TO THE MILITARY. NOW AT A LATER TIME AS YOU KNOW THERE WERE OFFICIALS... |
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THAT CAME AT A VERY LATE |
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THE OFFICIALS WERING TO AND |
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EARLY STAGES, YOU NEED |
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WE WERE IN CLOSE TOUCH AND RIGHT AT THAT MOMENT, THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT AREAS WERE DIPLOMACY AND... |
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THAT'S TRUE, BUT HE SAID I THINK YOU SHOULD INCLUDE EVEN IF YOU WOULD BE DIFFICULT. IN A WAY IF YOU... |
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I DON'T WANT TO GO OVER OLD GROUND. THEY MET FREQUENTLY IN THE CAB NED, NOT THAT THEY WERE NOT CONSULTED.... |
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YOU BOTH HAVE VERY DIFFERENT TESTIMONY. THE SAME THOUGHT YOU NEED TO ACCOMMODATE ANY DIFFERENCE AND... |
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NOBODY WAS AWARE OF THE WHOLE OF THE POLITICAL MAINSTREAM AT THE TIME. AND THE WORK FOR THOSE OF THEM,... |
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WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPLORE THE INTERACTION BETWEEN MAJOR POLICY MAKING AT CABINET LEVEL AND GOING INTO... |
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WE DISCUSSED THE PROCESS FOR WHICH HE WAS INVOLVED IN THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS. WHAT BECAME VERY... |
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I THINK THE VERY FIRST PAPER WE GOT IN MARCH OR THE CLUTCH OF PAPERS WE GOT IN MARCH OF 2002. AND THE... |
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HE WAS CONSTANTLY HAVING TO ASK AND WRITE HIS OPINION TO AND PROVIDE HIS CONTINUE AND HE SAID |
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HE SAID THAT ABOUT THE PARTICULAR OPINION AND NOT THAT IT WASN'T WELCOME, I WAS DEALING WITH A DIFFICULT... |
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THAT DOESN'T ALLOW FOR A COLLECTIVE DECISION MAKING FOR A |
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WITH RESPECT TO THE LEGAL OPINION, I THINK THE KEY THING REALLY WAS THIS. THEY WEREN'T INTERESTED... |
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BUT GOING BACK TO THE LEGAL ADVICE, WHEN THE CABINETS MET IN MARCH, HE ENTERED THE DRAFT AND THE ANSWER,... |
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THE LEGAL BASIS IS ESSENTIAL, |
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IN TERMS OF WHETHER IT WAS RIGHT OR WRONG TO DO IT, THAT WAS THE DISCUSSION. ONCE THE MEMBERS OF THE... |
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MR. BLAIR, DO YOU THINK THERE IS A CONTRAST OF APPROACH BETWEEN WHAT FREQUENTLY HAPPENS IN DUBLIN... |
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I THINK THAT THERE COULD BE. BUT I WOULD SAY IN THIS SITUATION, SINCE IN A WAY MARCH 2002 WAS THE... |
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IT STILL SEEMS FROM WHAT WE HAVE HEARD TODAY AND FROM PREVIOUS WITNESSES THAT THERE WAS A VERY CLEAR... |
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WELL, I THINK IT IS UNAVOIDABLE IN A SITUATION WHERE IT IS THAT CONTROVERSIAL AND DIVISIVE AND IT... |
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AND I THINK NECESSARILY IN THIS SITUATION WHERE WE WERE SETTING A STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, YOU KNOW,... |
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I THINK WE JUST WOULD LIKE TO ASK ONE OR TWO MORE QUESTIONS BEFORE WE COME TO THE CLOSE. |
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MY FINAL QUESTION IS ABOUT THE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT, BECAUSE THERE WILL BE A SORT OF LONG COMMAND... |
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IN THE PREWAR PART, WE HAD THE AD HOC GROUP ON IRAQ OF OFFICIALS WHICH MET FROM SEPTEMBER ONWARDS... |
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BUT THERE WAS NO MINISTER CABINET RANK REPORTING BACK AND DRIVING THE STATE TODAY BECAUSE FROM WHAT... |
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YES, I THINK ONE OF THE QUESTIONS, I THINK THIS HAS BEEN RAISED IN SOME OF THE EVIDENCE TO YOU IS... |
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ONE THING I WANT TO PUT TO YOU BECAUSE DAVID BOWMAN WHO WE SAW LAST WEEK, HE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE... |
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WE WOULD HAVE ENTIRELY RE-EVALUATED OUR STRATEGY HAD, AS I SAY, AND I'M USING THIS AS TERM, SADDAM... |
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EVEN LATE TERRE BECAME CLEAR THAT OUR POST WAR EFFORTS WERE BECOMING STRATEGIC FAILURE. I MEAN, DID... |
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THINKING? ABSOLUTELY. THE REASON WHY WE WERE IN A CONSTANT LIT RATION, VERY QUICKLY AFTER THE CONFLICT... |
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FROM YOUR POINT OF VIEW YOU THINK THE MACHINE OF THE |
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I CAN'T THINK -- I DON'T DOUBT YOU COULD HAVE HAVE A DIFFERENT MACHINERY, BUT WE DID HAVE A MACHINERY... |
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ON REFLECTION THERE IS NOTHING YOU WOULD DO |
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I THINK WHEN YOU LOOK BACK NOW AND I WOULD JUST SAY TO YOU EARLIER, FOR EXAMPLE, IF YOU WANT TO LOOK... |
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WE'RE COMING TO THE END, I THINK, MR. BLAIR. I GOT A COUPLE QUESTIONS I'D LIKE TO RAISE. THE FIRST... |
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IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY RIGHT NOW WHETHER THE IRAQI DEMOCRACY WILL TAKE ROOT AND WILL FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY.... |
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THE OTHER PERSPECTIVE, CLEARLY, AND YOU WILL APPRECIATE THIS BETTER THAN ANYONE CAN PROBABLY, OUR... |
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I MEAN, I SAID SOME OF THE THINGS THAT I THINK ARE LESSONS THAT COULD BE LEARNED ABOUT NATION-BUILDING.... |
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RESPONSIBILITY, BUT NOT A REGRET FOR MOVING SADDAM HUSSEIN. |
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I THINK THAT HE WAS A MONSTER. I BELIEVE HE THREATENED NOT JUST THE REGION, BUT THE WORLD. AND IN THE... |
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THANK YOU. THIS BRINGS US, I THINK, TO THE END OF TODAY'S HEARINGS. IS THERE ANY FINAL COMMENT BEYOND... |
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IN THAT CASE, CAN I SAY TWO THINGS. THE FIRST IS THAT THERE CLEARLY ARE CONSIDERABLE LIMITS TO WHAT... |
NOTE: The transcript for this program was compiled from uncorrected Closed Captioning.