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| TIME | SPEAKER | TEXT |
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| 00:00:06 |
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C-SPAN, CREATED AS A PUBLIC SERVICE FROM AMERICA'S CABLE COMPANIES. |
| 00:00:12 |
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AND NOW MEMBERS OF THE IRAQI PARLIAMENT TESTIFY ON A PROPOSED SECURITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S.... |
| 00:00:50 |
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THE COMMITTEE WILL COME TO ORDER. TODAY WE HAVE THE HONOR OF HAVING TWO DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS FROM... |
| 00:01:45 |
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WE'RE WE ARE HONORED TO HAVE TWO MEMBERS WITH US. WELCOME. I WILL DISCUSS THEIR BACKGROUNDS IN... |
| 00:12:45 |
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OBVIOUSLY THIS IS AN ISSUE THAT ALL AMERICANS CONSIDER TO BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. THIS IS IMPORTANT... |
| 00:17:43 |
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I THINK HE WRECKING THANK THE RANKING MEMBER. I WILL NOW GIVE THE FLOOR TO MR. MEEKS. |
| 00:17:56 |
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IT IS VERY TIMELY THAT YOU ARE DOING THIS HEARING AND IT IS A TESTAMENT TO YOUR LEADERSHIP AND YOUR... |
| 00:23:04 |
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I WILL NOW YIELD NOW TO THE GENTLEMAN FROM TEXAS, A FORMER CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED... |
| 00:24:40 |
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I THANK THE CHAIRMAN. I APPRECIATE VERY MUCH THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF REPRESENT HIS BEING HERE.... |
| 00:28:14 |
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I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR THE WITNESSES. I NOTE THE PRESENCE OF THE GENTLEMAN FROM NORTH CAROLINA, AN... |
| 00:29:04 |
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MR. CHAIRMAN, I WANT TO SAY TO THE MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE, THANK YOU FOR GIVING ME THIS OPPORTUNITY... |
| 00:30:16 |
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THANK YOU, MR. JONES. ON I AM GOING TO ASK THE QUESTION OF BOTH OF OUR COLLEAGUES FROM IRAQ BUT BEFORE... |
| 00:35:34 |
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THANK YOU. FIRST OF ALL, PLEASE REFER TO ME AS BEING AN IRAQI AND NOT AS ANYTHING ELSE. WITH REGARD... |
| 00:46:16 |
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THANK YOU, AND I WOULD OUT -- I WOULD NOW ASK IF HE WOULD RESPOND TO MY QUESTION AND THEN I WILL PROCEED... |
| 00:46:37 |
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THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR THIS MEETING. FIRST OF ALL, I THANK ALL THOSE PEOPLE WHO ARE HERE AND THE ... |
| 00:48:12 |
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YOU ARE GOING TO HAVE TO GET BACK A BIT. |
| 00:48:18 |
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BUT NOW WITH THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FORCES IN IRAQ WE ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT -- WE NEEDED TO BE ORGANIZED... |
| 00:53:50 |
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YES, THANK YOU. LET ME NOW GO TO MR. ROHRBACHER. |
| 00:54:16 |
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LET ME GET MORE SPECIFIC WITH SOME QUESTIONS HERE. IF IT IS PREFERRED, ANSWER YES OR NO. WOULD YOU... |
| 00:55:11 |
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WE WOULD PREFER IF IT DID NOT HAPPEN BECAUSE THIS LED TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE COUNTRY. |
| 00:55:17 |
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OK, SO, YOU WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THE UNITED STATES NOT TO HAVE GOTTEN RID OF SADDAM HUSSEIN? |
| 00:55:40 |
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THE UNITED STATES GOT RID OF ONE PERSON, BUT THEY BROUGHT HUNDREDS OF PERSONS WHO ARE WORSE THAN SADDAM... |
| 00:55:49 |
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A FAIR ANSWER. |
| 00:56:04 |
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AND UNFORTUNATELY, NOW IRAN IS GOING INTO IRAQ AND THIS IS UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF THE |
| 00:56:12 |
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OK, I GOT IT. LET ME ASK THIS GENTLEMAN, WHICH YOU HAVE PREFERRED NOW THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NEVER... |
| 00:56:26 |
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I PREFER THAT WE DO NOT GO BACK AND POUR INTO THE PAST. WE CANNOT. DO IT. -- WE CANNOT AGREE TO ITREDO... |
| 00:56:57 |
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OK, NOW, THEN MY NEXT QUESTION IS -- CURRENTLY, WE HAVE A NUMBER OF MILITARY TROOPS IN IRAQ. THEY... |
| 00:57:50 |
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I BELIEVE THAT IRAQ HAS ENOUGH CAPABILITIES TO DEFEND ITSELF AND TO BUILD UP MILITARY FORCES THAT... |
| 00:58:39 |
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AKAKA MY YOU'RE LOOKING BACK. YOU ARE RIGHT ABOUT LOOKING BACK. LET ME ASK YOU ABOUT LOOKING FORWARD.... |
| 00:58:55 |
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MAINTAINING AMERICAN TROOPS IN IRAQ HAS, PERHAPS, HAPPEN UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS -- HAPPENED UNDER... |
| 00:59:51 |
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SO, HE IS TELLING US THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE U.S. SHOULD BE CONTINUED -- SHOULD BEGIN WITHDRAWING... |
| 01:00:04 |
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BUT I AM SAYING IS -- |
| 01:00:09 |
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COULD USEYOU PAUSE FOR A MOMENT? WE ARE HAVING DIFFICULTIES. WHY DON'T WE TRY AGAIN? |
| 01:00:17 |
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DO YOU HEAR ME NOW? HOW ABOUT NOW? AND NO MORE PECO? SORRY ABOUT THAT. -- NO MORE ECHO? SORRY ABOUT... |
| 01:00:52 |
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I AM SORRY FOR INTERRUPTING BECAUSE I ONLY HAVE LIMITED TIME TO ASK MY QUESTIONS. WE COULD ACTUALLY... |
| 01:01:20 |
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HE SAYS THAT IRAQ DOES NOT NEED FOREIGN DEBT -- |
| 01:01:26 |
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SO, YOUR POSITION IS THAT WE SHOULD START WITHDRAWING OUR TROOPS? |
| 01:01:31 |
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I BELIEVE THAT THIS MEETING IS VERY CLEAR. -- MEANING IT IS VERY CLEAR. |
| 01:01:37 |
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WE SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO PUT OURSELVES ON THE RECORD IF IT IS VERY CLEAR. THE SAME QUESTION TO YOU.... |
| 01:02:10 |
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IT IS A WELL-KNOWN FACT [UNINTELLIGIBLE] SHOULD KEEP SECURITY AND ORDER IN THE COUNTRY AND TO GO THERE... |
| 01:03:05 |
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SO, YOUR ANSWER TO THE QUESTION IS, NO, WE SHOULD NOT BEGIN A QUICK WITHDRAWAL OF OUR FORCES AND YOUR... |
| 01:03:26 |
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I WOULD LIKE TO SEE A SCHEDULED WITHDRAWAL BASED ON A TIMETABLE THAT WOULD ALLOW ENOUGH TIME TO REBUILD... |
| 01:03:41 |
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LET ME NOTE TO YOU THAT THE STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT THAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT COULD WELL INCLUDE... |
| 01:04:21 |
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YOUR LAST SENTENCE I COULD NOT HERE. |
| 01:04:28 |
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-- I COULD NOT HEAR. |
| 01:04:33 |
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IT IS NECESSARY FOR US TO REACH AN AGREEMENT AND WE WOULD HOPE THAT IT WOULD BE RATIFIED BY THE PARLIAMENT... |
| 01:05:46 |
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THIS NEEDS TO BE FULLY EXPLAINED AND THIS WILL TAKE A LONG TIME, BUT IN BRIEF, FROM THE PIECES WE... |
| 01:06:57 |
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IS THAT THE ATTITUDE THAT IS REFLECTED IN THE MAJORITY OF THE PARLIAMENT? THAT IS WHAT I NEED TO KNOW.... |
| 01:07:18 |
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I BELIEVE MOST IRAQIS ARE INTERESTED IN A TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL WHICH WILL ALLOW TIME TO REBUILD... |
| 01:07:29 |
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THANK YOU VERY MUCH. THAT IS A VERY GOOD ANSWER AND I APPRECIATE THAT. I MET WITH TRIBAL LEADERS THIS... |
| 01:08:00 |
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BEFORE I GO TO MR. PAUL, I THINK WHAT I HEAR AND WHAT IS REFLECTED IN THE LETTER OF THE MAJORITY OF... |
| 01:09:03 |
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THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. I HAVE A QUESTION OR TWO FOR DR. AL-JABERI. |
| 01:09:13 |
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MAY I ASK A QUESTION, PLEASE? SO THAT YOU HAVE THE FULL PICTURE, IF YOU DO NOT MIND, WHAT ARE THE... |
| 01:09:31 |
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WHAT WAS THE QUESTION? |
| 01:09:37 |
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THAT WILL BE TOTALLY UP TO YOU TO DETERMINE. FRANKLY, IF YOU WANT AMERICAN FORCES THERE FOR WHAT EVER... |
| 01:10:33 |
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I WOULD LIKE YOU TO REST ASSURED, THERE ARE NO THREATS ON IRAQ. IN CASE OF FOREIGN AGGRESSION. AND... |
| 01:10:55 |
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WITH THAT, I WILL GO TO MR. PAUL FOR HIS OPPORTUNITY TO INQUIRE. BEFORE I DO, LET ME NOTICE THE PRESENCE... |
| 01:11:22 |
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THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. THIS IS A QUESTION FOR DR. AL- JABERI. THIS HAS TO DO WITH OUR WITHDRAWAL... |
| 01:12:11 |
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I WOULD LIKE FOR US TO AGREE ON THE PRINCIPLE FIRST. DETAILS ARE TO BE DISCUSSED BY THE EXPERTS IN... |
| 01:13:31 |
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OK, I AM DISAPPOINTED WITH THE ANSWER BECAUSE YOU ARE SAYING IT IS OPEN ENDED -- ASIX MONTHS, A YEAR,... |
| 01:14:55 |
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BY S Q -- I ASK YOU TO PERHAPS HAVE A REFERENDUM AND THAT WOULD TELL YOU THE TRUTH. |
| 01:15:00 |
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YOU HAVE NO IDEA? MAYBE ONLY 5% SUPPORT US LEADING. YOU HAVE TO HAVE AN IDEA. |
| 01:15:12 |
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OF COURSE NOT. THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE ARE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL. |
| 01:15:21 |
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51%? |
| 01:15:24 |
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PERHAPS EVEN ABOUT 70%. |
| 01:15:26 |
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OK, THAT IS GOOD. WHEN WE LEAVE, HOW WOULD IT BE PERCEIVED IF WE LEAVE THE EMBASSY WITH OUR PRESENCE... |
| 01:16:11 |
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THE EMBASSY IN IRAQ HAS AN INCREDIBLY LARGE AMOUNT OF STAFF. IT IS CERTAINLY LARGER THAN THE DIPLOMATIC... |
| 01:17:04 |
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LET ME NARROW THIS DOWN. WHAT DID HE NOT GOOD POLICY FOR US TO KEEP THE EMBASSY THAT TAKE? OR WOULD... |
| 01:17:40 |
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THIS IS THE SAME QUESTION I ASKED MYSELF. I MEAN, WHY DO WE NEED 3000 EMPLOYEES IN AN EMBASSY IN IRAQ?... |
| 01:18:02 |
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AKAKA I UNDERSTAND THAT. |
| 01:18:07 |
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FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY, WOULD IT BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE IRAQIS TO ESTABLISH A 3000 EMPLOYEES... |
| 01:18:16 |
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I AND YOUR STAND THAT, BUT WHAT I WANT TO KNOW IS THE EMOTIONAL, PUBLIC-RELATIONS REACTION OF THE... |
| 01:18:42 |
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IT CERTAINLY WOULD NOT BE A VERY POSITIVE SIGNAL TO THE IRAQI PEOPLE. IF YOU MAINTAIN A REASONABLE... |
| 01:19:03 |
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IT WOULD HELP COULD RELATIONS? |
| 01:19:08 |
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YES, YES, AND HAVE RELATIONS WITH THE POLITICAL ELITE AND THE SOCIETY. |
| 01:19:12 |
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AND WOULD YOU HAVE THE SAME ASSESSMENT WITH THE MILITARY BASES? |
| 01:19:28 |
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THE MILITARY BASES ARE A DIFFERENT STORY. DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ARE DONE IN ALL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS... |
| 01:20:12 |
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SO, PEOPLE WOULD BE LESS TOLERANT OF MILITARY BASES AND SOME AND THE SEAT. THE ARGUMENT WOULD BE THAT... |
| 01:20:30 |
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YES, THERE IS DEFINITELY SOME RESENTMENT FOR THE PRESENCE OF MILITARY BASES, NOT FOR A DIPLOMATIC... |
| 01:20:37 |
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AND THEREFORE, WE MUST ADDRESS THE MILITARY BASES. HIGH YIELD BACK. |
| 01:20:42 |
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I THANK THE JUDGMENT. AND NOW TO THE GENTLEMAN FROM ARIZONA. |
| 01:20:53 |
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I APOLOGIZE, I HAD A MEETING OUTSIDE, APOLOGIZE IF I COVER GROUND THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN COVERED. LET... |
| 01:21:47 |
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INCREASING THE NUMBER OF FORCES DID NOT AFFECT THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN IRAQ. BECAUSE OF THE WAR THERE... |
| 01:26:31 |
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IF I COULD ASK A QUICK FOLLOW-UP. IT IS OFTEN STATED HERE THAT A FIRM TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL WILL... |
| 01:27:46 |
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MR. ABS OF BARI, COULD YOU ANSWER THE QUESTION? -- MR. CALA JORIAL-JABERI, COULD YOU ANSWER THE QUESTION?... |
| 01:28:04 |
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IT IS OFTEN SAID HERE THAT IF THERE IS A TIMETABLE THAT THE ENEMY COULD SIT IN WAITING. IS THAT A... |
| 01:28:14 |
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I SAID A FEW MOMENTS AGO THAT MANY OF THE ARMED MILITIAS WERE ESTABLISHED IN ORDER TO FIGHT THE PRESENCE... |
| 01:30:18 |
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WITH REGARD TO THE TIMETABLE , IT HAS TO BE PREPARED BY PEOPLE WHO ARE SPECIALIZED AND THE PEOPLE... |
| 01:31:04 |
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THANK YOU, AND LET ME GO TO MR. JONES OF NORTH CAROLINA. |
| 01:31:08 |
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MR. CHAIRMAN, THANK YOU VERY MUCH. I AM SORRY THAT I HAD TO LEAVE FOR A FEW MINUTES, TOO. I AM PROBABLY... |
| 01:32:57 |
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THE TREW VULNERABILITY OF IN OUR FORCES -- TRUE VULNERABILITY IN OUR FORCES IS BECAUSE IT WAS ESTABLISHED... |
| 01:35:35 |
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1 FOLLOW UP VERY QUICKLY, MR. CHAIRMAN -- IF THE SUGGESTION THAT YOU NOW UNDERSTAND WHAT THE PROBLEM... |
| 01:36:26 |
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I AM GOING TO ASK THE SHEIKH TO RESPOND, GIVEN HIS MILITARY BACKGROUND. |
| 01:36:55 |
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IN FACT, THE IRAQI DO NOT NEED MUCH TRAINING BECAUSE ALL OF THEM HAVE MILITARY TRAINING SINCE WE HAVE... |
| 01:39:22 |
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THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. |
| 01:39:27 |
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IF I COULD RESTATE WHAT YOU SAID, YOU FEEL CONFIDENT THAT THERE IS AVAILABLE PROFESSIONAL, TRADE --... |
| 01:45:57 |
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AND THEY DON'T WANT TO THE IRAQI ARMY TO HAVE EVEN A MOTOR. ACCORDING TO A ARE RULES, EACH GOVERNOR... |
| 01:47:48 |
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THANK YOU, SHAPED =EIK. |
| 01:47:59 |
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WITH REGARD TO PESHMURGA, IT IS PRESENT TO BE DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER MILITIAS IN CERTAIN ASPECTS.... |
| 01:50:54 |
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I WANT TO EXPRESS MY PROFOUND GRATITUDE FOR YOUR PATIENCE. WE ARE NOW CALLED TO VOTE AND WE WILL BE... |
| 01:54:00 |
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I ALSO WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION AND THANKS FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE OPINIONS... |
| 01:55:49 |
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THE COMMITTEE WILL COME TO ORDER. LAST, BUT NOT LEAST, DR. KATHERINE. I CONTINUED TO SING YOUR PRAISES... |
| 01:58:29 |
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I THINK, THINKING ABOUT TODAY, IN SOME WAYS I HAVE REFINED MY OWN THINKING A LITTLE BIT. WHAT I SEE... |
| 02:00:46 |
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IS IT TRUE THAT -- AND AGAIN THIS IS FROM READING MEDIA REPORTS MORE OR LESS -- THAT WITHIN THE SHIA... |
| 02:02:45 |
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WELL, THIS IS WHAT I FIND IN SOME WAYS SOMEWHAT DISINGENUOUS WHEN PRIME MINISTER MALIKI SAYS HIS CRACKDOWN... |
| 02:03:16 |
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LET ME INTERRUPT. I DON'T THINK THE AMERICAN PEOPLE REALLY UNDERSTAND THAT. HISTORICALLY, COULD YOU... |
| 02:03:51 |
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YOU HAD THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IN 1980, WHICH CORRESPONDED WITH SADDAM'S CRACKDOWN AGAINST ISLAMIST SHIAS.... |
| 02:06:28 |
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ANOTHER ASPECT OF THIS, THOUGH, IS THE IRANIAN CONNECTION. BECAUSE I DON'T THINK MOST AMERICANS AND... |
| 02:07:23 |
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IT IS ACCURATE, ALTHOUGH I DO THINK THERE HAS BEEN A LITTLE BIT OF A SHIFT. WHEN SADDAM WAS OVERTHROWN,... |
| 02:08:33 |
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BUT THEY STILL EBULLITIONS WITH THE MALIKI AND THE OTHER PARTIES -- BUT THEY STILL HAVE RELATIONS... |
| 02:08:54 |
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WHEN MALIKI AND AL-SADR SPLIT IN 2007 THAT COMPLICATED LIFE FOR TEHRAN BECAUSE THEY HAD TO PLAY TWO... |
| 02:09:08 |
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IF IT IS COMPLICATED FOR TEHRAN. WE HAVE TO RECOGNIZE THAT. I, ALSO, FIND IT INTERESTING THAT THE... |
| 02:09:27 |
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AND THE PROVINCIAL COUNCILS. |
| 02:09:31 |
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YES, AND THE PROVINCIAL COUNCILS, THE EQUIVALENT OF OUR STATE LEGISLATORS. IT WOULD APPEAR, GIVEN... |
| 02:10:32 |
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I BELIEVE THAT MALIKI CAN NO LONGER COUNT ON A MAJORITY OF SEATS IN THE PARLIAMENT. YES, IT COULD... |
| 02:11:00 |
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BASED UPON WHAT YOU HAVE READ AND HEARD HERE TODAY, THE LETTER THAT WAS TRANSMITTED TO MYSELF, WHAT... |
| 02:12:23 |
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MY ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE IRAQIS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO AGREE TO A DRAFT THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO... |
| 02:13:15 |
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WERE YOU SURPRISED BY THE STATEMENT BY THE AYATOLLAH'S AS DONNSUSTANI? |
| 02:13:28 |
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I THINK HE IS VIEWED AS ALMOST A SEMI-TO-84 HIS STATURE. BUT HE DOES BLOW WITH THE POLITICAL WIND.... |
| 02:14:09 |
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WERE SURPRISED BY AL- HAKEEM'S POSITION? |
| 02:14:14 |
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HE WOULD BE THE ONE WHO ONE WOULD THINK WOULD HAVE THE MOST INTEREST IN ALLOWING MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY... |
| 02:14:30 |
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I NOTED IT WAS JUST I THINK MAYBE TWO OR THREE DAYS AGO WHERE THE FORMER PRIME MINISTER AL JAFARI... |
| 02:16:02 |
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I THINK WHAT I DISCERN IN IRAQ IS IT IS GOING TO HAPPEN THAT WAY ANYWAY. I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY... |
| 02:16:38 |
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I'M GOING TO CALL ON MY FRIEND AND COLLEAGUE FROM WASHINGTON AND GIVE HIM ALL THE TIME HE NEEDS. |
| 02:16:47 |
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THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. I'M SORRY I DID NOT HEAR YOUR PRESENTATION. SOME OF MY QUESTIONS MAYBE A... |
| 02:17:23 |
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THAT IS MY ANALYSIS, ABSOLUTELY. WHAT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT BEFORE IS WHAT I SEE IS AN ALLIANCE OF... |
| 02:17:50 |
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THE STATUS QUO? |
| 02:17:52 |
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YES. SO I ABSOLUTELY SEE THOSE GROUPS SUPPORTING US STAYING. |
| 02:17:59 |
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THEN THE THING THAT ONE WOULD ASK ONESELF IS HOW CAN IT BE THAT THIS GROUP OF PARLIAMENTARIANS WHO... |
| 02:18:58 |
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IT IS NO QUESTION A DIFFICULT SITUATION. I THINK THE ADMINISTRATION HOPE -- OUR ADMINISTRATION. |
| 02:19:07 |
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OUR ADMINISTRATION HOPED THAT THE TROOPS SEARCH WOULD CREATE A RELATIVELY PEACEFUL SECURITY SITUATIONS... |
| 02:20:15 |
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DOES THAT MEAN MALIKI HAS TO GO? |
| 02:20:16 |
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NOT NECESSARILY. I PERSONALLY-- |
| 02:20:22 |
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HAVE YOU EVER SEEN ANYONE YIELD POWER IN A POLITICAL SITUATION? |
| 02:20:26 |
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THERE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSIONS. THE SUNNI BLOCK, THE CONSENSUS BLOCK IS CONSIDERING REJOINING THE CABINET,... |
| 02:20:42 |
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FINANCE MINISTER, OR ZERO MINISTERS, THOSE KINDS OF THINGS. THEY WILL GET EDUCATION, CULTURE, ETC.,... |
| 02:20:49 |
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THAT'S RIGHT. IF I COULD JUST FINISH. ALSO, THE TRIBAL FIGHTERS, THE AWAKENING MOVEMENT, MALIKI WILL... |
| 02:21:20 |
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EARLIER IN THIS TIME BACK IN 2003 OR 2004 WE MET WITH SOME -- WE DID A VIDEO CONFERENCE WITH SOME... |
| 02:22:49 |
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IF WE WERE TO LEAVE TODAY, THEORETICALLY, OR SIX MONTHS FROM NOW, IT IS NO SECRET, MY ASSESSMENT IS... |
| 02:23:17 |
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INTO WHAT? |
| 02:23:20 |
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BACK INTO LITTLE MALICIOUS. -- BACK INTO LITTLE MILITIAS. I DON'T BELIEVE THE MALACC MALIKI GOVERNMENT... |
| 02:23:38 |
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IF IT FRACTURES, WHAT WOULD BE THE NEXT LIKELY SOCIOLOGICAL THING TO HAPPEN? |
| 02:23:45 |
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MY VIEW IS THAT CERTAIN AREAS WILL BE RELATIVELY STABLE, WHERE YOU HAVE COMMUNITIES THAT ARE HOMOGENOUS.... |
| 02:24:21 |
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BAGHDAD? |
| 02:24:24 |
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I THINK IN BAGHDAD YOU WOULD SEE SUBSTANTIAL FIGHTING, WHICH I THINK WOULD COME TO SOME AND. I THINK... |
| 02:24:38 |
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LED BY? |
| 02:24:39 |
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I DON'T KNOW. IT COULD BE AL-SADR. I PERSONALLY THINK HE'S VERY STRONG. MAYBE NOT AL-SADR HIMSELF,... |
| 02:24:59 |
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THE TWO GENTLEMEN WERE HERE BOTH RESISTED BEING IDENTIFIED AS SHIA OR SUNNI. THEY SAID WE HAVE BEEN... |
| 02:25:23 |
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I THINK EVEN MOST SUNNIS WOULD ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT A SHIA WOULD LEAD THE GOVERNMENT, BUT THEY WOULD... |
| 02:25:40 |
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KIND OF LIKE LEBANON. |
| 02:25:42 |
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SOMETHING LIKE THAT. IN ALL FAIRNESS TO MR. PAUL BREMER, WHEN THE GOVERNING COUNCIL WAS FORMED IN... |
| 02:26:26 |
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WAS A SECTARIAN OR WAS IT FORMERLY POWERFUL IN THE COUNTRY AND, THEREFORE, WE WANT OUR OLD BUDDIES... |
| 02:26:33 |
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IT WAS LARGELY ON SECTARIAN. THEY LOOKED AT THE COMPOSITION OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL AND THEY FELT... |
| 02:26:55 |
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THERE WERE COMPLICITOUS IN THAT? ALL THREE GROUPS? |
| 02:27:01 |
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I BELIEVE SO. |
| 02:27:04 |
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THAT BEGAN TO FALL APART WHEN WHAT HAPPENED? WHAT WAS THE PROCESS BY WHICH THAT DID NOT WORK? |
| 02:27:12 |
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THAT IS THE SITUATION WE HAVE. WE HAVE A SECTARIAN SITUATION. WE'VE HAD THE CIVIL WAR, WE'VE HAD THE... |
| 02:27:41 |
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PETER GALBRAITH HAS BEEN RIDING FOR SOME TIME THAT THIS OUGHT TO BE SPLIT INTO THREE PIECES FOR AND... |
| 02:27:54 |
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MY VIEW HAS BEEN THAT IT IS AN EVOLVING POWER OUT OF BAGHDAD AND GETTING THESE COMMUNITIES TO FOCUS... |
| 02:28:14 |
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WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE ISRAELIS? HOW WOULD THEY LOOKIT THAT POWER-SHARING AGREEMENT? |
| 02:28:21 |
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THE ISRAELIS? |
| 02:28:23 |
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IF IT WERE SPLIT IN THREE? |
| 02:28:26 |
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MY TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS AROUND IS THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT ANYTHING THAT STABILIZES. THE ISRAELI... |
| 02:28:48 |
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WHERE WOULD THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AS IT IS NOW BE IF WE STRUCK THE QUDS TRAINING FOR AND THAT WHOLE... |
| 02:29:03 |
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IT WE ATTACKED? |
| 02:29:05 |
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IF WE ATTACKED THE TERRITORY OF IRAN? |
| 02:29:10 |
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WHAT WE WOULD STRIKE, YOU MEAN? |
| 02:29:12 |
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KNOW, THERE'S BEEN TALK IN THE PAPER ABOUT STRIKING A TRAINING CAMP OF THE QUDS. |
| 02:29:20 |
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OK. I DON'T KNOW WHERE THE CAMP IS. I THINK IT IS SOMEWHERE WEST OF TEHRAN. THERE'S BEEN TALK OF... |
| 02:30:00 |
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IT IS ALL PART OF HIS MOVEMENT? |
| 02:30:05 |
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MAINLY HIS PEOPLE ARE UNDERGOING THE FIGHTING. |
| 02:30:08 |
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IF WE ATTACKED THAT PLACE, WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WE KILLED A THOUSAND TRAINEES? |
| 02:30:15 |
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I DOUBT THAT IT WOULD STOP THE ACTIVITY. AS A SHOW OF STRENGTH TO SHOW THAT WE CONSIDER IT IRAN MIDDLING... |
| 02:30:42 |
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IF THERE'S NO WAY WE CAN DO ANYTHING IN IRAN THAT WOULD STOP THEIR INVOLVEMENT, GET THEM TO KEEP THEIR... |
| 02:30:56 |
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MY VIEW, I WROTE A BOOK ON IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD, SO I BELIEVE I KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT ITS MILITARY... |
| 02:31:04 |
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THAT'S WHAT I'M DRIVING AT. |
| 02:31:06 |
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THEY'RE NOT PARTICULARLY POWERFUL. I HAVE A LITTLE BIT OF A DIFFERENT VIEW ON IRAN. I DO BELIEVE THAT... |
| 02:31:17 |
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SO, YOU THINK THAT IF WE DID THAT, THEY MIGHT STEP BACK? |
| 02:31:24 |
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AND SORRY? |
| 02:31:27 |
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THEY MIGHT STEP BACK FROM MEDDLING IN IRAQ? |
| 02:31:29 |
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THE SUPREME LEADER WAS PRESENT DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. IN THE LATER STAGES WE CAME IN ON THE SIDE... |
| 02:31:51 |
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THANK YOU. THANK YOU, MR. MCDERMOTT. THE REALITY IS WITH THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT IN IRAQ THAT THE ... |
| 02:32:23 |
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I CONCUR COMPLETELY. |
| 02:32:27 |
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SO WHAT WE'VE ACCOMPLISHED WITH THE MILITARY INVASION OF IRAQ IS TO RAISE IRAN TO THE STATUS OF A... |
| 02:33:04 |
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I BELIEVE IRAN HAS MORE INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST NOW THAN AT ANY TIME. I'VE BEEN WATCHING CLOSELY.... |
| 02:33:14 |
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BECAUSE OF AMERICAN ACTION? |
| 02:33:16 |
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PARTLY SO, YES. |
| 02:33:19 |
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THAT WAS A GREAT ACHIEVEMENT ON THE PART OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION. PART OF ITS LEGACY IN TERMS OF... |
| 02:33:40 |
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MR. CHAIRMAN, THANK YOU VERY MUCH. DR. KATZMAN, A MASSAR EM LATE, BUT I WANTED TO PICK UP ON WHAT ... |
| 02:34:21 |
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IN TERMS OF GROUND FORCES, I WOULD SAY NOT. IN TERMS OF MISSILE AND UNCONVENTIONAL FORCE, ABILITY... |
| 02:34:46 |
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-THROUGH SURROGATES. |
| 02:34:47 |
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COMPARED TO THE AIR FORCE SADDAM HAD? |
| 02:34:49 |
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INTERIOR. --INFERIOR TO THE AIR FORCE OF SADDAM. |
| 02:35:02 |
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IF THIS HAPPENED, THAT WE DID GO IN AND HAD SOME TYPE OF AIR STRIKES AGAINST IRAN, IS IT YOUR OPINION... |
| 02:35:38 |
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MY ASSESSMENT IS THAT IF THEY WERE TRYING TO RETALIATE AGAINST US FOR ANY STRIKE, THEIR MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY... |
| 02:35:55 |
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I THINK WE ALL KNOW AND YOU HEARD ME SAY EARLIER, I'M ON THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, OUR TROOPS... |
| 02:37:42 |
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IN MY OPINION THE SCENARIO FOR ENGAGING IRAN WOULD NOT BE THROUGH GROUND ACTION. I GUESS YOU'RE SAYING... |
| 02:37:54 |
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IF THEY DECIDED THAT THEY WERE GOING TO SOMEHOW RETALIATE AND THAT RETALIATION WOULD BE THAT THEY... |
| 02:38:16 |
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I DON'T THINK THAT THEY WOULD HAVE MUCH DESCENT INTO IRAQ BY THE TIME THE U.S. NAVY AND AIR FORCE... |
| 02:38:28 |
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MR. CHAIRMAN, THANK YOU. |
| 02:38:29 |
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I THANK THE GENTLEMAN. WE ENJOY THESE CONVERSATIONS WITH YOU, MR. KATZMAN, SO WE'RE ASKING YOU TO... |
| 02:38:43 |
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I'M NOT ADVOCATING MILITARY-- |
| 02:38:47 |
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I UNDERSTAND THAT. |
| 02:38:49 |
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MY POSITION ON IRAN IS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT THAN IRAQ, THIS IS NO SECRET. KNOWING WHAT I KNOW ABOUT... |
| 02:39:04 |
|
WE APPRECIATE THAT. WHAT I FIND INTERESTING IS THE LACK OF CONSULTATION THAT HAS UNLEASHED A FIRESTORM... |
NOTE: The transcript for this program was compiled from uncorrected Closed Captioning.
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