| 00:00:01 | ASIA. |
| 00:00:02 | BEFORE I GO FURTHER I HAVE TO MAKE THE OBLIGATORY DISCLAIMER THAT ALL THIS JUST INVOLVES MY PERSONAL VIEWS. |
| 00:00:11 | NONE OF THE OFFICIAL POLICY OR ASSESSMENTS OF THE U. |
| 00:00:14 | S. NAVY OR ANY OTHER ELEMENT OF THE U. |
| 00:00:17 | S. GOVERNMENT. |
| 00:00:18 | BUT LET ME HIGHLIGHT A FEW LARGER THEMES THAT I ATTEMPTED TO EXPLORE IN THE CHAPTER AND THE TWO AM PLY FLYING INTERVIEWS THAT GREG WAS SO KIND TO PUT TOGETHER. |
| 00:00:31 | IT WAS A PLEASURE WORKING WITH HIM AS WELL. |
| 00:00:35 | I THINK WHEN WE TRY TO UNDERSTAND WHERE CHINA'S MILITARY IS -- WHAT IT IS AND WHERE IT'S HEADED, THE NAVAL AND AIR FORCES POSE A PARTICULAR CHALLENGE BECAUSE THEY'RE DIVERSE, MANY DIFFERENT TYPES OF SYSTEMS, HOW TO MAKE A LARGER SENSE OF THIS, THIS COLLECTION OF SYSTEMS AND PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITY. |
| 00:01:01 | AND AS I WAS PUTTING TOGETHER AN ORDER OF BATTLE FOR MY CHAPTER BECAUSE I THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE AN 80% OPEN SOURCE SOLUTION ON THAT OTHER RESEARCHERS COULD BUILD ON IN THE FUTURE, I FELT THAT IT FURTHER REINFORCED SOME PATTERNS THAT I'VE BEEN SEEING FOR A LONG TIME. |
| 00:01:22 | NAMELY, THAT CHINA'S DEVELOPING LAYERS OF CAPABILITY, THAT I -- ONE ANALOGY I LIKE TO USE, DROPPING A STONE IN WATER AND HAVING IT RIPPLE OUT AND PROGRESSIVELY LESS INTENSE RINGS OF CAPABILITY AND I THINK ROY DID AN EXCELLENT JOB OF TALKING ABOUT THE GROUND FORCES AND ALSO HOW CENTRAL THAT'S BEEN TO CHINA IN THE PAST DECADES. |
| 00:01:53 | AND IT'S REALLY ONLY BEEN IN MY VIEW, IN MY -- AS I EXPRESSED IN MY CHAPTER SINCE THE 1980s THAT CHINA HAS BEEN ABLE TO FOCUS MORE BEYOND ITS IMMEDIATE HOMELAND INTO -- INTO THE NEAR SEAS AND THE AIR SPACE ABOVE THEM. |
| 00:02:12 | AND I THINK REALLY, THE TERM NEAR SEAS IS USEFUL HERE BECAUSE THE YELLOW SEA, THE EAST CHINA SEA AND SOUTH CHINA SEA ARE INDEED -- CONTAIN ALL OF CHINA'S REMAINING UNRESOLVED MARITIME CLAIMS AS WELL AS THE TERRITORIAL ISLAND RELATED CLAIMS THERE IN. |
| 00:02:33 | IT'S NO SURPRISE THAT CHINA IS FOCUSING INTENSELY IN THIS AREA, AS WHAT I WOULD CALL THE SECOND LAYER AFTER THE CORE HOMELAND DEFENSE CAPABILITIES. |
| 00:02:46 | CHINA IS PURSUING AN APPROACH THAT IS OFTEN REFERRED TO IN CHINESE SOURCES AS COUNTER INTERVENTION, PERHAPS A MORE SPECIFIC TERM WOULD BE ACTIVE STRATEGIC COUNTER ATTACKS ON EXTERIOR LINES. |
| 00:03:00 | THESE TERMS CAN BE INTERPRETED IN A WAY THAT'S MORE NUANCED AND CONTEXT SPECIFIC THAN THE ANTI-ACCESS AERIAL DEPLOYED BY THE U. |
| 00:03:13 | S. MILITARY. |
| 00:03:14 | HOWEVER, I WOULD ARGUE THAT THESE ARE REALLY ESSENTIALLY TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN. |
| 00:03:23 | CHINA FEELS THAT THESE NEAR SEAS AREAS AND APPROACHES ARE SENSITIVE AND WANTS TO HOLD FOREIGN FORCES AT RISK TO TRY TO DISSUADE THEM FROM ENTERING IN THE UNFORTUNATE EVENT OF CONFLICT AND FURTHERMORE IN PEACE TIME TO DETER THEM FROM PURSUING MILLIITARILY INFLUENCED APPROACHES TO EXERT LEVERAGE IN THESE AREAS. |
| 00:03:48 | CHINA IS DEVELOPING A SET OF WEAPON SYSTEMS THAT ARE DESIGNED TO FURTHER THIS SET OF APPROACHES THAT DRAW IN WHAT I CALL PHYSICS BASED LIMITATIONS. |
| 00:04:04 | THE IDEA THAT ALL THINGS BEING EQUAL AND THEY AREN'T ALWAYS EQUAL, BUT TENDS TO BE EASIER TO ATTACK WITH A MISSILE THAN TO DEFEND AGAINST THAT MISSILE. |
| 00:04:13 | I THINK CHINA HAS BEEN FOCUSED AND FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ITS SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES, QUITE INTELLIGENT IN ITS TARGETING OF THESE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS. |
| 00:04:24 | BUT THERE IS A FLIP SIDE TO THIS AND THAT IS, AS CHINA SEEKS TO HAVE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY MUCH BEYOND ITS OWN SHORES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS APPROACH DROPS OFF RAPIDLY FOR CHINA. |
| 00:04:42 | I THINK YOU CAN MAKE A ROUGH ARGUMENT THAT BECAUSE OF, PERHAPS, EARTH'S CURVATURE AND THE PARAMETERS OF MANY AIRBORNE ISR OPERATIONS, YOU TEND TO LOSE LINE OF SIGHT BY AROUND 200 NAUTICAL MILES, IF NOT BEFORE, INTERESTINGLY COINCIDING WITH A POTENTIAL EEZ CLAIM. |
| 00:05:03 | THE RESULT IS THAT THERE IS ONE AREA OF THE NEAR SEAS OR THE THREE SEAS, THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA WHERE LAND-BASED COVERAGE WILL NOT EASILY GET CHINA NECESSARILY THE INFLUENCE THAT IT WANTS IN THAT CRITICAL AREA. |
| 00:05:20 | AND THEN, OF COURSE, GOING MUCH FURTHER BEYOND INTO THE INDIAN OCEAN INTO A THIRD LAYER OR PERHAPS EVEN A FOURTH LAYER OF CAPABILITIES, CHINA VERY CLEARLY BECOMES ACUTELY VULNERABLE TO THE SAME TYPES OF PHYSICS BASED LIMITATIONS THAT IT HAS SO STUDIOUSLY ATTEMPTED TO TARGET IN U. |
| 00:05:39 | S. AND FOREIGN PLATFORMS. |
| 00:05:42 | MY CHAPTER WAS NOT ABLE TO ADDRESS BECAUSE OF NEW THINGS HAPPENING IN CHINA ALL THE TIME, THE SECOND -- AIRCRAFT CORPORATION'S APPARENT WORK ON A J-31 OR F-60 AIRCRAFT PROTOTYPE. |
| 00:05:59 | ALSO THE POTENTIAL EMERGENCE OF A TYPE 052 D AREA AIR DEFENSE DESTROYER AND THE COMMISSIONING OF THEIR AIRCRAFT CARRIER ON 25 SEPTEMBER. |
| 00:06:13 | BUT I STILL MAINTAIN THAT THESE DEVELOPMENTS, HOWEVER EXCITING AND THE SPECIFICS, FIT INTO THIS LARGER RU BRICK THAT I WAS ABLE TO LAY OUT. |
| 00:06:24 | LOOKING FORWARD TO 2020 AND BEYOND, THERE ARE MANY VARIABILITYVAREIABLES HERE. |
| 00:06:32 | IT'S DIFFICULT TO SAY. RESEARCHERS AT THE PLA NAVY STRATEGIC THINK TANK TALK ABOUT BY THAT TIME DEVELOPING A REGIONAL BLUE WATER DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE TYPE NAVY CAPABLE OF A VARIETY OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF MISSIONS. |
| 00:06:47 | I GIVE SPECIFIC IN THE CHAPTER. |
| 00:06:49 | I WONDER IF WHEN CHINA'S MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE DISCUSS POTENTIAL CARRIER CAPABILITIES, THE PHRASE ENHANCING PROTECTION OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES MIGHT NOT FIT INTO THAT. |
| 00:07:01 | BUT THERE WILL BE MANY INDICATORS AS CHINA SEEKS TO MOVE INTO THE FAR SEAS AND THEY WILL BE HIGHLY VISIBLE. |
| 00:07:09 | OF COURSE, THE SOFTWARE IS AS IMPORTANT, IF NOT MORE, THAN THE HARDWARE. |
| 00:07:16 | ORGANIZATIONAL TRAINING PERSONNEL DEVELOPMENT WILL DETERMINE AMONG OTHER THINGS IF, WITH RESPECT TO THE SOPHISTICATED C 4 ISR THAT IS REQUIRED FOR BOTH NEAR SEAS AND FAR SEAS MISSIONS, CHINA WILL BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE THE NECESSARY DATA FUSION OR IF INDEED DATA CONFUSION IS WHAT RESULTS. |
| 00:07:34 | AND THE JURY IS STILL OUT ON THAT ONE. |
| 00:07:40 | ADDITIONAL UNCERTAINTIES CONCERN THE TRAJECTORY OF CHINA'S ECONOMY AND DEMOGRAPHICS. |
| 00:07:45 | I THINK STRAIGHT LINE PROJECTIONS ARE EXTREMELY UNREALISTIC AND I WONDER SOMETIMES IF WE'LL LOOK BACK ON THE 2010 PERIOD AS CHINA'S BIG WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY NOT JUST ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE BUT ALSO IN TERMS OF DOMESTIC FACTORS SUCH AS DEMOGRAPHICS. |
| 00:08:07 | IN CONCLUSION I BELIEVE FROM A U. |
| 00:08:13 | S. POLICY PERSPECTIVE IT'S IMPORTANT TO LOOK AT CHINA'S NAVAL AND AIR FORCE MODERNIZATION THROUGH WHAT I CALL THE LENS OF DISTANCE. |
| 00:08:19 | I THINK THE IMPLICATIONS ARE SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT, DEPENDING ON THE AREA THAT WE EXAMINE. |
| 00:08:26 | UNFORTUNATELY IN THE NEAR SEAS FOR SOME TIME TO COME, I THINK THERE WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF STRATEGIC FRICTION AND COMPETITION, ALTHOUGH IT CAN BE MITIGATED WITH WISE POLICIES AND I HOPE A GOOD DEAL OF SO I THANK YOU VERY MUCH AND IF ANYONE IS IN THE INTERESTED IN THE FUTURE RESEARCH I'M DOING MANY OF YOU MAY BE FAMILIAR WITH MY RESEARCH WEBSITES WWW. |
| 00:09:06 | ANDREW ERICKSONERICKSON. |
| 00:09:07 | COM AND WWW. |
| 00:09:10 | CHINA SIGNPOST.COM. >> THANK YOU. |
| 00:09:15 | >> THANK YOU VERY MUCH. I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO COME AND ADDRESS ONE OF MY FAVORITE TOPICS. |
| 00:09:20 | WHICH IS THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY, SECOND ARTILLERY FORCE. |
| 00:09:26 | IN MY BRIEF REMARKS HERE THIS MORNING I'LL TALK A BIT ABOUT MISSIONS AND DRIVERS FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION FOR THE SECOND ARTILLERY FORCE AND DEFINING WHAT SECOND ARTILLERY IS AND TALK A BIT ABOUT TECHNICAL TRENDS, TECHNOLOGY TRENDS IN CHINA'S EXPANDING CAPACITY FOR LONG RANGE PRECISION STRIKE, TALK ABOUT OPERATIONAL TRENDS IN INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRAINING AND THEN END UP WITH A FEW REMARKS ABOUT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS INTERESTS IN PEACE, STABILITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. |
| 00:10:03 | TO START OFF WITH, SECOND OR TILLERY, SECOND ARTILLERY FORCE, IS CHINA'S PREMIER ORGANIZATION THAT'S EXISTS TO DELIVER FIRE POWER, DIRECTLY TO AN ADVERSARY'S CENTER OF GRAVITY. |
| 00:10:20 | TAKE THE FIGHT, TAKE FIRE POWER, DEEP INSIDE THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER COUNTRY, WHETHER IT'S THE CAPITAL, WHETHER IT'S CERTAIN CRITICAL NODES WITHIN AN ADVERSARY'S MILITARY FORCE. |
| 00:10:34 | IT'S BEEN AROUND FOR QUITE A WHILE. |
| 00:10:36 | THE SECOND ARTILLERY WAS FORMED IN 1960s, FORMED AS PRIMARILY AS CHINA'S NUCLEAR FORCE DELIVERING NUCLEAR -- SHARING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND COUNTER COERCION. |
| 00:10:48 | SINCE EARLY 1990s IT'S EXPANDED AND DIVERSIFIED TO INCLUDE A CONVENTIONAL MISSION. |
| 00:10:55 | THE PRINCIPLE STRATEGIC DRIVER OR FORCE DRIVER PARTICULARLY WITHIN THE SECOND ARTILLERY AND THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY AS A WHOLE IS TAIWAN. |
| 00:11:06 | DESPITE ALL THE ATTENTION THAT SOUTH CHINA SEA AND EAST CHINA SEA GETS TAIWAN REMAINS THE DIRECTION TO SOME EXTENT PERHAPS EVEN AN OBSESSION. |
| 00:11:18 | DOESN'T GET MUCH PRESS THESE DAYS. |
| 00:11:21 | THAT REMAINS THE PRIMARY DRIVER. |
| 00:11:26 | THE SECOND ARTILLERY FORCE MODERNIZATION IS THE PERCEIVED NEED TO HAVE A DETERRENT AND ABILITY TO COUNTER PERCEIVED COERCION THAT NUCLEAR FORCES OF OTHER COUNTRIES COULD POSE TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. |
| 00:11:40 | BUT IT'S ALSO TO BE ABLE TO ENSURE -- IT'S ALSO -- THE FORCE MODERNIZATION TO MEET REQUIREMENTS FOR WHAT THEY PERCEIVE TO BE THREATS TO TERRITORIAL -- TERRITORY AND INSOVEREIGNTY AROUND THE PER RIFFTY, WHETHER TAIWAN OR THE EAST CHINA SEA OR SOUTH CHINA SEA OR OTHER LOCATIONS. |
| 00:12:04 | INCREASINGLY ACCURATE IN BALLISTIC MISSILES AND LAND ATTACK CRUISE MISSILES. |
| 00:12:10 | THEY PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE ABLE TO GO INTO -- GO AGAINST, FOR EXAMPLE, TAIWAN COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM, AIRFIELDS RUNWAYS, NAVAL FACILITIES, NAVAL BASES AS WELL AS AS TIME GOES ON ALSO BE ABLE TO GO AFTER DIRECTLY U. |
| 00:12:25 | S. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND OTHER SHIPS AT SEA AS THEY CONTINUE TO IMPROVE THE TECHNICAL CAPABILITY OF BALLISTIC MISSILES. |
| 00:12:35 | ANOTHER DRIVER IS SIMPLY BECAUSE -- WHY THEY'RE ABLE TO DO THIS BECAUSE TECHNOLOGY IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY AVAILABLE. |
| 00:12:41 | IT'S DIFFICULT TO STOP THE DIFFUSION OF TECHNOLOGY THAT'S GOING ON ON A GLOBAL LEVEL AND PARTICULARLY IN INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY COMMUNICATIONS AREA WHERE THEY'RE ABLE TO LEVERAGE A LOT OF THE MICRO ELECTRONICS TO REDUCE THE SIZE OF PAYLOADS AND INCREASE THE ACCURACY THROUGH TERMINAL GUIDANCE SYSTEMS. |
| 00:13:01 | IN TERMS ON THIS ISSUE ON TECHNICAL TREND, SECOND ARTILLERY IS EXPANDING THE RANGE OF THE MISSILE FORCES, FOCUS MOSTLY ON THE CONVENTIONAL SIDE FROM EARLY 1990s, SAY 1991, UP UNTIL LET'S SAY MAYBE EARLY PART OF -- EARLIER PART OF THIS DECADE, THEIR FOCUS -- ABOUT A RANGE OF 600 KILOMETERS GENERALLY WITH THEIR SHORT-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS. |
| 00:13:27 | AS TIME WENT ON THEY'RE ABLE TO MASTER SOME OF THE CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES TO ENABLE THEM TO PROVIDE A CONVENTIONAL MISSILE TO THEIR MEDIUM-RANGE FORCES. |
| 00:13:36 | PROVIDING A WAY OF DELIVERING FIRE POWER TO A RANGE OF 1,500, 1,700 KILOMETERS WHICH PUTS MUCH OF JAPAN, FOR EXAMPLE, WITHIN THE RANGE AS WELL AS SOUTH CHINA SEA. |
| 00:13:48 | BEFORE ONLY LAND CAPABLE, ONLY CAPABLE OF GOING AFTER LAND TARGETS WITH SOME DEGREE OF PRECISION, DIVERSIFYING THAT TO GO AFTER MOVING TARGETS AT SEA. |
| 00:13:58 | GENERALLY BELIEVE THERE'S SOME OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY AVAILABLE TO THE SECOND ARTILLERY PERHAPS EVEN TODAY. |
| 00:14:07 | BUT BEYOND EXPANDING THE RANGE OF BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES AND AS AN ASIDE, AS TIME GOES ON, LIKELIHOOD OF THEM EXPANDING THE RANGE, YOU KNOW, DELIVERING CONVENTIONAL FIRE POWER TO 3,000 KILOMETERS APPEARS SOMETHING THAT ONE COULD ANTICIPATE. |
| 00:14:26 | ALSO DIVERSIFYING THE DELIVERY PLATFORMS NO LONGER JUST BALLISTIC MISSILES BUT LAND ATTACK CRUISE MISSILES WHICH ARE VERY DIFFICULT TO INTERCEPT AND STOP IN FLIGHT. |
| 00:14:40 | ALSO INTEGRATING COMPLEX MISSILE DEFENSE COUNTER MEASURES MAKING IT DIFFICULT TO INTERCEPT THESE MISSILES IN CERTAIN STAGES OF FLIGHT, WHETHER MID COURSE STAGE OF FLIGHT OR TERMINAL PHASE THROUGH ON BOARD JAMMERS AND A WHOLE RANGE OF OTHER TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES, REDUCING THE RADAR CROSS SECTION, WHICH POSE A SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE TO MISSILE DEFENSES. |
| 00:15:04 | GREETER LETHALITY. |
| 00:15:06 | MUCH MORE VARIETY OF PAYLOADS, CONVENTIONAL PAYLOADS, RUNWAY CREATING MUNITIONS, DEEP BURIED TARGETS, PERHAPS EVEN MORE EXOTIC SOURCE OF FIRE POWER LIKE NOT NECESSARILY NUCLEAR BUT HIGH POWERED MICROWAVE OR OTHER PAYLOADS THAT AS TIME GOES ON IF THEY'RE ABLE TO MASTER SOME OF THE TECHNOLOGIES THAT COULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES FOR ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS ON U. |
| 00:15:32 | S. AND OTHER FACILITIES AROUND THE WORLD. |
| 00:15:34 | SO WITH THAT IN TERMS OF OPERATIONAL TRENDS THE SECOND ARTILLERY OPERATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE HAS GROWN FROM SAY 15 BRIGADES, SORT OF THE BASIC UNIT WITHIN THE SECOND ARTILLERY ONE COULD LAST LOOK AT, 15 BRIGADES IN 1994, UP TO AT LEAST 28 BRIGADES TODAY, 28, 29, 30 BRIGADES. |
| 00:15:57 | JUST DOUBLED IN SIZE SINCE EARLY 1990s. |
| 00:16:02 | THE BULK OF THE EXPANSION AS MENTIONED BEFORE IT'S OPPOSITE TAIWAN UNDER A CORE LEFLG ORGANIZATION THAT'S GENERALLY DEDICATED TOWARD A TAIWAN SCENARIO ALTHOUGH THEY'RE EXPANDING UNITS OUT MORE TOWARD THE WESTERN PART OF -- SOUTHWESTERN PART OF CHINA WHICH COULD BE AVAILABLE FOR SOUTH CHINA SEA COULD TEND TO SEE RATHER -- AGAINST IRAN -- I'M SORRY INDIA OR OTHERS. |
| 00:16:30 | IMPROVE LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES, INCREASINGLY COMPLEX TRAINING, ESPECIALLY JOINT TRAINING WITH THE AIR FORCE, PERHAPS WITH THE NAVY, BUT ALSO OTHER TRENDS INCLUDE INTERCHANGEABLE NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS. |
| 00:16:46 | EXACTLY WHAT UNITS ARE CAPABLE -- WHAT BRIGADES ARE CAPABLE OF HAVING INTERCHANGEABLE NUCLEAR WARHEADS IS NOT CLEAR AND THE ONLY DATA POINT IN THE PARADE WHERE THEY SHOWN THE MISSILE AS BEING DUAL NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL CAPABLE. |
| 00:17:06 | WITH THAT IN TERMS OF OPERATIONAL TRENDS THERE ARE IMPLICATIONS OF U. |
| 00:17:11 | S. INTERESTS. |
| 00:17:12 | IN GENERAL WITH THESE TIPS OF MISSILE CAPABILITIES INCREASINGLY ACCURATE, MEANING LET'S SAY ROUGHLY BEING ABLE TO HIT A TARGET ON LAND, FOR EXAMPLE, AN AIR BASE OR COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITY, BEING ABLE TO HIT WITHIN LET'S SAY AT LEAST 30 METERS, BETWEEN 30 AND PERHAPS 50 METERS IN TERMS OF ACCURACY, IF NOT BETTER WITH LAND ATTACK CRUISE MISSILES, BUT IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BE ABLE TO AT LEAST COMPLICATE U. |
| 00:17:37 | S. ABILITY TO OPERATE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. |
| 00:17:42 | TAIWAN, OF COURSE, IT PROVIDES -- IT PRESENTS SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES FOR TAIWAN TO BE ABLE TO DENY THE PLA AIR FORCE AIR SUPERIORITY WHEN FACED WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES THAT CAN DAMAGE RUNWAYS, FOR EXAMPLE. |
| 00:17:55 | DOESN'T MEAN THAT TAIWAN SHOULDN'T HAVE AN AIR FORCE OR INVEST, BUT IT MAKES IT MORE CHALLENGING TO BE ABLE TO OPERATE FROM AIRFIELDS WHEN YOU HAVE THAT TYPE OF PERSISTENT THREAT OF HAVING BALLISTIC MISSILES COME IN AND DAMAGING THE RUNWAYS. |
| 00:18:12 | ANOTHER CHALLENGE THAT IS, IF TRENDS CONTINUE IN TERMS OF DEVELOPING A FORCE WITH AC CURE VA RASY AND LETHALITY, ONE SHOULD NOT DISMISS THE POSSIBILITY OVER THE NEXT 10, 15 YEARS OF HAVING SORT OF A MIRROR PROGRAM TO U. |
| 00:18:31 | S. GLOBAL STRIKE IN TERMS OF BEING ABLE TO DELIVER CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS OUT TO ICBN, INTERCONTINENTAL RANGES, STRIKE TARGETS WITHIN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES WITH CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS, TARGETS THAT COULD -- IF AFFECTED NEGATIVELY AFFECTED COULD DETRACT FROM THE U. |
| 00:18:50 | S. ABILITY TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS AROUND THE WORLD. |
| 00:18:52 | ANOTHER CHALLENGE NOT DEFINITE, JUST THINGS TO BE ABLE TO WATCH OVER THE NEXT 10 TO 15 YEARS. |
| 00:18:58 | FINALLY, ONE OF THE OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF PLA'S RELIANCE UPON LONG RANGE PRECISION STRIKE ASSETS, BALLISTIC MISSILES, IS IT COULD PROMPT OTHER MILITARIES IN THE REGION TO DEVELOP SIMILAR CAPABILITIES. |
| 00:19:15 | THE MOST EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE WAY OF DISEASE FENDING IS TO -- DEFENDING IS TO -- IT'S NATURAL THE OTHER COUNTRIES AROUND THE REGION WHETHER TAIWAN OR JAPAN, INDIA AND OTHERS, COULD BE DEVELOPING SIMILAR CAPABILITIES. |
| 00:19:31 | FINAL NOTE BEAR IN MIND THAT THE EXPANSION OF THE ARTILLERY TOOK PLACE IN THE WAKE OF THE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCE AGREEMENT OR INF TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FORMER SOVIET UNION. |
| 00:19:46 | SO THEY'RE RI THE LINE UPON BALLISTIC MISSILES AS A CENTRAL PART OF THEIR WAR FIGHTING CAPABILITY TOOK PLACE WITHIN THE VACUUM CREATED BY A TREATY AND THAT'S THE LAST POTENTIAL IMPLICATION IS THAT IT COULD PROMPT MOSCOW OR IN THE FUTURE PERHAPS EVEN A FUTURE ROMNEY OR OBAMA OR BEYOND THAT ADMINISTRATION, TO BE ABLE TO RETHINK COMMITMENTS UNDER THE TREATY GIVEN IT BINDS TWO FORCES WITHOUT BINDING THE REST OF THE WORLD. |
| 00:20:14 | TURN IT BACK OVER TO YOU. |
| 00:20:15 | >> THANK YOU VERY MUCH, MARK. |
| 00:20:17 | KEVIN? >> OKAY. THANK YOU, TRAVIS. |
| 00:20:18 | GOOD MORNING, EVERYBODY. |
| 00:20:19 | I'M HERE TO TALK ABOUT INFORMATION WARFARE, INFORMATION WARFARE IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE IT CROSS CUTS ALL OF THE DIFFERENT CAMPAIGNS THAT WE'VE BEEN TALKING ABOUT, THE LAND, AIR AND SEA AND MISSILE CAMPAIGNS. |
| 00:20:33 | THE CHINESE -- IT'S IMPORTANT BECAUSE THE CHINESE VIEW INFORMATION, THE ABILITY TO USE INFORMATION, THE ABILITY TO DENY INFORMATION TO AN OPPONENT AS THE PRIMARY OR THE FOUNDATIONAL CRITERIA FOR WHETHER YOU WIN OR LOSE ON THE BATTLEFIELD. |
| 00:20:49 | BEFORE I GET TOO MUCH INTO INFORMATION WARFARE LET ME TALK ABOUT THE PLA'S CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS, SORT OF INFORM BETTER OUR DISCUSSION OF INFORMATION WARFARE. |
| 00:20:58 | THE CHINESE ARE LOOKING TO FIGHT A WAR THAT IS THEY CALL IT A QUICK WAR WITH QUICK RESOLUTION. |
| 00:21:03 | THEY HAVE LOOKED AT LET'S SAY THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WAR, THE 1991 OPERATION DESERT STORM, AND THEY HAVE COME TO DETERMINE THAT BATTLES, MODERN BATTLES ARE FOUGHT WITH ONE CAMPAIGN. |
| 00:21:17 | IT'S NOT LIKE WORLD WAR II WHERE YOU HAVE A NORTH AFRICA CAMPAIGN AND AN ITALIAN CAMPAIGN AND THEN A NORTHERN EUROPE CAMPAIGN. |
| 00:21:25 | BECAUSE MODERN BATTLES ARE FOUGHT IN JUST ONE CAMPAIGN IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT YOU SEIZE THE INITIATIVE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE BECAUSE YOU WON'T HAVE A SECOND CHANCE TO GO AHEAD AND TRY TO COUNTER ATTACK AGAINST YOUR ENEMY. |
| 00:21:40 | THIS IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT WHEN YOU FACE A STRONG OPPONENT LIKE THE U. |
| 00:21:44 | S. MILITARY. BECAUSE THE CHINESE HAVE LEARNED FROM THEIR HISTORY IF YOU LET THE U. |
| 00:21:47 | S. MILITARY GET LOCKED AND LOADED ON YOUR BORDER IT'S TOO LATE. |
| 00:21:51 | WE WILL STEAM ROLL OVER YOU. |
| 00:21:52 | SO YOU GOT -- YOU HAVE TO DO SOMETHING BEFORE THE U. |
| 00:21:55 | S. CAN BUILD UP ITS FORCES. |
| 00:21:57 | CONSEQUENTLY WHAT YOU SEE, WHAT IS PREVALENT IN CHINESE MILITARY WRITINGS, IS THE CONCEPT OF GAINING MASSTRY BY STRIKING FIRST WHICH ENCOMPASSES A LOT OF THINGS BUT FOR OUR DISCUSSION HERE ENCOMPASSES PREEMPTION AND SURPRISE ATTACKS BECAUSE WHAT YOU SEE IS THAT RECOGNITION YOU CAN'T LET A SUPERIOR FORCE GET BUILT UP TOO MUCH. |
| 00:22:17 | YOU HAVE TO STRIKE THEM EARLY, PERHAPS EVEN IN THE BUILD UP STAGE WHILE THE ENEMY IS UNPREPARED. |
| 00:22:25 | SO HOW DOES THIS RELATE TO INFORMATION WARFARE? |
| 00:22:27 | WHAT KIND OF TARGETS IS CHINA TALKING ABOUT WHEN THEY'RE WANTING TO CONDUCT THESE FIRST STRIKES? |
| 00:22:35 | THEY ARE LOOKING AT THINGS THAT THEY CALL VITAL TARGETS. |
| 00:22:38 | OTHERWISE KNOWN AS CENTERS OF GRAVITY. |
| 00:22:40 | AND THESE ARE TARGETS THAT COULD HAVE AN OVERALL IMPACT ON THE OVERALL SITUATION ON THE OVERALL BATTLE BATTLEFIELD SITUATION. |
| 00:22:49 | ATTACKING VITAL TARGETS IS ESPECIALLY RECOMMENDED IN CASES WHERE THE PLA FACES A, QUOTE, POWERFUL ENEMY EQUIPPED WITH HIGH TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT. |
| 00:22:57 | OKAY. |
| 00:23:00 | READ THE U.S. MILITARY. |
| 00:23:01 | THEY ALSO SAY VITAL TARGETS ARE THOSE INVOLVED IN COLLECTING AND PROCESSING INFORMATION. |
| 00:23:06 | OKAY. C 4 ISR SYSTEMS ARE THE D ARE THESE VITAL TARGETS. |
| 00:23:11 | THESE ARE THE ONES THAT THEY NEED TO STRIKE FIRST. |
| 00:23:15 | CONSEQUENTLY, INFORMATION SUPERIORITY IS NOW SEEN AS THE MAIN DETERMINER OF SUCCESS ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND, INDEED, THE PLA IS NOW TASKED WITH WINNING LOCAL WARS UNDER CONDITIONS OF INFORMATIONIZATION. |
| 00:23:27 | SO THAT PLA IS NOW CHARGED WITH SEIZING INFORMATION SUPERIORITY, DEFINED AS THE ABILITY TO FREELY USE INFORMATION AND TO DENY THE USE OF INFORMATION TO YOUR OPPONENT. |
| 00:23:39 | AND THIS IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE THEY VIEW NOW THAT THE ABILITY, THE SPEED WITH WHICH AND MILITARY IS ABLE TO MAKE DECISIONS IS THE FOUNDATIONAL FACTOR IN WHY A MILITARY IS SUCCESSFUL ON THE BATTLEFIELD. |
| 00:23:54 | THERE ARE TWO WAYS. |
| 00:23:56 | ONE, YOU CAN IMPROEFBL YOUR OWN DECISION MAKING ABILITY SPEED THROUGH BETTER C 4 ISR SYSTEM. |
| 00:24:01 | THE OTHER WAY TO DENY THOSE ABILITIES TO YOUR OPPONENT. |
| 00:24:04 | AND WE ACTUALLY SEE THAT HAPPENING NOW, BOTH IN CHINESE DOCTRINE AND IN TECHNOLOGY. |
| 00:24:12 | INFORMATION SUPERIORITY DOES NOT HAVE TO BE ACHIEVED ACROSS ALL BATTLEFIELDS FOR ALL TIME. |
| 00:24:17 | YOU SEE CHINESE WRITINGS THEY ARE SAYING THAT INFORMATION SUPERIORITY CAN BE ACHIEVED LOCALLY IN A CERTAIN PLACE, AS WELL AS IN A CERTAIN TIME. |
| 00:24:25 | SO WHAT YOU'RE SEEING HERE IS WHAT THEY'RE TALKING ABOUT IS STRIKING SPECIFIC C 4 ISR NOTES THAT OPENS UP A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY THAT FOLLOW ON FORCES CAN THEN EXPLOIT TO ACHIEVE A DECISIVE ADVANTAGE IN THE BATTLE. |
| 00:24:41 | THE GOAL HERE IS TO PARALYZE NOT TO ANNIHILATE THE ENEMY. |
| 00:24:45 | THEY'RE NOT OUT TO DESTROY EVERY FIGHTER PLANE OR SINK EVERY SHIP. |
| 00:24:51 | THEY'RE HEAR TO MAKE THE ENEMY DEAF, DUMB AND BLIND. |
| 00:24:54 | TAKE OUT COMMUNICATIONS AND ISR. |
| 00:24:57 | SPACE, CYBER AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE ARE ALL SUBSETS OF INFORMATION WARFARE. |
| 00:25:05 | LET ME TALK ABOUT SPACE FIRST. |
| 00:25:08 | JUST ABOUT, YOU KNOW, EVERY BOOK OR JOURNAL ARTICLE THAT YOU READ ON SPACE WARFARE GYPS WITH THE LINE, WHOEVER CONTROLS SPACE CONTROLS THE EARTH. |
| 00:25:17 | WHY DO THEY SAY THIS? |
| 00:25:18 | THEY SAY THIS BECAUSE THEY'RE LOOKING AT THE WAY THAT THE U. |
| 00:25:21 | S. MILITARY HAS FOUGHT ITS WARS AND ITS RELIANCE ON SPACE. |
| 00:25:25 | CHINESE AUTHORS STATE THAT THE U. |
| 00:25:27 | S. DEPENDS FOR 80% OF IT CHANCECATIONS ON COMMUNICATION SATELLITES, DEPENDS FOR 80 TO 90% OF INTELLIGENCE ON SPACE BASED ISR. |
| 00:25:39 | THEY SEE THE GREAT BENEFIT THE U. |
| 00:25:41 | S. MILITARY HAS DERIVED FROM SPACE AND AS THEY'RE THINKING ABOUT GOING FARER FROM THEIR SHORES INTO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, GULF OF ADEN, THEY SEE HOW SPACE CAN PLAY A VITAL PART IN IMPROVING THEIR OPERATIONS AND POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITIES. |
| 00:25:56 | HOWEVER, WHEN THEY SEE THAT U. |
| 00:25:58 | S. MILITARY RELIES SO MUCH ON SPACE THEY VIEW IT AS AN ACHILLES HEEL, SOMETHING YOU CAN STRIKE AND ACHIEVE GREAT EFFECTS WITH. |
| 00:26:05 | THEREFORE, THAT'S WHAT YOU SEE WHEN LET'S SAY WE SEE THE TEST WHERE THEY LAUNCHED A DIRECT CONNECT TO KILL VEHICLE TO DESTROY ONE OF THEIR WEATHER AGING SATELLITES. |
| 00:26:18 | TALK ABOUT CYBER. |
| 00:26:19 | CYBER IS THE MOST PERNICIOUS THREAT. |
| 00:26:22 | SEEMS LIKE NOT A WEEK GOES BY WE DON'T HEAR OF SOME MILITARY, GOVERNMENT, OR COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATION GETTING HACKED INTO BY THE CHINESE. |
| 00:26:31 | THE CHINESE VIEW CYBER WARFARE, HACKING INTO COMPUTERS, COMPUTER WARFARE, AS CENTRAL TO INFORMATION WARFARE. |
| 00:26:39 | WHY? BECAUSE COMPUTERS ARE UBIQUITOUS. |
| 00:26:41 | THEY'RE EVERYWHERE, AND THEY ARE CENTRAL TO ALL INFORMATION SYSTEMS. |
| 00:26:46 | FOR THE CHINESE, CYBER HAS SOME PRETTY GOOD ADVANTAGES. |
| 00:26:51 | FIRST IT'S LOW COST. |
| 00:26:52 | IT'S NOT AN EXPENSIVE AS AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER OR FIGHTER PLANE. |
| 00:26:56 | IT HAS RAPID EFFECTS. |
| 00:26:58 | VIRUSES CAN SPREAD THROUGHOUT AN INFORMATION SYSTEM QUICKLY AND BE COVERT. |
| 00:27:02 | YOU CAN'T -- IT'S DIFFICULT TO ATTRIBUTE AN ATTACK TO ANY ONE INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP. |
| 00:27:08 | ALSO, CHINESE WRITERS OFTEN STATE THAT CYBER ATTACKS CAN POSSESS THE SAME DESTRUCTIVE ABILITY AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS. |
| 00:27:17 | FINALLY, CYBER ALLOWS CHINA A POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITY WHERE THEY LACK IN OTHER FIELDS. |
| 00:27:23 | THEY CAN REACH OUT AND TOUCH THAT ADVERSARY ACROSS THE OCEAN WHERE THEY CAN'T DO THAT WITH THEIR OTHER WEAPON SYSTEMS. |
| 00:27:30 | WHAT KIND OF TARGETS ARE THEY TALKING ABOUT IN THE CYBER REALLY REALM? |
| 00:27:36 | COMMAND AND CONTROL TARGETS, RADAR SYSTEMS, COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, BUT NOT LIMITED TO MILITARY TARGETS. |
| 00:27:42 | THEY ALSO TALK ABOUT HITTING CIVILIAN TARGETS, SUCH AS POWER STATIONS, FINANCIAL CENTERS AND TRANSPORTATION NOTES. |
| 00:27:51 | OF COURSE THE FINAL ELEMENT HERE OF INFORMATION WARFARE IS ELECTRONIC WARFARE. |
| 00:27:56 | CHINA IS VERY INTERESTED IN JAMMING COMMUNICATIONS AND JAMMING RADAR SIGNALS OR SPOOFING RADAR SIGNALS. |
| 00:28:05 | WE'VE SEEN HERE AS IN SPACE AND CYBER, AN INCREASE IN THEIR CAPABILITIES IN THESE AREAS. |
| 00:28:10 | SO WHAT ARE THE TAKE AYEWAYS? |
| 00:28:13 | OVER THE LONG TERM, ANY POTENTIAL ADVERSARY OF CHINA MUST BE PREPARED FOR STRONG STRIKES AGAINST ITS C 4 ISR SYSTEMS AT THE BEGINNING OF A CAMPAIGN. |
| 00:28:25 | OR EVEN BEFORE. |
| 00:28:27 | WHEN THAT ADVERSARY IS BUILDING UP ITS FORCES OR PREPARING FOR A CAMPAIGN. |
| 00:28:33 | THIS IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT FOR THE U. |
| 00:28:35 | S. MILITARY. |
| 00:28:36 | BECAUSE AS I'VE STATED BEFORE, THE CHINESE MILITARY KNOWS YOU CAN'T LET THE U. |
| 00:28:42 | S. MILITARY GET BUILT UP AND GET READY TO STRIKE BECAUSE WE'RE JUST TOO POWERFUL. |
| 00:28:46 | SO THEY HAVE TO HIT US EARLY, PERHAPS EVEN WHEN WE'RE IN THE BUILDUP PHASE. |
| 00:28:52 | THIS PLACES A PREMIUM ON US TO BE ABLE TO HAVE GOOD DEFENSES FOR OUR C 4 ISR SYSTEMS. |
| 00:29:00 | BECAUSE WE HAVE TO BE ABLE TO WITHSTAND THAT FIRST STRONG STRIKE BY THE PLA. |
| 00:29:07 | HOWEVER, IN INFORMATION WARFARE OFFENSE IS SUPERIOR. |
| 00:29:12 | DEFENSE IS INFERIOR. |
| 00:29:13 | WE HAVE TO BE PREPARED FOR SOME SORT OF LOSSES. |
| 00:29:16 | AND IN THAT CASE WE NEED TO THINK ABOUT WHAT DO WE DO IF WE LOSE SPACE ASSETS? |
| 00:29:21 | WHAT DO WE DO IF WE DO LOSE SOME COMPUTER CAPABILITIES? |
| 00:29:25 | YOU KNOW, WHAT IS A PLAN B? |
| 00:29:27 | DO WE KNOW HOW TO OPERATE WITHOUT CERTAIN SPACE ASSETS OR COMPUTER SYSTEMS? |
| 00:29:33 | AND, OF COURSE, THE BACKDROP OF THIS IS HOW DO WE MANAGE ALL THIS IN A TIME OF BUDGET AUSTERITY. |
| 00:29:40 | WE HAVE -- WE RELY RIGHT NOW IN MANY AREAS ON A FEW HIGHLY VALUABLE, BUT LOW NUMBER OF SYSTEMS THAT ARE VERY CAPABLE. |
| 00:29:50 | WHAT DO WE DO IF WE LOSE THOSE SYSTEMS. |
| 00:29:54 | CONSEQUENTLY, HOW TO CONDUCT INFORMATION WARFARE IN AN AGE OF BUDGET AUSTERITY IS CENTRAL TO THE QUESTION OF HOW WE RESPOND TO CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION. |
| 00:30:06 | >> GREAT, THANK YOU, KEVIN AND TO ALL OUR PANELS FOR THE TERRIFIC PRESENTATIONS. |
| 00:30:10 | WE'RE GOING TO HAVE A FEW MINUTES NOW FOR QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR. |
| 00:30:13 | IF YOU WOULD PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATION WHEN YOU RAISE YOUR QUESTION THAT WOULD BE GREAT. |
| 00:30:22 | >> CHRIS. |
| 00:30:23 | >> THANKS SO MUCH. |
| 00:30:24 | CHRIS NELSON, WONDERFUL DISCUSSIONS. |
| 00:30:26 | I HAD A BROAD QUESTION AND THEN A SPECIFIC ONE TO ROY KAMPHAUSEN, ON NORTH KOREA, FASCINATING YOUR POINT THAT THE PLA IS PREPARING FOR UNILATERAL INTERVENTION IN A COLLAPSE SCENARIO. |
| 00:30:42 | COULD YOU FILL THAT OUT A LITTLE BIT MORE? |
| 00:30:44 | IS THERE ANY SENSE OF -- ARE WE TALKING BORDER CONTROL OR HEADING STRAIGHT FOR PYONGYANG? |
| 00:30:51 | IS THERE ANY SENSE OF THEIR AWARENESS SENSE OF THE AWARENESS TO AT LEAST TALK TO US ABOUT IT IF NOT COORDINATE? |
| 00:30:59 | WHAT DO WE DO IF THE PLACE FALLS APART. |
| 00:31:03 | SO THAT'S MY QUESTION TO ROY. |
| 00:31:05 | THE BROADER QUESTION, AND I WOULD HAVE ASKED THIS OF THE SECRETARY, AS WE DESCRIBE WHAT WE'RE GOING TO HAVE TO DO BECAUSE OF WHAT THEY'RE DOING, WE'RE REALLY DESCRIBING AN ENORMOUS ARM'S RACE, WHICH BUILDS IN RESPONSE, COUNTERRESPONSE AND YET WE ALL RUN INTO THE BUDGET THING. |
| 00:31:27 | IS IT NAIVE TO BE THINKING OF CAN WE DEAL WITH ALL THIS WITHOUT A BUILT IN ARM'S RACE AND ALL THAT THAT IMPLIES? |
| 00:31:39 | >> I ACTUALLY THOUGHT CHRISTIAN MIGHT ASK THAT QUESTION. |
| 00:31:43 | AND I FLUSH IT OUT SOMEWHAT IN THE CHAPTER. |
| 00:31:46 | IT'S IMPORTANT TO HEAR WHAT I'M NOT SAYING AS WELL AS WHAT I'M SAYING. |
| 00:31:49 | THE EVIDENCE, IN MY VIEW, SUPPORTS THE JUDGMENT THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO OPERATE UNILATERALLY. |
| 00:31:57 | WE HAVE VERY LITTLE EVIDENCE OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE FORCES OF THE MILITARY REGION AND THE PEOPLE'S ARMY. |
| 00:32:07 | THERE MIGHT BE SOME IN THE CLASSIFIED DOMAIN, BUT THE OPEN SOURCE, PRECIOUS LITTLE EVIDENCE OF THAT. |
| 00:32:10 | SECOND, THE CONTENT THAT WE SEE IS LARGELY AT SENIOR LEVELS AND THAT IS LARGELY OF A POLITICAL NATURE. |
| 00:32:18 | NOT EXCLUSIVELY, BUT LARGELY, SUGGEST ING SUGGESTING THAT THAT IS AN ELEMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP THAT'S, PERHAPS, MORE IMPORTANT TO THE TWO PARTIES. |
| 00:32:29 | AND THEN THE THIRD, THE EVIDENCE THAT WE HAVE FROM EXERCISES IS VERY LIMITED AND NONEXISTENT WHEN IT COMES TO THE TWO FORCES OPERATING TOGETHER. |
| 00:32:39 | AND FINALLY, THE PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR THAT WE HAVE SEEN IN THE PAST, WHETHER ACCURATELY REPORTED OR NOT BY MEDIA, IS OF UNILATERAL STEPS TAKEN BY THE CHINESE BORDER SECURITY FORCES OR MILITARY. |
| 00:32:51 | THAT ARE THOSE OCCASIONS WHEN WE HAVE SEEN THAT THE BORDER HAS BEEN QUOTE, UNQUOTE, CLOSED. |
| 00:32:58 | WE HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOURCING FOR THAT IS LIMITED TO THOSE THAT WANT TO PRESENT A PARTICULAR JUDGMENT OR MESSAGE. |
| 00:33:08 | BUT IT ALSO IS VERY LIMITED IN WHAT IT'S COMPLETELY UNCOLLABORATIVE. |
| 00:33:12 | SO MY CONCLUSION, THEY ARE PREPARING TO OPERATE. |
| 00:33:15 | BEYOND THAT, IT'S HIGHLY SPECULATIVE. |
| 00:33:18 | I TALK ABOUT THE WAYS THEY MIGHT THINK ABOUT IT, BUT YOU HAVE A RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES ON ONE EXTREME MOVING FORCES INTO NORTH KOREA AND ESSENTIALLY SETTING UP A BUFFER ZONE TO A VERY MORE LIMITED OPTION WHICH IS TO DEFEND CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AT THE BORDER ITSELF. |
| 00:33:44 | THE THIRD PART, ARE WE TALKING? |
| 00:33:46 | WE HOPEFULLY ARE, BUT THERE'S NOT MUCH EVIDENCE ABOUT THAT. |
| 00:33:52 | THE CONCERN FROM THE CHOOI NAEZ PERSPECTIVE, IF IT LEAKS, IT APPEARS THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY MOVED ON TO AN END GAME THAT DESTABILIZES THEIR PARTNER. |
| 00:34:07 | BUT A GRAVE CONCERN, I THINK WE OUGHT TO BE WORRIED ABOUT, IS IN THE CASE OF A SUDDEN COLLAPSE OR A SUDDEN SCENARIO, IF YOU WILL, THERE ARE STRATEGIC SITES WITHIN NORTH KOREA THAT IT'S IN THE INTEREST OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES EACH TO SECURE AND THE WORRY IS THEY WOULD PURSUE THOSE SECURING MISSIONS IN AN UNCOORDINATED FASHION. |
| 00:34:34 | THAT'S PRETTY CONCERNING. |
| 00:34:35 | >> TAKE ONE OF OUR QUESTIONS FROM OUR AUDIENCE MEMBERS IN THE OVERFLOW AREA. |
| 00:34:41 | AND JUST ASK THE AUTHORS IF YOU WANT TO RESPOND, WE'LL TAKE TWO QUICK RESPONSES. |
| 00:34:47 | SHE ASKS, TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS WILL INFLUENCE MODERNIZATION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE LAND FORCES IN THE FUTURE? |
| 00:35:07 | >> I THINK IT WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE DEGREE TO WHICH CHINA IS ACCEPTED IN AN INTERNATIONAL SETTING. |
| 00:35:12 | BUT I DON'T SEE IT AS A DRIVER FOR MODERNIZATION EXCEPT IN THE SUPPORTING OTHER TYPES OF DIMENSIONS THAT WOULD ENABLE A FORCE TO DEPLOY. |
| 00:35:26 | >> DID YOU WANT TO COMMENT ON ABLE FORCES AT ALL? |
| 00:35:31 | >> I CERTAINLY THINK THE NAVY IS LEARNING A LOT IN THE GULF. |
| 00:35:37 | AND I THINK IT'S MAKING A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION. |
| 00:35:41 | THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW CHINA CAN RECEIVE MORE RECOGNITION BUT I THINK THE PLA NAVY AND THE CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP IS VERY FOCUSED ON CHINA'S SPECIFIC STRATEGIC GOALS AND I DON'T THINK IT WILL GET DIVERTED FROM THAT. |
| 00:36:00 | ONE AREA TO WATCH IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH CHINA'S NAVY AND AIR FORCE AS WELL WILL MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF. |
| 00:36:14 | THERE ARE SOMETIMES SOME POSITIVE MURMURINGS, I THINK, FROM CHINESE POLICYMAKERS, BUT I HAVE YET TO SEE THE PROOF THAT THE SERVICES ARE INTERESTED IN REALLY FOCUSING ON THAT. |
| 00:36:31 | I DON'T SEE A HUGE IMPACT HERE. |
| 00:36:34 | CERTAINLY NO DISTRACTION FROM THE AREAS OF CENTRAL FOCUS. |
| 00:36:36 | >> THANK YOU VERY MUCH. |
| 00:36:38 | WE'RE GOING TO BREAK RIGHT NOW FOR A SHORT COFFEE BREAK. |
| 00:36:44 | SO REFILL YOUR COFFEE. |
| 00:36:45 | I WOULD ASK THAT YOU'LL PROMPTLY RETURN. |
| 00:36:48 | WE'RE GOING TO START THE SECOND PANEL RIGHT AT 11:05. |
| 00:36:58 | SO IF YOU CAN JOIN ME IN THANKING THE PANELISTS. |
| 00:37:02 | [ APPLAUSE ] |
| 00:41:05 | >>> TONIGHT |
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